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From: Nayna <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>,
	linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Jeremy Kerr <jk@ozlabs.org>,
	Matthew Garret <matthew.garret@nebula.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com>,
	George Wilson <gcwilson@linux.ibm.com>,
	Elaine Palmer <erpalmer@us.ibm.com>,
	Eric Ricther <erichte@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Oliver O'Halloran" <oohall@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 4/8] powerpc/ima: add measurement rules to ima arch specific policy
Date: Sat, 19 Oct 2019 14:27:07 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <6f1d20dc-fb1e-58ed-a060-1537c19beed0@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8736fuuu0x.fsf@mpe.ellerman.id.au>

Hi Michael,


On 10/15/2019 07:29 AM, Michael Ellerman wrote:
> Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> writes:
>> This patch adds the measurement rules to the arch specific policies on
>> trusted boot enabled systems.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
>> ---
>>   arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
>>   1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
>> index c22d82965eb4..88bfe4a1a9a5 100644
>> --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
>> @@ -12,8 +12,19 @@ bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
>>   	return is_powerpc_os_secureboot_enabled();
>>   }
>>   
>> -/* Defines IMA appraise rules for secureboot */
>> +/*
>> + * The "arch_rules" contains both the securebot and trustedboot rules for adding
>> + * the kexec kernel image and kernel modules file hashes to the IMA measurement
>> + * list and verifying the file signatures against known good values.
>> + *
>> + * The "appraise_type=imasig|modsig" option allows the good signature to be
>> + * stored as an xattr or as an appended signature. The "template=ima-modsig"
>> + * option includes the appended signature, when available, in the IMA
>> + * measurement list.
>> + */
>>   static const char *const arch_rules[] = {
>> +	"measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK template=ima-modsig",
>> +	"measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig",
>>   	"appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
>>   #if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE)
>>   	"appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
>> @@ -22,12 +33,40 @@ static const char *const arch_rules[] = {
>>   };
>>   
>>   /*
>> - * Returns the relevant IMA arch policies based on the system secureboot state.
>> + * The "measure_rules" are enabled only on "trustedboot" enabled systems.
>> + * These rules add the kexec kernel image and kernel modules file hashes to
>> + * the IMA measurement list.
>> + */
>> +static const char *const measure_rules[] = {
>> +	"measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK",
>> +	"measure func=MODULE_CHECK",
> Why do these ones not have "template=ima-modsig" on the end?

ima-modsig template is applicable only when IMA "collects" the appended 
signatures. IMA can then include it in the measurement list.

>
>> +	NULL
>> +};
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Returns the relevant IMA arch policies based on the system secureboot
>> + * and trustedboot state.
>>    */
>>   const char *const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
>>   {
>> -	if (is_powerpc_os_secureboot_enabled())
>> +	const char *const *rules;
>> +	int offset = 0;
>> +
>> +	for (rules = arch_rules; *rules != NULL; rules++) {
>> +		if (strncmp(*rules, "appraise", 8) == 0)
>> +			break;
>> +		offset++;
>> +	}
> This seems like kind of a hack, doesn't it? :)
>
> What we really want is three sets of rules isn't it? But some of them
> are shared between the different sets. But they just have to be flat
> arrays of strings.
>
> I think it would probably be cleaner to just use a #define for the
> shared part of the rules, eg something like:
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
> #define APPRAISE_MODULE
> #else
> #define APPRAISE_MODULE \
> 	"appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
> #endif
>
> #define APPRAISE_KERNEL \
> 	"appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist appraise_type=imasig|modsig"
>
> #define MEASURE_KERNEL \
> 	"measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK"
>
> #define MEASURE_MODULE \
> 	"measure func=MODULE_CHECK"
>
> #define APPEND_TEMPLATE_IMA_MODSIG		\
> 	" template=ima-modsig"
>
> static const char *const secure_and_trusted_rules[] = {
> 	MEASURE_KERNEL APPEND_TEMPLATE_IMA_MODSIG,
> 	MEASURE_MODULE APPEND_TEMPLATE_IMA_MODSIG,
> 	APPRAISE_KERNEL,
> 	APPRAISE_MODULE
> 	NULL
> };
>
> static const char *const secure_rules[] = {
> 	APPRAISE_KERNEL,
> 	APPRAISE_MODULE
> 	NULL
> };
>
> static const char *const trusted_rules[] = {
> 	MEASURE_KERNEL,
> 	MEASURE_MODULE,
> 	NULL
> };

Yes, I agree it is sort of a hack to walk through the rules to find the 
start of the appraise policy.  While trying your suggestion, I realized 
that defining three arrays, with some rule duplication, can fix the hack 
without #defines. This also improves readability of the rules. I have 
just now posted the new version with the changes. Please let me know if 
this looks ok.

Thanks & Regards,
      - Nayna


  reply	other threads:[~2019-10-19 18:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-10-08  1:14 [PATCH v7 0/8] powerpc: Enabling IMA arch specific secure boot policies Nayna Jain
2019-10-08  1:14 ` [PATCH v7 1/8] powerpc: detect the secure boot mode of the system Nayna Jain
2019-10-15 11:30   ` Michael Ellerman
2019-10-08  1:14 ` [PATCH v7 2/8] powerpc: add support to initialize ima policy rules Nayna Jain
2019-10-11 13:12   ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-15  9:59     ` Michael Ellerman
2019-10-15 11:29   ` Michael Ellerman
2019-10-17 12:58     ` Nayna
2019-10-08  1:14 ` [PATCH v7 3/8] powerpc: detect the trusted boot state of the system Nayna Jain
2019-10-15 10:23   ` Michael Ellerman
2019-10-08  1:14 ` [PATCH v7 4/8] powerpc/ima: add measurement rules to ima arch specific policy Nayna Jain
2019-10-15 11:29   ` Michael Ellerman
2019-10-19 18:27     ` Nayna [this message]
2019-10-08  1:14 ` [PATCH v7 5/8] ima: make process_buffer_measurement() generic Nayna Jain
2019-10-11 13:14   ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-08  1:14 ` [PATCH v7 6/8] certs: add wrapper function to check blacklisted binary hash Nayna Jain
2019-10-11 13:18   ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-08  1:14 ` [PATCH v7 7/8] ima: check against blacklisted hashes for files with modsig Nayna Jain
2019-10-11 13:19   ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-19 18:30     ` Nayna
2019-10-08  1:14 ` [PATCH v7 8/8] powerpc/ima: update ima arch policy to check for blacklist Nayna Jain
2019-10-11 13:19   ` Mimi Zohar

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