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From: Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Matthew Garrett <mgarrett@aurora.tech>,
	Daniil Lunev <dlunev@google.com>,
	zohar@linux.ibm.com, "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>,
	Gwendal Grignou <gwendal@chromium.org>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	Linux PM <linux-pm@vger.kernel.org>,
	Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/10] PM: hibernate: Mix user key in encrypted hibernate
Date: Wed, 3 Aug 2022 13:48:08 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAE=gft4_M=9TsbHFEVQO-3BRrQsDia0Mwt0C9OpA6fMcnaDsrw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YumpwkIz+S+zDfol@sol.localdomain>

On Tue, Aug 2, 2022 at 3:48 PM Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> On Wed, May 04, 2022 at 04:21:00PM -0700, Evan Green wrote:
> > +/*
> > + * Allow user mode to fold in key material for the data portion of the hibernate
> > + * image.
> > + */
> > +struct uswsusp_user_key {
> > +     /* Kernel returns the metadata size. */
> > +     __kernel_loff_t meta_size;
> > +     __u32 key_len;
> > +     __u8 key[16];
> > +     __u32 pad;
> > +};
>
> Shouldn't the key field be 32 bytes?
>

Short answer: yes, it should, will fix. Long answer: I had used a
hardcoded AEAD algorithm of "gcm(aes)", and was envisioning it being
AES128. But making it accommodate 32 bytes now before this gets set in
stone is a better idea.

> > +/* Derive a key from the kernel and user keys for data encryption. */
> > +static int snapshot_use_user_key(struct snapshot_data *data)
> > +{
> > +     struct shash_desc *desc;
> > +     u8 digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
> > +     struct trusted_key_payload *payload;
> > +     struct crypto_shash *tfm;
> > +     int ret;
> > +
> > +     tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0);
> > +     if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
> > +             ret = -EINVAL;
> > +             goto err_rel;
> > +     }
> > +
> > +     desc = kmalloc(sizeof(struct shash_desc) +
> > +                    crypto_shash_descsize(tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
> > +     if (!desc) {
> > +             ret = -ENOMEM;
> > +             goto err_rel;
> > +     }
> > +
> > +     desc->tfm = tfm;
> > +     ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
> > +     if (ret != 0)
> > +             goto err_free;
> > +
> > +     /*
> > +      * Hash the kernel key and the user key together. This folds in the user
> > +      * key, but not in a way that gives the user mode predictable control
> > +      * over the key bits. Hash in all 32 bytes of the key even though only 16
> > +      * are in active use as extra salt.
> > +      */
> > +     payload = data->key->payload.data[0];
> > +     crypto_shash_update(desc, payload->key, MIN_KEY_SIZE);
> > +     crypto_shash_update(desc, data->user_key, sizeof(data->user_key));
> > +     crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
> > +     ret = crypto_aead_setkey(data->aead_tfm,
> > +                              digest,
> > +                              SNAPSHOT_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SIZE);
> > +
> > +err_free:
> > +     kfree(desc);
> > +
> > +err_rel:
> > +     crypto_free_shash(tfm);
> > +     return ret;
> > +}
>
> Just select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256, and you can use sha256_init/update/final which
> would be much simpler.  Similarly with sha256_data() that is added by the next
> patch; you could just call sha256().

Good idea, will do. Thanks!

>
> - Eric

  reply	other threads:[~2022-08-03 20:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-05-04 23:20 [PATCH 00/10] Encrypted Hibernation Evan Green
2022-05-04 23:20 ` [PATCH 01/10] tpm: Add support for in-kernel resetting of PCRs Evan Green
2022-05-04 23:20 ` [PATCH 02/10] tpm: Allow PCR 23 to be restricted to kernel-only use Evan Green
2022-05-04 23:20 ` [PATCH 03/10] security: keys: trusted: Parse out individual components of the key blob Evan Green
2022-05-04 23:20 ` [PATCH 04/10] security: keys: trusted: Allow storage of PCR values in creation data Evan Green
2022-08-02 23:00   ` Eric Biggers
2022-08-03 20:48     ` Evan Green
2022-05-04 23:20 ` [PATCH 05/10] security: keys: trusted: Verify " Evan Green
2022-05-04 23:20 ` [PATCH 06/10] PM: hibernate: Add kernel-based encryption Evan Green
2022-08-29 21:45   ` TPM: hibernate with IMA PCR 10 Ken Goldman
2022-08-29 21:51     ` Matthew Garrett
2022-08-31  2:48       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-09-07 20:47         ` Evan Green
2022-09-07 23:57           ` Mimi Zohar
2022-09-08  5:25             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-09-11  2:40               ` Mimi Zohar
2022-09-20  4:36                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-09-21 20:15                   ` Mimi Zohar
2022-09-23 13:30                     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-09-27 16:03                       ` Evan Green
2022-09-28  9:42                         ` Jonathan McDowell
2022-05-04 23:20 ` [PATCH 07/10] PM: hibernate: Use TPM-backed keys to encrypt image Evan Green
2022-05-04 23:21 ` [PATCH 08/10] PM: hibernate: Mix user key in encrypted hibernate Evan Green
2022-05-06 16:08   ` Pavel Machek
2022-05-09 16:44     ` Evan Green
2022-05-10 12:29       ` Pavel Machek
2022-05-10 16:02         ` Evan Green
2022-08-02 22:48   ` Eric Biggers
2022-08-03 20:48     ` Evan Green [this message]
2022-05-04 23:21 ` [PATCH 09/10] PM: hibernate: Verify the digest encryption key Evan Green
2022-08-02 22:51   ` Eric Biggers
2022-05-04 23:21 ` [PATCH 10/10] PM: hibernate: seal the encryption key with a PCR policy Evan Green
2022-05-06 16:08 ` [PATCH 00/10] Encrypted Hibernation Pavel Machek
2022-05-09 16:43   ` Evan Green
2022-05-17 16:06     ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2022-05-17 17:34       ` Evan Green
2022-06-16 15:42         ` Evan Green
2022-08-01 22:32           ` Evan Green
2022-08-02 18:36             ` Matthew Garrett
2022-08-04  0:59               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-08-04 21:55                 ` Evan Green
2022-08-06 18:21                   ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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