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From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
To: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>,
	linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Jeremy Kerr <jk@ozlabs.org>,
	Matthew Garret <matthew.garret@nebula.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com>,
	George Wilson <gcwilson@linux.ibm.com>,
	Elaine Palmer <erpalmer@us.ibm.com>,
	Eric Ricther <erichte@linux.ibm.com>,
	Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>,
	Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 2/8] powerpc/ima: add support to initialize ima policy rules
Date: Thu, 24 Oct 2019 10:35:11 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <dd7e04fc-25e8-280f-b565-bdb031939655@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191024034717.70552-3-nayna@linux.ibm.com>

On 10/23/2019 8:47 PM, Nayna Jain wrote:

> +/*
> + * The "secure_rules" are enabled only on "secureboot" enabled systems.
> + * These rules verify the file signatures against known good values.
> + * The "appraise_type=imasig|modsig" option allows the known good signature
> + * to be stored as an xattr or as an appended signature.
> + *
> + * To avoid duplicate signature verification as much as possible, the IMA
> + * policy rule for module appraisal is added only if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
> + * is not enabled.
> + */
> +static const char *const secure_rules[] = {
> +	"appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
> +#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
> +	"appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
> +#endif
> +	NULL
> +};

Is there any way to not use conditional compilation in the above array 
definition? Maybe define different functions to get "secure_rules" for 
when CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE is defined and when it is not defined.
Just a suggestion.

  -lakshmi

  reply	other threads:[~2019-10-24 17:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-10-24  3:47 [PATCH v9 0/8] powerpc: Enabling IMA arch specific secure boot policies Nayna Jain
2019-10-24  3:47 ` [PATCH v9 1/8] powerpc: detect the secure boot mode of the system Nayna Jain
2019-10-24 17:26   ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-25 16:49     ` Nayna Jain
2019-10-24  3:47 ` [PATCH v9 2/8] powerpc/ima: add support to initialize ima policy rules Nayna Jain
2019-10-24 17:35   ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian [this message]
2019-10-25 17:02     ` Nayna Jain
2019-10-25 18:03       ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-28 23:42         ` Michael Ellerman
2019-10-26 23:52       ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-28 11:54         ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-24  3:47 ` [PATCH v9 3/8] powerpc: detect the trusted boot state of the system Nayna Jain
2019-10-24 17:38   ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-25 16:50     ` Nayna Jain
2019-10-24  3:47 ` [PATCH v9 4/8] powerpc/ima: define trusted boot policy Nayna Jain
2019-10-24 17:40   ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-24  3:47 ` [PATCH v9 5/8] ima: make process_buffer_measurement() generic Nayna Jain
2019-10-24 15:20   ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-25 17:24     ` Nayna Jain
2019-10-25 17:32       ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-27  0:13         ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-30 15:22   ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-30 16:35     ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-24  3:47 ` [PATCH v9 6/8] certs: add wrapper function to check blacklisted binary hash Nayna Jain
2019-10-24  3:47 ` [PATCH v9 7/8] ima: check against blacklisted hashes for files with modsig Nayna Jain
2019-10-24 17:48   ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-25 17:36     ` Nayna Jain
2019-10-24  3:47 ` [PATCH v9 8/8] powerpc/ima: update ima arch policy to check for blacklist Nayna Jain
2019-10-28 12:10 ` [PATCH v9 0/8] powerpc: Enabling IMA arch specific secure boot policies Mimi Zohar

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