linux-integrity.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] Trusted Key policy for TPM 2.0
Date: Sun, 23 May 2021 01:45:04 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YKmJcJWHZj7sLidd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <49bf69d011373f339a21bb61183b135babb6edc8.camel@infradead.org>

On Fri, May 21, 2021 at 02:48:55PM +0100, David Woodhouse wrote:
> On Thu, 2021-05-20 at 17:43 -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> > Now that the ASN.1 representation of trusted keys is upstream we can
> > add policy to the keys as a sequence of policy statements meaning the
> > kernel can now construct and use the policy session rather than the
> > user having to do it and pass the session down to the kernel.  This
> > makes TPM 2.0 keys with policy much easier.
> > 
> > The format of the policy statements is compatible with the
> > openssl_tpm2_engine policy implementation:
> > 
> > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/openssl_tpm2_engine.git/
> > 
> > And the seal_tpm2_data command in the above can be used to create
> > sealed keys (including with policy statements) for the kernel.
> 
> I'd love to see that format properly defined and documented instead of
> just a reference to another implementation.

A valid point. How can we know that this is good for "everyone"?

Also, one major thing that this patch set is kselftest's. It's too
obnoxious to copy-paste examples from commit messages, and also
does not really create a good platform to discuss any possible
issues that these patches might have.

/Jarkko

      parent reply	other threads:[~2021-05-22 22:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-05-21  0:43 [PATCH 0/4] Trusted Key policy for TPM 2.0 James Bottomley
2021-05-21  0:43 ` [PATCH 1/4] security: keys: trusted: add PCR policy to TPM2 keys James Bottomley
2021-05-22 22:38   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-05-21  0:43 ` [PATCH 2/4] security: keys: trusted: add ability to specify arbitrary policy James Bottomley
2021-05-22 22:40   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-05-21  0:44 ` [PATCH 3/4] security: keys: trusted: implement counter/timer policy James Bottomley
2021-05-21  0:44 ` [PATCH 4/4] security: keys: trusted: implement authorization policy James Bottomley
2021-05-21 13:48 ` [PATCH 0/4] Trusted Key policy for TPM 2.0 David Woodhouse
2021-05-21 14:28   ` James Bottomley
2021-05-21 15:22     ` David Woodhouse
2021-05-21 15:55       ` James Bottomley
2021-05-21 16:12         ` David Woodhouse
2021-05-21 16:17           ` James Bottomley
2021-05-21 17:53             ` David Woodhouse
2021-05-22 22:45   ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=YKmJcJWHZj7sLidd@kernel.org \
    --to=jarkko@kernel.org \
    --cc=James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com \
    --cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=dwmw2@infradead.org \
    --cc=keyrings@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).