From: Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Jeremy Kerr <jk@ozlabs.org>,
Matthew Garret <matthew.garret@nebula.com>,
Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] Enabling secure boot on PowerNV systems
Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 18:11:44 -0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4ce5e057-0702-b0d5-7bb2-cea5b22e2efa@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACdnJuumhkqTb4+1=QBiLmbW4xd3wW=MZu6Tj_KdaoTMhCN+Tg@mail.gmail.com>
On 4/2/19 4:36 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 11:15 AM Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
>> 1. Enable efivarfs by selecting CONFIG_EFI in the CONFIG_OPAL_SECVAR
>> introduced in this patch set. With CONFIG_EFIVAR_FS, userspace tools can
>> be used to manage the secure variables.
> efivarfs has some pretty significant behavioural semantics that
> directly reflect the EFI specification. Using it to expose non-EFI
> variable data feels like it's going to increase fragility - there's a
> risk that we'll change things in a way that makes sense for the EFI
> spec but breaks your use case. Is the desire to use efivarfs to
> maintain consistency with existing userland tooling, or just to avoid
> having a separate filesystem?
>
We want to use the efivarfs for compatibility with existing userspace
tools. We will track and match any EFI changes that affect us.
Our use case is restricted to secure boot - this is not going to be a
general purpose EFI variable implementation.
Claudio
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-04-02 21:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-04-02 18:15 [PATCH 0/4] Enabling secure boot on PowerNV systems Claudio Carvalho
2019-04-02 18:15 ` [PATCH 1/4] powerpc/include: Override unneeded early ioremap functions Claudio Carvalho
2019-04-02 18:15 ` [PATCH 2/4] powerpc/powernv: Add support for OPAL secure variables Claudio Carvalho
2019-04-02 18:15 ` [PATCH 3/4] powerpc/powernv: Detect the secure boot mode of the system Claudio Carvalho
2019-04-02 18:15 ` [PATCH 4/4] powerpc: Add support to initialize ima policy rules Claudio Carvalho
2019-04-02 19:36 ` [PATCH 0/4] Enabling secure boot on PowerNV systems Matthew Garrett
2019-04-02 21:11 ` Claudio Carvalho [this message]
2019-04-02 21:51 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-04-02 23:31 ` Claudio Carvalho
2019-04-03 22:27 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-04-05 21:11 ` Claudio Carvalho
2019-04-05 22:19 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-04-09 22:55 ` Claudio Carvalho
2019-04-10 17:36 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-05-10 21:31 ` Claudio Carvalho
2019-05-13 22:06 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-04-03 13:21 ` Michael Ellerman
2019-04-03 21:48 ` Claudio Carvalho
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