From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.9 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FORGED_FROMDOMAIN,FREEMAIL_FROM, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D21F1C433FF for ; Thu, 1 Aug 2019 06:37:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8A262214DA for ; Thu, 1 Aug 2019 06:37:05 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com header.i=@gmail.com header.b="Irrr23fM" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729976AbfHAGg7 (ORCPT ); Thu, 1 Aug 2019 02:36:59 -0400 Received: from mail-lj1-f194.google.com ([209.85.208.194]:35249 "EHLO mail-lj1-f194.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728884AbfHAGg6 (ORCPT ); Thu, 1 Aug 2019 02:36:58 -0400 Received: by mail-lj1-f194.google.com with SMTP id x25so68265353ljh.2; Wed, 31 Jul 2019 23:36:56 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=X9ZQbHrGzFtjEODVBGVi3gOgXCwBSDCk0xPlVmAv39c=; b=Irrr23fMhTG6al2CUIKvRGL5QX0PhtRLcRnbsblPKgEqQOxD8SJoM0uIVm3vH8a07y sps88K+hpaaGuRLYTRBAE727L6SCNxZHl98YcWCGE2nZBlrKZCFqhQYnFQa3O46eY8lL /DxLFOpm2FTCNqNU9snTg9au+8PRn02r+vYkQ8uFHGAqYPis0WcrgzH4YS4+SDBfQEoV 7J4/uuOHdv42lZlMfAfkuWhF1r6IfctmUnPGE8QearmzNB3FBL+pVJ7DCBccFWYyYHn4 IiZQ1ElUjB3Z1LOP9E4MADCJzJeaPW8qtNE1bgA7zqga8L4CC95+lpKWT1r1gq4voAWE 6ZVQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=X9ZQbHrGzFtjEODVBGVi3gOgXCwBSDCk0xPlVmAv39c=; b=NpDDvPthk+qRlJgv2aSBvSwFoTO3c1qKXNcXYY2a/Rzt2TJ4I1jz6fmSE5Mjp8P0ka SXHSo4Kpq9FnPNsGHlNN3TpCzamab0TwyV9YOAZM64/TLO0wJnS8vgVteBVjXAKYOb79 u+97/EVjZTXpY02Hg2nZLQ9QXuref1mzVVUqNpQlO2BUabyqH+5QKKiNVCKFQnN/fZOJ m94CE75ahEa6bxUJ5IRPu9T+GXlvnF9rHxZjO3K8gqmXzNQny9GyA6VK3QQViPs0UmB7 PwKBTOQBRPiWPklaOq3V6GqKERTo4g/3zXer3Wd5873cuI/o+EaClUdKU6Weh5CPE4t8 MepQ== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAXPkYLGoxx6gr40BSrgGJqjVoBcEwth09DSpRZcfYol95v3h7PF A/nCj3wpuLFFcssUuaDe0ocvHGh5zns7eSFKSvM= X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqxL/s6TY+Lcm9PtMPnltGMxl9EapEj/9hC3l7HRYjwRx4X4cLUEHb7EUd4m82x93CeGKns2H6cCLt/hUSnHVmU= X-Received: by 2002:a2e:b1c1:: with SMTP id e1mr31450663lja.228.1564641416029; Wed, 31 Jul 2019 23:36:56 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <1564489420-677-1-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> In-Reply-To: From: Janne Karhunen Date: Thu, 1 Aug 2019 09:36:44 +0300 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support To: Sumit Garg Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Jens Wiklander , Jonathan Corbet , dhowells@redhat.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, Jarkko Sakkinen , Mimi Zohar , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Casey Schaufler , Ard Biesheuvel , Daniel Thompson , Linux Doc Mailing List , Linux Kernel Mailing List , linux-arm-kernel , "tee-dev @ lists . linaro . org" Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Jul 31, 2019 at 5:23 PM Sumit Garg wrote: > > I guess my wording was wrong, tried to say that physical TEEs in the > > wild vary massively hardware wise. Generalizing these things is rough. > > > > There are already well defined GlobalPlatform Standards to generalize > the TEE interface. One of them is GlobalPlatform TEE Client API [1] > which provides the basis for this TEE interface. I'm aware of it - I have implemented a large part of the GP TEE APIs earlier (primarily the crypto functions). Does the TEE you work with actually support GP properly? Can I take a look at the code? Normally the TEE implementations are well-guarded secrets and the state of the implementation is quite random. In many cases keeping things secret is fine from my point of view, given that it is a RoT after all. The secrecy is the core business here. So, this is why I opted the userspace 'secret' route - no secrets in the kernel, but it's fine for the userspace. Umh was a logical fit to implement it. -- Janne