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From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
	dhowells@redhat.com, geert@linux-m68k.org,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, nayna@linux.ibm.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, bauerman@linux.ibm.com, mpe@ellerman.id.au,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] ima: Implement support for uncompressed module appended signatures
Date: Thu, 6 Feb 2020 12:01:26 -0700
Message-ID: <73919AC1-E13A-4B35-B811-B0FFBC7E8644@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1581012329.5585.439.camel@linux.ibm.com>


> On Feb 6, 2020, at 11:05 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> 
> On Thu, 2020-02-06 at 11:42 -0500, Eric Snowberg wrote:
>> Currently IMA can validate compressed modules containing appended
>> signatures.  This adds the ability to also validate uncompressed
>> modules when appraise_type=imasig|modsig.
>> 
>> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
> 
> Your patch description in no way matches the code.
> 

How about if I changed the description to the following:

Currently IMA can only validate compressed modules containing appended
signatures when appraise_type=imasig|modsig.  An uncompressed module that 
is internally signed must still be ima signed.  

Add the ability to validate the uncompress module by validating it against
keys contained within the .builtin_trusted_keys keyring. Now when using a
policy such as:

appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig

It will load modules containing an appended signature when either compressed
or uncompressed.


>> ---
>> security/integrity/digsig.c           | 9 +++++++--
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 3 +++
>> security/integrity/integrity.h        | 3 ++-
>> 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>> 
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
>> index ea1aae3d07b3..5e0c4d04ab9d 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
>> @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
>> #include <linux/key-type.h>
>> #include <linux/digsig.h>
>> #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
>> +#include <linux/verification.h>
>> #include <crypto/public_key.h>
>> #include <keys/system_keyring.h>
>> 
>> @@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ static const char * const keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
>> 	".ima",
>> #endif
>> 	".platform",
>> +	".builtin_trusted_keys",
>> };
>> 
>> #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY
>> @@ -45,8 +47,11 @@ static struct key *integrity_keyring_from_id(const unsigned int id)
>> 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>> 
>> 	if (!keyring[id]) {
>> -		keyring[id] =
>> -			request_key(&key_type_keyring, keyring_name[id], NULL);
>> +		if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_KERNEL)
>> +			keyring[id] = VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING;
>> +		else
>> +			keyring[id] = request_key(&key_type_keyring,
>> +						  keyring_name[id], NULL);
>> 		if (IS_ERR(keyring[id])) {
>> 			int err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]);
>> 			pr_err("no %s keyring: %d\n", keyring_name[id], err);
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
>> index 300c8d2943c5..4c009c55d620 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
>> @@ -294,6 +294,9 @@ static int modsig_verify(enum ima_hooks func, const struct modsig *modsig,
>> 	    func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK)
>> 		rc = integrity_modsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM,
>> 					     modsig);
>> +	if (rc && func == MODULE_CHECK)
>> +		rc = integrity_modsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_KERNEL, modsig);
>> +
>> 	if (rc) {
>> 		*cause = "invalid-signature";
>> 		*status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
>> index 73fc286834d7..63f0e6bff0e0 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
>> +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
>> @@ -145,7 +145,8 @@ int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
>> #define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM		0
>> #define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA		1
>> #define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM	2
>> -#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX		3
>> +#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_KERNEL	3
>> +#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX		4
>> 
>> extern struct dentry *integrity_dir;
>> 
> 


  reply index

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-02-06 16:42 [RFC PATCH 0/2] ima: uncompressed module appraisal support Eric Snowberg
2020-02-06 16:42 ` [RFC PATCH 1/2] ima: Implement support for uncompressed module appended signatures Eric Snowberg
2020-02-06 17:07   ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2020-02-06 17:30     ` Eric Snowberg
2020-02-06 18:05   ` Mimi Zohar
2020-02-06 19:01     ` Eric Snowberg [this message]
2020-02-06 19:10       ` Mimi Zohar
2020-02-06 16:42 ` [RFC PATCH 2/2] ima: Change default secure_boot policy to include " Eric Snowberg
2020-02-06 20:22 ` [RFC PATCH 0/2] ima: uncompressed module appraisal support Nayna
2020-02-06 21:40   ` Eric Snowberg
2020-02-07 14:51     ` Mimi Zohar
2020-02-07 16:57       ` Eric Snowberg
2020-02-07 17:40         ` Mimi Zohar
2020-02-07 17:49           ` Eric Snowberg
2020-02-07 18:28             ` Mimi Zohar
2020-02-07 18:45               ` Eric Snowberg
2020-02-07 18:54                 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-02-07 21:38                   ` Eric Snowberg
2020-02-08 23:43                     ` Mimi Zohar
2020-02-10 16:34                       ` Eric Snowberg
2020-02-10 17:09                         ` Mimi Zohar
2020-02-10 19:24                           ` Eric Snowberg
2020-02-10 20:33                             ` Mimi Zohar
2020-02-11 17:33                               ` Eric Snowberg
2020-02-12 14:04                                 ` Nayna
2020-02-13 15:32                                   ` Eric Snowberg

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