From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>,
Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>,
Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] KEYS: asymmetric: enforce that sig algo matches key algo
Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2022 19:22:40 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Yfn5AFaH6mMa6FB3@sol.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Yfn2KZgjuFRSJzSj@sol.localdomain>
On Tue, Feb 01, 2022 at 07:10:33PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > This seem incorrect too, as sig->pkey_algo could be NULL for direct
> > signature verification calls. For example, for keyctl pkey_verify.
>
> We can make it optional if some callers aren't providing it. Of course, such
> callers wouldn't be able to verify ECDSA signatures.
Sorry, I got that backwards. ECDSA signatures don't specify the curve, but the
keys do (as I noted in a comment). So ECDSA wouldn't require sig->pkey_algo.
Since it appears that KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY does in fact have no way to specify a
pkey_algo, I'll allow NULL pkey_algo in v2.
Note that SM2 isn't implemented correctly when sig->pkey_algo is NULL, as the
following code incorrectly uses the signature's pkey_algo rather than the key's:
if (sig->pkey_algo && strcmp(sig->pkey_algo, "sm2") == 0 &&
sig->data_size) {
ret = cert_sig_digest_update(sig, tfm);
if (ret)
goto error_free_key;
}
I'm not sure whether I should even bother fixing that, given how broken the SM2
stuff is anyway.
- Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-02-02 3:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-02-01 0:34 [PATCH 0/2] Fix bugs in public_key_verify_signature() Eric Biggers
2022-02-01 0:34 ` [PATCH 1/2] KEYS: asymmetric: enforce that sig algo matches key algo Eric Biggers
2022-02-02 2:52 ` Vitaly Chikunov
2022-02-02 3:10 ` Eric Biggers
2022-02-02 3:22 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2022-02-02 5:20 ` Vitaly Chikunov
2022-02-21 1:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 19:26 ` Eric Biggers
2022-03-05 5:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-02-01 0:34 ` [PATCH 2/2] KEYS: asymmetric: properly validate hash_algo and encoding Eric Biggers
2022-02-21 1:46 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-02-21 2:21 ` Eric Biggers
2022-02-21 20:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-02-01 2:38 ` [PATCH 0/2] Fix bugs in public_key_verify_signature() Stefan Berger
2022-02-07 7:45 ` Tianjia Zhang
2022-02-07 11:43 ` [PATCH] KEYS: asymmetric: enforce SM2 signature use pkey algo Tianjia Zhang
2022-02-08 5:35 ` Eric Biggers
2022-02-08 9:45 ` Tianjia Zhang
2022-02-21 1:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-02-21 2:43 ` Tianjia Zhang
2022-02-21 20:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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