From: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
To: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
dhowells@redhat.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>,
Linux Doc Mailing List <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
"tee-dev @ lists . linaro . org" <tee-dev@lists.linaro.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support
Date: Thu, 1 Aug 2019 09:36:44 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAE=NcrYz8bT9zDhS_ZcvY84fpeTDxZ-KhJKeQGGyf=o4pG2J-Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAFA6WYOKcOzSwakHhgshZcebD8ZBMSi7xQdjWYFS79=Xc+odOg@mail.gmail.com>
On Wed, Jul 31, 2019 at 5:23 PM Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> wrote:
> > I guess my wording was wrong, tried to say that physical TEEs in the
> > wild vary massively hardware wise. Generalizing these things is rough.
> >
>
> There are already well defined GlobalPlatform Standards to generalize
> the TEE interface. One of them is GlobalPlatform TEE Client API [1]
> which provides the basis for this TEE interface.
I'm aware of it - I have implemented a large part of the GP TEE APIs
earlier (primarily the crypto functions). Does the TEE you work with
actually support GP properly? Can I take a look at the code?
Normally the TEE implementations are well-guarded secrets and the
state of the implementation is quite random. In many cases keeping
things secret is fine from my point of view, given that it is a RoT
after all. The secrecy is the core business here. So, this is why I
opted the userspace 'secret' route - no secrets in the kernel, but
it's fine for the userspace. Umh was a logical fit to implement it.
--
Janne
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-08-01 6:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-07-30 12:23 [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` [RFC v2 1/6] tee: optee: allow kernel pages to register as shm Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` [RFC v2 2/6] tee: enable support to register kernel memory Sumit Garg
2019-08-08 22:26 ` [Tee-dev] " Stuart Yoder
2019-08-09 5:36 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` [RFC v2 3/6] tee: add private login method for kernel clients Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` [RFC v2 4/6] KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` [RFC v2 5/6] doc: keys: Document usage of " Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` [RFC v2 6/6] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for " Sumit Garg
2019-07-31 7:11 ` [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 10:21 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 13:58 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 6:21 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 7:40 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 7:59 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 10:00 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 10:40 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 10:26 ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-31 11:02 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 14:23 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 6:36 ` Janne Karhunen [this message]
2019-08-01 6:50 ` [Tee-dev] " Rouven Czerwinski
2019-08-01 7:30 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 7:58 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 8:30 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 10:27 ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-04 20:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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