From: Ken Goldman <kgold@linux.ibm.com>
To: Lakshmi <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>,
Linux Integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>,
Linux Kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Balaji Balasubramanyan <balajib@linux.microsoft.com>,
Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva@linux.microsoft.com>,
jorhand@linux.microsoft.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] public key: IMA signer logging: Log public key of IMA Signature signer in IMA log
Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 14:57:28 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b1a2edc1-45c7-7a9f-7a77-e252b2f85a64@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <54663a75-a601-ae6c-8068-bc2c3923a948@linux.microsoft.com>
On 5/20/2019 7:15 PM, Lakshmi wrote:
> On 5/17/19 7:41 AM, Ken Goldman wrote:
>
> Hi Ken,
>
> Apologize for the delay in responding.
>
>> Since a platform typically uses only a few signing keys, 4 bytes makes
>> the chance of a collision quite small. The collision would have to be
>> within the same log, not global.
>>
>> In that worst case, the verifier would have to try two keys. It's a
>> slight performance penalty, but does anything break?
>
> Problem Statement:
> - If the attestation service has to re-validate the signature reported
> in the IMA log, the service has to maintain the hash\signature of all
> the binaries deployed on all the client nodes. This approach will not
> scale for large cloud deployments.
1 - How is your solution - including a public key with each event -
related to this issue?
2 - I don't understand how a large cloud affects scale. Wouldn't the
verifier would typically be checking known machines - those of their
enterprise - not every machine on the cloud?
Can't we assume a typical attestation use case has a fairly locked down
OS with a limited number of applications.
> - Possibility of collision of "Key Ids" is non-zero
> - In the service if the "Key Id" alone is used to verify using a map of
> "Key Id" to "Signing Key(s)", the service cannot determine if the
> trusted signing key was indeed used by the client for signature
> validation (Due to "Key Id" collision issue or malicious signature).
Like I said, it should be rare. In the worst case, can't the service
tell by trying both keys?
>
> Proposed Solution:
> - The service receives known\trusted signing key(s) from a trusted
> source (that is different from the client machines)
> - The clients measure the keys in key rings such as IMA, Platform,
> BuiltIn Trusted, etc. as early as possible in the boot sequence.
> - Leave all IMA measurements the same - i.e., we don't log public keys
> in the IMA log for each file, but just use what is currently available
> in IMA.
I thought your solution was to change the IMA measurements, adding the
public key to each entry with a new template? Did I misunderstand, or
do you have a new proposal?
>
> Impact:
> - The service can verify that the keyrings have only known\trusted keys.
If the service already has trusted keys from a trusted source, why do
they have to come from the client at all?
> - The service can cross check the "key id" with the key rings measured.
> - The look up of keys using the key id would be simpler and faster on
> the service side.
> - It can also handle collision of Key Ids.
How does this solve the collision issue? If there are two keys with the
same key ID, isn't there still a collision?
>
> Note that the following is a key assumption:
>
> - Only keys signed by a key in the "BuiltIn Trusted Keyring" can be
> added to IMA\Platform keyrings.
I understand how the client keyring is used in IMA to check file
signatures, but how is that related to the attestation service?
>
>
> Thanks,
> -lakshmi
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-05-22 18:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-05-14 17:14 [PATCH 0/2] public key: IMA signer logging: Log public key of IMA Signature signer in IMA log Lakshmi
2019-05-14 17:29 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-05-15 18:17 ` Lakshmi
2019-05-16 22:45 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-05-16 14:34 ` Ken Goldman
2019-05-17 1:29 ` Lakshmi
2019-05-17 14:41 ` Ken Goldman
2019-05-20 23:15 ` Lakshmi
2019-05-22 18:57 ` Ken Goldman [this message]
2019-05-22 19:37 ` Lakshmi
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