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[209.85.210.49]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id m35-20020a4a9526000000b00443abbc1f3csm5200609ooi.24.2022.09.07.10.10.23 for (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Wed, 07 Sep 2022 10:10:23 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-ot1-f49.google.com with SMTP id h9-20020a9d5549000000b0063727299bb4so10691155oti.9 for ; Wed, 07 Sep 2022 10:10:23 -0700 (PDT) X-Received: by 2002:a05:6830:58:b0:637:1974:140a with SMTP id d24-20020a056830005800b006371974140amr1823656otp.362.1662570231101; Wed, 07 Sep 2022 10:03:51 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20220823222526.1524851-1-evgreen@chromium.org> <20220823152108.v2.2.I9ded8c8caad27403e9284dfc78ad6cbd845bc98d@changeid> In-Reply-To: From: Evan Green Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2022 10:03:15 -0700 X-Gmail-Original-Message-ID: Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 02/10] tpm: Allow PCR 23 to be restricted to kernel-only use To: Jarkko Sakkinen Cc: LKML , Gwendal Grignou , Eric Biggers , Matthew Garrett , zohar@linux.ibm.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Pavel Machek , apronin@chromium.org, Daniil Lunev , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Linux PM , Jonathan Corbet , "James E.J. Bottomley" , Matthew Garrett , Matthew Garrett , Jason Gunthorpe , Peter Huewe Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Aug 25, 2022 at 8:02 PM Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > On Tue, Aug 23, 2022 at 03:25:18PM -0700, Evan Green wrote: > > From: Matthew Garrett > > > > Under certain circumstances it might be desirable to enable the creation > > of TPM-backed secrets that are only accessible to the kernel. In an > > ideal world this could be achieved by using TPM localities, but these > > don't appear to be available on consumer systems. An alternative is to > > simply block userland from modifying one of the resettable PCRs, leaving > > it available to the kernel. If the kernel ensures that no userland can > > access the TPM while it is carrying out work, it can reset PCR 23, > > extend it to an arbitrary value, create or load a secret, and then reset > > the PCR again. Even if userland somehow obtains the sealed material, it > > will be unable to unseal it since PCR 23 will never be in the > > appropriate state. > > > > From: Matthew Garrett > > Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett > > > > Signed-off-by: Evan Green > > Same issues as the other patch. > > > --- > > Matthew's original version of this patch is at: > > https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/12096491/ > > Suggestion: find a lore URL instead for Matthew's patch, > and then add "Link: " to your commit before > sob's. It's a useful reference also in the commit log. > > > > > Changes in v2: > > - Fixed sparse warnings > > > > drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig | 10 +++++++++ > > drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c | 8 +++++++ > > drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 21 +++++++++++++++++++ > > drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++ > > drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c | 2 +- > > 6 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig > > index 927088b2c3d3f2..4483b61a428b11 100644 > > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig > > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig > > @@ -211,4 +211,14 @@ config TCG_FTPM_TEE > > This driver proxies for firmware TPM running in TEE. > > > > source "drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/Kconfig" > > + > > +config TCG_TPM_RESTRICT_PCR > > + bool "Restrict userland access to PCR 23" > > + depends on TCG_TPM > > + help > > + If set, block userland from extending or resetting PCR 23. This > > + allows it to be restricted to in-kernel use, preventing userland > > + from being able to make use of data sealed to the TPM by the kernel. > > + This is required for secure hibernation support, but should be left > > + disabled if any userland may require access to PCR23. > > endif # TCG_TPM > > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c > > index dc4c0a0a512903..7a4e618c7d1942 100644 > > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c > > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c > > @@ -198,6 +198,14 @@ ssize_t tpm_common_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, > > priv->response_read = false; > > *off = 0; > > > > + if (priv->chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) > > + ret = tpm2_cmd_restricted(priv->chip, priv->data_buffer, size); > > + else > > + ret = tpm1_cmd_restricted(priv->chip, priv->data_buffer, size); > > + > > + if (ret) > > + goto out; > > + > > /* > > * If in nonblocking mode schedule an async job to send > > * the command return the size. > > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h > > index a80b341d38eb8c..077c3ca0a127ba 100644 > > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h > > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h > > @@ -229,6 +229,8 @@ void tpm2_shutdown(struct tpm_chip *chip, u16 shutdown_type); > > unsigned long tpm2_calc_ordinal_duration(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 ordinal); > > int tpm2_probe(struct tpm_chip *chip); > > int tpm2_get_cc_attrs_tbl(struct tpm_chip *chip); > > +int tpm_find_and_validate_cc(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space, > > + const void *buf, size_t bufsiz); > > int tpm2_find_cc(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 cc); > > int tpm2_init_space(struct tpm_space *space, unsigned int buf_size); > > void tpm2_del_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space); > > @@ -244,4 +246,23 @@ void tpm_bios_log_setup(struct tpm_chip *chip); > > void tpm_bios_log_teardown(struct tpm_chip *chip); > > int tpm_dev_common_init(void); > > void tpm_dev_common_exit(void); > > + > > +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM_RESTRICT_PCR > > +#define TPM_RESTRICTED_PCR 23 > > + > > +int tpm1_cmd_restricted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buffer, size_t size); > > +int tpm2_cmd_restricted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buffer, size_t size); > > +#else > > +static inline int tpm1_cmd_restricted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buffer, > > + size_t size) > > +{ > > + return 0; > > +} > > + > > +static inline int tpm2_cmd_restricted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buffer, > > + size_t size) > > +{ > > + return 0; > > +} > > +#endif > > #endif > > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c > > index 8ec743dec26544..318e75ae42fb85 100644 > > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c > > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c > > @@ -845,3 +845,38 @@ int tpm1_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) > > > > return 0; > > } > > + > > +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM_RESTRICT_PCR > > +int tpm1_cmd_restricted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buffer, size_t size) > > +{ > > + struct tpm_header *header = (struct tpm_header *)buffer; > > + char len, offset; > > + __be32 *pcr; > > + int pos; > > + > > + switch (be32_to_cpu(header->ordinal)) { > > + case TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND: > > + if (size < (TPM_HEADER_SIZE + sizeof(u32))) > > + return -EINVAL; > > + pcr = (__be32 *)&buffer[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]; > > + if (be32_to_cpu(*pcr) == TPM_RESTRICTED_PCR) > > + return -EPERM; > > + break; > > + case TPM_ORD_PCR_RESET: > > + if (size < (TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 1)) > > + return -EINVAL; > > + len = buffer[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]; > > + if (size < (TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 1 + len)) > > + return -EINVAL; > > + offset = TPM_RESTRICTED_PCR/3; > > + if (len < offset) > > + break; > > + pos = TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 1 + offset; > > + if (buffer[pos] & (1 << (TPM_RESTRICTED_PCR - 2 * offset))) > > + return -EPERM; > > + break; > > + } > > + > > + return 0; > > +} > > +#endif > > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c > > index 69126a6770386e..dbf7f5552c6782 100644 > > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c > > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c > > @@ -821,3 +821,25 @@ int tpm2_find_cc(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 cc) > > > > return -1; > > } > > + > > +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM_RESTRICT_PCR > > +int tpm2_cmd_restricted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buffer, size_t size) > > +{ > > + int cc = tpm_find_and_validate_cc(chip, NULL, buffer, size); > > + __be32 *handle; > > + > > + switch (cc) { > > + case TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND: > > + case TPM2_CC_PCR_RESET: > > + if (size < (TPM_HEADER_SIZE + sizeof(u32))) > > + return -EINVAL; > > + > > + handle = (__be32 *)&buffer[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]; > > + if (be32_to_cpu(*handle) == TPM_RESTRICTED_PCR) > > + return -EPERM; > > + break; > > + } > > + > > + return 0; > > +} > > +#endif > > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c > > index ffb35f0154c16c..6f51cd92c6400f 100644 > > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c > > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c > > @@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ static int tpm2_map_command(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 cc, u8 *cmd) > > return 0; > > } > > > > -static int tpm_find_and_validate_cc(struct tpm_chip *chip, > > +int tpm_find_and_validate_cc(struct tpm_chip *chip, > > struct tpm_space *space, > > const void *cmd, size_t len) > > Split the export to a separate commit. Will do all these, thanks for taking a look.