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[217.165.113.120]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id e67sm1470295wmg.1.2019.02.11.15.28.41 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Mon, 11 Feb 2019 15:28:43 -0800 (PST) From: Igor Stoppa X-Google-Original-From: Igor Stoppa Cc: Igor Stoppa , Andy Lutomirski , Nadav Amit , Matthew Wilcox , Peter Zijlstra , Kees Cook , Dave Hansen , Mimi Zohar , Thiago Jung Bauermann , Ahmed Soliman , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 12/12] IMA: turn ima_policy_flags into __wr_after_init Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2019 01:27:49 +0200 Message-Id: <93a44c8854b914fb9558fd37b7c4c9ee6051c20c.1549927666.git.igor.stoppa@huawei.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.1 In-Reply-To: References: Reply-To: Igor Stoppa MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit To: unlisted-recipients:; (no To-header on input) Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org The policy flags could be targeted by an attacker aiming at disabling IMA, so that there would be no trace of a file system modification in the measurement list. Since the flags can be altered at runtime, it is not possible to make them become fully read-only, for example with __ro_after_init. __wr_after_init can still provide some protection, at least against simple memory overwrite attacks Signed-off-by: Igor Stoppa CC: Andy Lutomirski CC: Nadav Amit CC: Matthew Wilcox CC: Peter Zijlstra CC: Kees Cook CC: Dave Hansen CC: Mimi Zohar CC: Thiago Jung Bauermann CC: Ahmed Soliman CC: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org CC: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com CC: linux-mm@kvack.org CC: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org --- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 3 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 9 +++++---- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index cc12f3449a72..297c25f5122e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include "../integrity.h" @@ -50,7 +51,7 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 }; #define IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT "d|n" /* current content of the policy */ -extern int ima_policy_flag; +extern int ima_policy_flag __wr_after_init; /* set during initialization */ extern int ima_hash_algo; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 8bc8a1c8cb3f..d49c545b9cfb 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ #define INVALID_PCR(a) (((a) < 0) || \ (a) >= (FIELD_SIZEOF(struct integrity_iint_cache, measured_pcrs) * 8)) -int ima_policy_flag; +int ima_policy_flag __wr_after_init; static int temp_ima_appraise; static int build_ima_appraise __ro_after_init; @@ -460,12 +460,13 @@ void ima_update_policy_flag(void) list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_rules, list) { if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK) - ima_policy_flag |= entry->action; + wr_assign(ima_policy_flag, + ima_policy_flag | entry->action); } ima_appraise |= (build_ima_appraise | temp_ima_appraise); if (!ima_appraise) - ima_policy_flag &= ~IMA_APPRAISE; + wr_assign(ima_policy_flag, ima_policy_flag & ~IMA_APPRAISE); } static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func) @@ -651,7 +652,7 @@ void ima_update_policy(void) list_splice_tail_init_rcu(&ima_temp_rules, policy, synchronize_rcu); if (ima_rules != policy) { - ima_policy_flag = 0; + wr_assign(ima_policy_flag, 0); ima_rules = policy; /* -- 2.19.1