linux-integrity.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: THOBY Simon <Simon.THOBY@viveris.fr>,
	"dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com" <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
	"linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
	BARVAUX Didier <Didier.BARVAUX@viveris.fr>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] IMA: restrict the accepted digest algorithms for the security.ima xattr
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 2021 18:56:23 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <bc23859c8e2cfd9cd02133120fb04e9aa2590713.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210728132112.258606-1-simon.thoby@viveris.fr>

On Wed, 2021-07-28 at 13:21 +0000, THOBY Simon wrote:
> IMA protects files by storing a hash (or a signature thereof) of their
> content in the security.ima xattr. While the security.ima xattr itself
> is protected by EVM with either a HMAC or a digital signature, no
> mechanism is currently in place to ensure that the security.ima xattr
> was generated with a strong digest algorithm, and any hash defined
> in the kernel will be accepted, even obsolete format like MD4 and MD5.
> 
> The kernel itself will only write this xattr with the 'ima_hash' parameter,
> fixed at init, but it will also happily accept userland writes for said
> xattr, and those writes may use arbitrary hash algorithms as long as the
> kernel have support for it.
> 
> One important point is safeguarding users from mislabelling their
> files when using userland utilities to update their files, as this
> is the kind of behavior one can observe with evmctl (`evmctl ima_hash`
> defaults to sha1). Another group that may be interested is those
> that have deployed IMA years ago, possibly using algorithms that
> was then deemed sufficiently collision-resistant, but that proved
> to be weak with the passage of time (note that this could also
> happen in the future with algorithms considered safe today).
> This patch provides a migration path of sorts for these users.
> 
> This patch series gives users the ability to restrict the algorithms
> accepted by their system, both when writing/updating xattrs, and
> when appraising files, while retaining a permissive behavior by default
> to preserve backward compatibility.
> 
> To provide these features, alter the behavior of setxattr to
> only accept hashes built in the kernel, instead of any hash listed
> in the kernel (complete list crypto/hash_info.c). In addition, the
> user can define in his IMA policy the list of digest algorithms
> allowed for writing to the security.ima xattr. In that case,
> only algorithms present in that list are accepted for writing.
> 
> In addition, users may opt-in to whitelisting the hash
> algorithms accepted when appraising thanks to the new
> "appraise_hash" IMA policy option.
> By default IMA will keep accepting any hash algorithm, but specifying
> that option will make appraisal of files hashed with another algorithm
> fail.
> 
> 
> Even when using this option to restrict accepted hashes, a migration
> to a new algorithm is still possible. Suppose your policy states you
> must migrate from 'old_algo' (e.g. sha1) to 'new_algo' (e.g. one of
> sha256/384/512). You can upgrade without relaxing the hash requirements:
> alter your policy rules from 'appraise_hash=old_algo' to
> 'appraise_hash=old_algo,new_algo', load a new SETXATTR_CHECK policy
> rule that accept writes using 'new_algo', reboot, relabel
> all your files with 'new_algo', alter your policy rules from
> 'appraise_hash=old_algo,new_algo' to 'appraise_hash=new_algo',
> and you're done.
> While this represent a significant amount of work, it is important to
> showcase that this patchset is flexible enough to let users upgrade
> if needed.
> 
> 
> This series is based on the following repo/branch:
>  repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
>  branch: master
>  commit ff1176468d368232b684f75e82563369208bc371 ("Linux 5.14-rc3")

A few high level comments:

- I recently accepted a couple of patches, which are now in the next-
integrity-testing branch.  When reposting, please rebase this patch set
on top of it.

- The code uses the term "allowed lists", not "white lists", but the
cover letter, patch descriptions, and/or comments still refer to "white
lists".  For an explanation refer to the new section "Naming" in
Documentation/process/coding-style.rst.

- There was some discussion about allowing code longer than 80 columns,
but the section on  "Breaking long lines and strings" in
Documentation/process/coding-style.rst hasn't been updated.  Please
make sure that the new code has a max line length of 80.

thanks,

Mimi


      parent reply	other threads:[~2021-07-28 22:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-07-28 13:21 [PATCH v5 0/5] IMA: restrict the accepted digest algorithms for the security.ima xattr THOBY Simon
2021-07-28 13:21 ` [PATCH v5 1/5] IMA: remove the dependency on CRYPTO_MD5 THOBY Simon
2021-08-03 16:01   ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2021-07-28 13:21 ` [PATCH v5 2/5] IMA: block writes of the security.ima xattr with unsupported algorithms THOBY Simon
2021-08-03 16:33   ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2021-07-28 13:21 ` [PATCH v5 3/5] IMA: add support to restrict the hash algorithms used for file appraisal THOBY Simon
2021-08-03 16:41   ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2021-07-28 13:21 ` [PATCH v5 4/5] IMA: add a policy option to restrict xattr hash algorithms on appraisal THOBY Simon
2021-07-28 13:21 ` [PATCH v5 5/5] IMA: introduce a new policy option func=SETXATTR_CHECK THOBY Simon
2021-07-28 22:57   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-07-29  7:47     ` THOBY Simon
2021-07-29 16:15       ` Mimi Zohar
2021-07-28 22:56 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=bc23859c8e2cfd9cd02133120fb04e9aa2590713.camel@linux.ibm.com \
    --to=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=Didier.BARVAUX@viveris.fr \
    --cc=Simon.THOBY@viveris.fr \
    --cc=dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com \
    --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).