From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
zohar@linux.ibm.com, dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net,
jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com
Cc: keescook@chromium.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
weiyongjun1@huawei.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com, ebiggers@google.com,
ardb@kernel.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, lszubowi@redhat.com,
jason@zx2c4.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, pjones@redhat.com,
konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 08/17] integrity: add new keyring handler for mok keys
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 2021 02:46:28 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b6cd1296b3e0c0d7cfb79d2b68736e4271d2397a.camel@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211124044124.998170-9-eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Nit: in the short summary mok -> MOK
Otherwise LGTM.
/Jarkko
On Tue, 2021-11-23 at 23:41 -0500, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> Currently both Secure Boot DB and Machine Owner Keys (MOK) go through
> the same keyring handler (get_handler_for_db). With the addition of the
> new machine keyring, the end-user may choose to trust MOK keys.
>
> Introduce a new keyring handler specific for MOK keys. If MOK keys are
> trusted by the end-user, use the new keyring handler instead.
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
> v1: Initial version
> v3: Only change the keyring handler if the secondary is enabled
> v4: Removed trust_moklist check
> v5: Rename to machine keyring
> v7: Unmodified from v5
> v8: Code unmodified from v7 added Mimi's Reviewed-by
> ---
> .../integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
> .../integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h | 5 +++++
> security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 4 ++--
> 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
> index e9791be98fd9..4872850d081f 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
> @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static __init void uefi_revocation_list_x509(const char *source,
>
> /*
> * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
> - * the UEFI db and MokListRT tables.
> + * the UEFI db tables.
> */
> __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
> {
> @@ -76,6 +76,21 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
> + * the MokListRT tables.
> + */
> +__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
> +{
> + if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0) {
> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING))
> + return add_to_machine_keyring;
> + else
> + return add_to_platform_keyring;
> + }
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
> * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables.
> diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
> index 2462bfa08fe3..284558f30411 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
> @@ -24,6 +24,11 @@ void blacklist_binary(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len);
> */
> efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
>
> +/*
> + * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the mok.
> + */
> +efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
> +
> /*
> * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx.
> */
> diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
> index f290f78c3f30..c1bfd1cd7cc3 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
> @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ static int __init load_moklist_certs(void)
> rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT (MOKvar table)",
> mokvar_entry->data,
> mokvar_entry->data_size,
> - get_handler_for_db);
> + get_handler_for_mok);
> /* All done if that worked. */
> if (!rc)
> return rc;
> @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ static int __init load_moklist_certs(void)
> mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize, &status);
> if (mok) {
> rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT",
> - mok, moksize, get_handler_for_db);
> + mok, moksize, get_handler_for_mok);
> kfree(mok);
> if (rc)
> pr_err("Couldn't parse MokListRT signatures: %d\n", rc);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-11-27 0:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-11-24 4:41 [PATCH v8 00/17] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Eric Snowberg
2021-11-24 4:41 ` [PATCH v8 01/17] KEYS: Create static version of public_key_verify_signature Eric Snowberg
2021-11-24 4:41 ` [PATCH v8 02/17] integrity: Fix warning about missing prototypes Eric Snowberg
2021-11-24 4:41 ` [PATCH v8 03/17] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine Eric Snowberg
2021-11-25 2:49 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-11-29 22:50 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-11-27 0:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-11-24 4:41 ` [PATCH v8 04/17] integrity: Do not allow machine keyring updates following init Eric Snowberg
2021-11-27 0:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-11-24 4:41 ` [PATCH v8 05/17] X.509: Parse Basic Constraints for CA Eric Snowberg
2021-11-27 0:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-11-24 4:41 ` [PATCH v8 06/17] KEYS: CA link restriction Eric Snowberg
2021-11-27 0:44 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-11-24 4:41 ` [PATCH v8 07/17] integrity: restrict INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE to restrict_link_by_ca Eric Snowberg
2022-02-14 12:42 ` Darren Kenny
2021-11-24 4:41 ` [PATCH v8 08/17] integrity: add new keyring handler for mok keys Eric Snowberg
2021-11-27 0:46 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2021-11-24 4:41 ` [PATCH v8 09/17] KEYS: Rename get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction Eric Snowberg
2021-11-27 0:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-11-30 17:21 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-12-01 10:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-01 13:46 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-12-04 17:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-15 18:14 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-12-15 19:54 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-11-24 4:41 ` [PATCH v8 10/17] KEYS: add a reference to machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2022-02-14 12:18 ` Darren Kenny
2021-11-24 4:41 ` [PATCH v8 11/17] KEYS: Introduce link restriction for machine keys Eric Snowberg
2022-02-14 12:23 ` Darren Kenny
2021-11-24 4:41 ` [PATCH v8 12/17] KEYS: integrity: change link restriction to trust the machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-11-24 4:41 ` [PATCH v8 13/17] integrity: store reference to " Eric Snowberg
2022-02-14 12:27 ` Darren Kenny
2021-11-24 4:41 ` [PATCH v8 14/17] KEYS: link machine trusted keys to secondary_trusted_keys Eric Snowberg
2022-02-14 12:28 ` Darren Kenny
2021-11-24 4:41 ` [PATCH v8 15/17] efi/mokvar: move up init order Eric Snowberg
2022-02-14 12:29 ` Darren Kenny
2021-11-24 4:41 ` [PATCH v8 16/17] integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT found Eric Snowberg
2022-02-14 12:31 ` Darren Kenny
2022-11-10 0:01 ` Morten Linderud
2022-11-10 0:54 ` Eric Snowberg
2022-11-10 15:06 ` Morten Linderud
2022-11-10 15:27 ` James Bottomley
2022-11-10 15:30 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-11-10 7:42 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-11-10 14:27 ` Morten Linderud
2022-11-10 14:15 ` James Bottomley
2021-11-24 4:41 ` [PATCH v8 17/17] integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true Eric Snowberg
2022-02-14 12:37 ` Darren Kenny
2022-02-20 23:23 ` [PATCH v8 00/17] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Jarkko Sakkinen
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