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From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>,
	"jarkko@kernel.org" <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	"a.fatoum@pengutronix.de" <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>,
	"gilad@benyossef.com" <gilad@benyossef.com>,
	"jejb@linux.ibm.com" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	"zohar@linux.ibm.com" <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	"dhowells@redhat.com" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"sumit.garg@linaro.org" <sumit.garg@linaro.org>,
	"david@sigma-star.at" <david@sigma-star.at>,
	"michael@walle.cc" <michael@walle.cc>,
	"john.ernberg@actia.se" <john.ernberg@actia.se>,
	"jmorris@namei.org" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"serge@hallyn.com" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"davem@davemloft.net" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	"j.luebbe@pengutronix.de" <j.luebbe@pengutronix.de>,
	"ebiggers@kernel.org" <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	"richard@nod.at" <richard@nod.at>,
	"keyrings@vger.kernel.org" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" 
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Sahil Malhotra <sahil.malhotra@nxp.com>,
	Kshitiz Varshney <kshitiz.varshney@nxp.com>,
	Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@nxp.com>,
	Varun Sethi <V.Sethi@nxp.com>
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [PATCH v0 3/8] crypto: hbk flags & info added to the tfm
Date: Wed, 12 Oct 2022 17:06:16 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y0aDiLp7BztzwNez@gondor.apana.org.au> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Y0XLqd/+C1sxq2G0@zx2c4.com>

On Tue, Oct 11, 2022 at 02:01:45PM -0600, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
>
> I've got no stake in this, but isn't the whole idea that if you specify
> "aes" you get AES, and if you specify "cbc(aes)" you get AES-CBC, and so
> forth? And so leaking implementation details into the algorithm name
> feels like it breaks the abstraction a bit.

Well, keys stored in hardware are fundamentally incompatible with
the algorithm/implementation model.  The whole point of having
algorithms with multiple implementations (e.g., drivers) is that
they all provide exactly the same functionality and could be
substituted at will.

This completely breaks down with hardware keys because by definition
the key is stored in a specific piece of hardware so it will only
work with a particular driver.  IOW it almost never makes sense
to allocate "aes" if you have a hardware key, you almost always
want to allocate "aes-mydriver" instead.

> Rather, drivers that do AES should be called "aes". For this hardware
> key situation, I guess that means keys have a type (in-memory vs
> hardware-resident). Then, a crypto operation takes an "algorithm" and a
> "key", and the abstraction then picks the best implementation that's
> compatible with both the "algorithm" and the "key".

No the key is already in a specific hardware bound to some driver.
The user already knows where the key is and therefore they know
which driver it is.

> If you don't want a proliferation of different ways of doing the same
> thing, maybe the requirement should be that the author of this series
> also converts the existing "paes" kludge to use the new thing he's
> proposing?

Yes that would definitely be a good idea.  We should also talk to the
people who added paes in the first place, i.e., s390.

Cheers,
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

  reply	other threads:[~2022-10-12  9:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-10-06 13:08 [PATCH v0 0/8] Hardware Bound key added to Trusted Key-Ring Pankaj Gupta
2022-10-06 13:08 ` [PATCH v0 1/8] hw-bound-key: introducing the generic structure Pankaj Gupta
2022-10-12  8:52   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-10-12  8:53   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-10-06 13:08 ` [PATCH v0 2/8] keys-trusted: new cmd line option added Pankaj Gupta
2022-10-06 12:37   ` Ben Boeckel
2022-10-06 13:08 ` [PATCH v0 3/8] crypto: hbk flags & info added to the tfm Pankaj Gupta
2022-10-07  6:58   ` Herbert Xu
2022-10-10 11:15     ` [EXT] " Pankaj Gupta
2022-10-10 15:15       ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-10-10 21:35         ` [EXT] " David Gstir
2022-10-11  9:03         ` [EXT] " Herbert Xu
2022-10-11 11:32           ` Pankaj Gupta
2022-10-11 20:01           ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-10-12  9:06             ` Herbert Xu [this message]
2022-10-14 19:19               ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-10-20  4:26                 ` Eric Biggers
2022-10-20 19:23                   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-10-20 21:28                     ` Eric Biggers
2022-10-20 23:42                       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-10-11 11:05         ` Pankaj Gupta
2022-10-12  8:57   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-10-06 13:08 ` [PATCH v0 4/8] sk_cipher: checking for hw bound operation Pankaj Gupta
2022-10-12  8:59   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-10-06 13:08 ` [PATCH v0 5/8] keys-trusted: re-factored caam based trusted key Pankaj Gupta
2022-10-06 13:08 ` [PATCH v0 6/8] KEYS: trusted: caam based black key Pankaj Gupta
2022-10-06 12:42   ` Ben Boeckel
2022-10-06 12:52     ` James Bottomley
2022-10-06 13:08 ` [PATCH v0 7/8] caam alg: symmetric key ciphers are updated Pankaj Gupta
2022-10-12  9:01   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-10-06 13:08 ` [PATCH v0 8/8] dm-crypt: consumer-app setting the flag-is_hbk Pankaj Gupta

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