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From: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
To: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: "kernel@pengutronix.de" <kernel@pengutronix.de>,
	Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>,
	David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>,
	"tharvey@gateworks.com" <tharvey@gateworks.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@nxp.com>,
	Aymen Sghaier <aymen.sghaier@nxp.com>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	Jan Luebbe <j.luebbe@pengutronix.de>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
	Franck Lenormand <franck.lenormand@nxp.com>,
	Matthias Schiffer <matthias.schiffer@ew.tq-group.com>,
	"keyrings@vger.kernel.org" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" 
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: RE: [EXT] Re: [PATCH v5 3/5] KEYS: trusted: allow trust sources to use kernel RNG for key material
Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2022 04:43:42 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <DU2PR04MB8630747D195F49D56A5D7E2195039@DU2PR04MB8630.eurprd04.prod.outlook.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <994a4d49-b1d3-a7ab-d7b3-33405b13c125@pengutronix.de>

Acked-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>

Regards
Pankaj

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
> Sent: Wednesday, February 23, 2022 9:53 PM
> To: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>; Jarkko Sakkinen
> <jarkko@kernel.org>; Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>; David Howells
> <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Cc: kernel@pengutronix.de; Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>; David Gstir
> <david@sigma-star.at>; tharvey@gateworks.com; James Morris
> <jmorris@namei.org>; Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>; Horia Geanta
> <horia.geanta@nxp.com>; Aymen Sghaier <aymen.sghaier@nxp.com>;
> Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>; David S. Miller
> <davem@davemloft.net>; Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>; Jan Luebbe
> <j.luebbe@pengutronix.de>; Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>; Franck
> Lenormand <franck.lenormand@nxp.com>; Matthias Schiffer
> <matthias.schiffer@ew.tq-group.com>; Pankaj Gupta
> <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>; keyrings@vger.kernel.org; linux-
> crypto@vger.kernel.org; linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org; linux-
> kernel@vger.kernel.org; linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
> Subject: [EXT] Re: [PATCH v5 3/5] KEYS: trusted: allow trust sources to use
> kernel RNG for key material
> 
> Caution: EXT Email
> 
> On 22.02.22 20:58, Ahmad Fatoum wrote:
> > The two existing trusted key sources don't make use of the kernel RNG,
> > but instead let the hardware that does the sealing/unsealing also
> > generate the random key material. While a previous change offers users
> > the choice to use the kernel RNG instead for both, new trust sources
> > may want to unconditionally use the kernel RNG for generating key
> > material, like it's done elsewhere in the kernel.
> >
> > This is especially prudent for hardware that has proven-in-production
> > HWRNG drivers implemented, as otherwise code would have to be
> > duplicated only to arrive at a possibly worse result.
> >
> > Make this possible by turning struct trusted_key_ops::get_random into
> > an optional member. If a driver leaves it NULL, kernel RNG will be
> > used instead.
> 
> The rebase on the change in scope of the previous commit made this one
> here quite small. I would squash it into the previous commit for v6, unless
> there are objections.
> 
> 
> >
> > Acked-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
> > Reviewed-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
> > Tested-By: Tim Harvey <tharvey@gateworks.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
> > ---
> > To: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
> > To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
> > To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> > To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> > Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
> > Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
> > Cc: "Horia Geantă" <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
> > Cc: Aymen Sghaier <aymen.sghaier@nxp.com>
> > Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
> > Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
> > Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
> > Cc: Jan Luebbe <j.luebbe@pengutronix.de>
> > Cc: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
> > Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
> > Cc: Franck LENORMAND <franck.lenormand@nxp.com>
> > Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
> > Cc: Tim Harvey <tharvey@gateworks.com>
> > Cc: Matthias Schiffer <matthias.schiffer@ew.tq-group.com>
> > Cc: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
> > Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
> > Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
> > Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
> > Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> > Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
> > ---
> >  include/keys/trusted-type.h | 2 +-
> >  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
> > index d89fa2579ac0..4eb64548a74f 100644
> > --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h
> > +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
> > @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ struct trusted_key_ops {
> >       /* Unseal a key. */
> >       int (*unseal)(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob);
> >
> > -     /* Get a randomized key. */
> > +     /* Optional: Get a randomized key. */
> >       int (*get_random)(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len);
> >
> >       /* Exit key interface. */
> 
> 
> --
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  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-03-02  4:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-02-22 19:58 [PATCH v5 0/5] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys Ahmad Fatoum
2022-02-22 19:58 ` [PATCH v5 1/5] KEYS: trusted: allow use of TEE as backend without TCG_TPM support Ahmad Fatoum
2022-02-22 19:58 ` [PATCH v5 2/5] KEYS: trusted: allow users to use kernel RNG for key material Ahmad Fatoum
2022-02-23 15:42   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-02-22 19:58 ` [PATCH v5 3/5] KEYS: trusted: allow trust sources " Ahmad Fatoum
2022-02-23 16:23   ` Ahmad Fatoum
2022-02-25 11:57     ` [EXT] " Pankaj Gupta
2022-03-02  4:43     ` Pankaj Gupta [this message]
2022-02-22 19:58 ` [PATCH v5 4/5] crypto: caam - add in-kernel interface for blob generator Ahmad Fatoum
2022-02-23 15:41   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-02-23 16:20     ` Ahmad Fatoum
2022-02-25 12:20       ` [EXT] " Pankaj Gupta
2022-03-14 15:33         ` Ahmad Fatoum
2022-02-28 12:14       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-16 16:44         ` Ahmad Fatoum
2022-02-22 19:58 ` [PATCH v5 5/5] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys Ahmad Fatoum
2022-02-25 12:43   ` [EXT] " Pankaj Gupta
2022-03-02  4:37   ` Pankaj Gupta
2022-03-07  4:48     ` Pankaj Gupta

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