From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>,
linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 7/8] ima: support fs-verity file digest based version 3 signatures
Date: Tue, 01 Feb 2022 12:03:14 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <51d294703f69ab05252c85437be668e25bab08f3.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YfiHrMU5tOsg5DMi@sol.localdomain>
On Mon, 2022-01-31 at 17:06 -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 25, 2022 at 07:06:57PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > Instead of calculating a file hash and verifying the signature stored
> > in the security.ima xattr against the calculated file hash, verify
> > fs-verity's signature (version 3).
> >
> > To differentiate between a regular file hash and an fs-verity file digest
> > based signature stored as security.ima xattr, define a new signature type
> > named IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG.
> >
> > Update the 'ima-sig' template field to display the new fs-verity signature
> > type as well.
> >
> > For example:
> > appraise func=BPRM_CHECK digest_type=hash|verity
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> > ---
> > Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 10 +++++
> > Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst | 4 +-
> > security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
> > security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 3 +-
> > security/integrity/integrity.h | 5 ++-
> > 5 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> All this IMA-specific stuff is confusing to me, so let me ask a question about
> what the end result actually is. Let's say I want to use IMA to authenticate
> ("appraise") a file. I've signed its fs-verity digest with a key. I put only
> that one key in the IMA keyring, and that key was only ever used to sign that
> one fs-verity digest. Can an attacker (who controls the file's contents and IMA
> xattr) replace the file with one with a different contents and still pass the
> IMA check? For example, could they replace the file's contents with the
> ima_file_id of the authentic file, and then downgrade the signature version to
> v2? If they can do that, then the goal of authentication wasn't met. It might
> be necessary to enforce that only one signature version is used at a time, to
> avoid this kind of ambiguity.
Instead of only allowing a single signature version, the signature
verification could be based on policy rules. "ima: include fsverity's
file digests in the IMA measurement list" defines the new policy rule
'digest_type=' option, which currently permits either IMA or fsverity
signatures to match. Instead only allow IMA or fsverity signatures,
not both, on a per policy rule basis.
From an IMA perspective, this would be safe since the builtin policies
do not support fs-verity signatures. After loading a custom policy,
additional rules can only extend the custom policy.
thanks,
Mimi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-02-01 17:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-01-26 0:06 [PATCH v3 0/8] ima: support fs-verity digests and signatures Mimi Zohar
2022-01-26 0:06 ` [PATCH v3 1/8] ima: rename IMA_ACTION_FLAGS to IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS Mimi Zohar
2022-01-26 0:06 ` [PATCH v3 2/8] ima: define ima_max_digest_data struct without a flexible array variable Mimi Zohar
2022-01-26 0:06 ` [PATCH v3 3/8] fs-verity: define a function to return the integrity protected file digest Mimi Zohar
2022-02-01 0:44 ` Eric Biggers
2022-01-26 0:06 ` [PATCH v3 4/8] ima: define a new template field 'd-type' and a new template 'ima-ngv2' Mimi Zohar
2022-01-26 0:06 ` [PATCH v3 5/8] ima: include fsverity's file digests in the IMA measurement list Mimi Zohar
2022-02-01 0:56 ` Eric Biggers
2022-01-26 0:06 ` [PATCH v3 6/8] ima: define signature version 3 Mimi Zohar
2022-01-26 0:06 ` [PATCH v3 7/8] ima: support fs-verity file digest based version 3 signatures Mimi Zohar
2022-02-01 1:06 ` Eric Biggers
2022-02-01 17:03 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2022-01-26 0:06 ` [PATCH v3 8/8] fsverity: update the documentation Mimi Zohar
2022-02-01 0:36 ` [PATCH v3 0/8] ima: support fs-verity digests and signatures Eric Biggers
2022-02-01 19:20 ` Mimi Zohar
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