From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4C110C433FE for ; Sun, 23 Oct 2022 21:55:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229649AbiJWVzX (ORCPT ); Sun, 23 Oct 2022 17:55:23 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:40682 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229608AbiJWVzW (ORCPT ); Sun, 23 Oct 2022 17:55:22 -0400 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [145.40.68.75]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 367B33A48F; Sun, 23 Oct 2022 14:55:16 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7F4B6B80E05; Sun, 23 Oct 2022 21:55:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 98B7FC433C1; Sun, 23 Oct 2022 21:55:13 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1666562114; bh=ZKN6qPUKnFeC0DSv6i0+oQTXmyk9XpOHU4Olt7pVdNI=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=IH0ShmKqQEEua6/hAHrf3oos/OMg5YKFpZXkQyNLslUEb/zCIZcFh45qIiw/8y7RH 3Y0MaOChdIYnj3gjpFLSS6d3APddLnK/szUfbfJ8y3mvrH/88zUmS5yA5EEuixMSW6 j2lL49FfVB5FMpohhtjIq8GuiBv6NPW11pGa18gAbLY8qxh1EDTqjdIeRXEkDyIZMl LbupoDd5v/uyNjTv8W7NRTge1y205eox8gKL9zV7ymeL6/pdQFM3ETgqpFXnG+WttB oiWyPyCT2qz2rW787kGHzbQ6ArS93LTmGkZzlMNVsdtV3xySIbzi7K3+RscUn2HjRd vjIWovspyLERg== Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 00:55:07 +0300 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Evan Green Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, apronin@chromium.org, dlunev@google.com, Pavel Machek , Ben Boeckel , rjw@rjwysocki.net, corbet@lwn.net, linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, zohar@linux.ibm.com, Kees Cook , Eric Biggers , jejb@linux.ibm.com, gwendal@chromium.org, Matthew Garrett , Len Brown , "Rafael J. Wysocki" Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 08/11] PM: hibernate: Use TPM-backed keys to encrypt image Message-ID: References: <20220927164922.3383711-1-evgreen@chromium.org> <20220927094559.v3.8.Ibd067e73916b9fae268a5824c2dd037416426af8@changeid> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Oct 21, 2022 at 12:56:50PM -0700, Evan Green wrote: > On Fri, Sep 30, 2022 at 2:35 PM Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > > On Tue, Sep 27, 2022 at 09:49:19AM -0700, Evan Green wrote: > > > When using encrypted hibernate images, have the TPM create a key for us > > > and seal it. By handing back a sealed blob instead of the raw key, we > > > prevent usermode from being able to decrypt and tamper with the > > > hibernate image on a different machine. > > > > > > We'll also go through the motions of having PCR23 set to a known value at > > > the time of key creation and unsealing. Currently there's nothing that > > > enforces the contents of PCR23 as a condition to unseal the key blob, > > > that will come in a later change. > > > > > > Sourced-from: Matthew Garrett > > > Signed-off-by: Evan Green > > > > > > --- > > > Matthew's incarnation of this patch is at: > > > https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-pm/patch/20210220013255.1083202-9-matthewgarrett@google.com/ > > > > > > Changes in v3: > > > - ENCRYPTED_HIBERNATION needs TRUSTED_KEYS builtin for > > > key_type_trusted. > > > - Remove KEYS dependency since it's covered by TRUSTED_KEYS (Kees) > > > > > > Changes in v2: > > > - Rework load/create_kernel_key() to eliminate a label (Andrey) > > > - Call put_device() needed from calling tpm_default_chip(). > > > > > > kernel/power/Kconfig | 1 + > > > kernel/power/snapenc.c | 207 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > > > kernel/power/user.h | 1 + > > > 3 files changed, 200 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) > > > > > > diff --git a/kernel/power/Kconfig b/kernel/power/Kconfig > > > index cd574af0b43379..2f8acbd87b34dc 100644 > > > --- a/kernel/power/Kconfig > > > +++ b/kernel/power/Kconfig > > > @@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ config ENCRYPTED_HIBERNATION > > > bool "Encryption support for userspace snapshots" > > > depends on HIBERNATION_SNAPSHOT_DEV > > > depends on CRYPTO_AEAD2=y > > > + depends on TRUSTED_KEYS=y > > > default n > > > help > > > Enable support for kernel-based encryption of hibernation snapshots > > > diff --git a/kernel/power/snapenc.c b/kernel/power/snapenc.c > > > index cb90692d6ab83a..90079f6d4f184b 100644 > > > --- a/kernel/power/snapenc.c > > > +++ b/kernel/power/snapenc.c > > > @@ -4,13 +4,23 @@ > > > #include > > > #include > > > #include > > > +#include > > > +#include > > > #include > > > #include > > > +#include > > > #include > > > > > > #include "power.h" > > > #include "user.h" > > > > > > +/* sha256("To sleep, perchance to dream") */ > > > +static struct tpm_digest known_digest = { .alg_id = TPM_ALG_SHA256, > > > + .digest = {0x92, 0x78, 0x3d, 0x79, 0x2d, 0x00, 0x31, 0xb0, 0x55, 0xf9, > > > + 0x1e, 0x0d, 0xce, 0x83, 0xde, 0x1d, 0xc4, 0xc5, 0x8e, 0x8c, > > > + 0xf1, 0x22, 0x38, 0x6c, 0x33, 0xb1, 0x14, 0xb7, 0xec, 0x05, > > > + 0x5f, 0x49}}; > > > + > > > /* Encrypt more data from the snapshot into the staging area. */ > > > static int snapshot_encrypt_refill(struct snapshot_data *data) > > > { > > > @@ -313,6 +323,12 @@ void snapshot_teardown_encryption(struct snapshot_data *data) > > > { > > > int i; > > > > > > + if (data->key) { > > > > Would be a helpful to have perhaps inline comment before the check. > > > > Just stating this because I did not exactly follow why the null > > check was needed (but do believe that there are good reasons to > > do it). > > > > > + key_revoke(data->key); > > > + key_put(data->key); > > > + data->key = NULL; > > > + } > > > + > > > if (data->aead_req) { > > > aead_request_free(data->aead_req); > > > data->aead_req = NULL; > > > @@ -381,11 +397,83 @@ static int snapshot_setup_encryption_common(struct snapshot_data *data) > > > return rc; > > > } > > > > > > +static int snapshot_create_kernel_key(struct snapshot_data *data) > > > +{ > > > + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); > > > + struct tpm_digest *digests = NULL; > > > + struct tpm_chip *chip; > > > + struct key *key = NULL; > > > + int ret, i; > > > + /* Create a key sealed by the SRK. */ > > > + char *keyinfo = "new\t32\tkeyhandle=0x81000000"; > > > > Again, I'd consider put this declaration as first. > > > > > + > > > + chip = tpm_default_chip(); > > > + if (!chip) > > > + return -ENODEV; > > > + > > > + if (!(tpm_is_tpm2(chip))) { > > > + ret = -ENODEV; > > > + goto out_dev; > > > + } > > > + > > > + ret = tpm_pcr_reset(chip, 23); > > > + if (ret) > > > + goto out; > > > + > > > + digests = kcalloc(chip->nr_allocated_banks, sizeof(struct tpm_digest), > > > + GFP_KERNEL); > > > + if (!digests) { > > > + ret = -ENOMEM; > > > + goto out; > > > + } > > > + > > > + for (i = 0; i <= chip->nr_allocated_banks; i++) { > > > + digests[i].alg_id = chip->allocated_banks[i].alg_id; > > > + if (digests[i].alg_id == known_digest.alg_id) > > > + memcpy(&digests[i], &known_digest, sizeof(known_digest)); > > > + } > > > + > > > + ret = tpm_pcr_extend(chip, 23, digests); > > > + if (ret != 0) > > > + goto out; > > > + > > > + key = key_alloc(&key_type_trusted, "swsusp", GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, > > > + GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred, 0, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, > > > + NULL); > > > + > > > + if (IS_ERR(key)) { > > > + ret = PTR_ERR(key); > > > + key = NULL; > > > + goto out; > > > + } > > > + > > > + ret = key_instantiate_and_link(key, keyinfo, strlen(keyinfo) + 1, NULL, > > > + NULL); > > > > Generally speaking, even if it somehow would be "safe", not strlen() > > thank you. > > > > AFAIK, keyinfo is a constant so you could just as well use sizeof(). > > And then you would not need "+ 1". > > Ack, I'm changing this one to sizeof(keyinfo), but... > > > > > > + if (ret != 0) > > > + goto out; > > > + > > > + data->key = key; > > > + key = NULL; > > > + > > > +out: > > > + if (key) { > > > + key_revoke(key); > > > + key_put(key); > > > + } > > > + > > > + kfree(digests); > > > + tpm_pcr_reset(chip, 23); > > > + > > > +out_dev: > > > + put_device(&chip->dev); > > > + return ret; > > > +} > > > + > > > int snapshot_get_encryption_key(struct snapshot_data *data, > > > struct uswsusp_key_blob __user *key) > > > { > > > - u8 aead_key[SNAPSHOT_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SIZE]; > > > u8 nonce[USWSUSP_KEY_NONCE_SIZE]; > > > + struct trusted_key_payload *payload; > > > int rc; > > > /* Don't pull a random key from a world that can be reset. */ > > > if (data->ready) > > > @@ -399,21 +487,28 @@ int snapshot_get_encryption_key(struct snapshot_data *data, > > > get_random_bytes(nonce, sizeof(nonce)); > > > memcpy(&data->nonce_low, &nonce[0], sizeof(data->nonce_low)); > > > memcpy(&data->nonce_high, &nonce[8], sizeof(data->nonce_high)); > > > - /* Build a random key */ > > > - get_random_bytes(aead_key, sizeof(aead_key)); > > > - rc = crypto_aead_setkey(data->aead_tfm, aead_key, sizeof(aead_key)); > > > + > > > + /* Create a kernel key, and set it. */ > > > + rc = snapshot_create_kernel_key(data); > > > + if (rc) > > > + goto fail; > > > + > > > + payload = data->key->payload.data[0]; > > > + /* Install the key */ > > > + rc = crypto_aead_setkey(data->aead_tfm, payload->key, SNAPSHOT_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SIZE); > > > if (rc) > > > goto fail; > > > > > > - /* Hand the key back to user mode (to be changed!) */ > > > - rc = put_user(sizeof(struct uswsusp_key_blob), &key->blob_len); > > > + /* Hand the key back to user mode in sealed form. */ > > > + rc = put_user(payload->blob_len, &key->blob_len); > > > if (rc) > > > goto fail; > > > > > > - rc = copy_to_user(&key->blob, &aead_key, sizeof(aead_key)); > > > + rc = copy_to_user(&key->blob, &payload->blob, payload->blob_len); > > > if (rc) > > > goto fail; > > > > > > + /* The nonce just gets handed back in the clear. */ > > > rc = copy_to_user(&key->nonce, &nonce, sizeof(nonce)); > > > if (rc) > > > goto fail; > > > @@ -425,10 +520,99 @@ int snapshot_get_encryption_key(struct snapshot_data *data, > > > return rc; > > > } > > > > > > +static int snapshot_load_kernel_key(struct snapshot_data *data, > > > + struct uswsusp_key_blob *blob) > > > > Bad alignment. > > > > > +{ > > > + > > > + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); > > > + char *keytemplate = "load\t%s\tkeyhandle=0x81000000"; > > > > Ditto. > > > > > + struct tpm_digest *digests = NULL; > > > + char *blobstring = NULL; > > > + char *keyinfo = NULL; > > > + struct tpm_chip *chip; > > > + struct key *key = NULL; > > > + int i, ret; > > > + > > > + chip = tpm_default_chip(); > > > + if (!chip) > > > + return -ENODEV; > > > + > > > + if (!(tpm_is_tpm2(chip))) { > > > + ret = -ENODEV; > > > + goto out_dev; > > > + } > > > + > > > + ret = tpm_pcr_reset(chip, 23); > > > + if (ret) > > > + goto out; > > > + > > > + digests = kcalloc(chip->nr_allocated_banks, sizeof(struct tpm_digest), > > > + GFP_KERNEL); > > > + if (!digests) > > > + goto out; > > > + > > > + for (i = 0; i <= chip->nr_allocated_banks; i++) { > > > + digests[i].alg_id = chip->allocated_banks[i].alg_id; > > > + if (digests[i].alg_id == known_digest.alg_id) > > > + memcpy(&digests[i], &known_digest, sizeof(known_digest)); > > > + } > > > + > > > + ret = tpm_pcr_extend(chip, 23, digests); > > > + if (ret != 0) > > > + goto out; > > > + > > > + blobstring = kmalloc(blob->blob_len * 2, GFP_KERNEL); > > > + if (!blobstring) { > > > + ret = -ENOMEM; > > > + goto out; > > > + } > > > + > > > + bin2hex(blobstring, blob->blob, blob->blob_len); > > > + keyinfo = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, keytemplate, blobstring); > > > + if (!keyinfo) { > > > + ret = -ENOMEM; > > > + goto out; > > > + } > > > + > > > + key = key_alloc(&key_type_trusted, "swsusp", GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, > > > + GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred, 0, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, > > > + NULL); > > > + > > > + if (IS_ERR(key)) { > > > + ret = PTR_ERR(key); > > > + key = NULL; > > > + goto out; > > > + } > > > + > > > + ret = key_instantiate_and_link(key, keyinfo, strlen(keyinfo) + 1, NULL, > > > + NULL); > > > > Ditto. > > ... I can't change this one to sizeof. Since this came out of > kasprintf() and we already checked against null, strlen() seemed safe > here. Is there a different pattern I should be following? You're right. Let's strlen() here givent that as long as kasprintf() is working correctly there's no risks involved. BR, Jarkko