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From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>,
	corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org,
	serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org,
	axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org,
	eparis@redhat.com
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, fsverity@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev,
	audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v15 16/21] security: add security_inode_setintegrity()  hook
Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2024 19:00:38 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <fd1c5f7f7c7fe7125e70788149e08cd4@paul-moore.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1710560151-28904-17-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com>

On Mar 15, 2024 Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
> 
> This patch introduces a new hook to save inode's integrity
> data. For example, for fsverity enabled files, LSMs can use this hook to save
> the verified fsverity builtin signature into the inode's security blob,
> and LSMs can make access decisions based on the data inside the signature,
> like the signer certificate.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
> 
> --
> v1-v14:
>   + Not present
> 
> v15:
>   + Introduced
> 
> ---
>  include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |  3 +++
>  include/linux/security.h      | 10 ++++++++++
>  security/security.c           | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  3 files changed, 41 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index 6808ae763913..c88587fc3691 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -177,6 +177,9 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_listsecurity, struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
>  LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_getsecid, struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_copy_up, struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode_copy_up_xattr, const char *name)
> +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setintegrity, struct inode *inode,
> +	 enum lsm_intgr_type type, const void *value, size_t size)
> +
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernfs_init_security, struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
>  	 struct kernfs_node *kn)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_permission, struct file *file, int mask)
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 60b40b523d57..0885866b261e 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -405,6 +405,9 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer
>  void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
>  int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
>  int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name);
> +int security_inode_setintegrity(struct inode *inode,
> +				enum lsm_intgr_type type, const void *value,
> +				size_t size);
>  int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
>  				  struct kernfs_node *kn);
>  int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
> @@ -1021,6 +1024,13 @@ static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +static inline int security_inode_setintegrity(struct inode *inode,
> +					      enum lsm_intgr_type, type,
> +					      const void *value, size_t size)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
>  static inline int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
>  						struct kernfs_node *kn)
>  {
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 8d88529ac904..c5d426d084ab 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2681,6 +2681,34 @@ int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr);
>  
> +/**
> + * security_inode_setintegrity() - Set the inode's integrity data
> + * @inode: inode
> + * @type: type of integrity, e.g. hash digest, signature, etc
> + * @value: the integrity value
> + * @size: size of the integrity value
> + *
> + * Register a verified integrity measurement of a inode with the LSM.
> + *
> + * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure.
> + */
> +int security_inode_setintegrity(struct inode *inode,
> +				enum lsm_intgr_type type, const void *value,
> +				size_t size)
> +{
> +	int rc = 0;
> +	struct security_hook_list *p;
> +
> +	hlist_for_each_entry(p, &security_hook_heads.inode_setintegrity, list) {
> +		rc = p->hook.inode_setintegrity(inode, type, value, size);
> +		if (rc)
> +			return rc;
> +	}
> +
> +	return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setintegrity);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setintegrity);

Same as the block device variant of this hook, we should convert this
to use the call_int_hook() macro unless there is a strong reason to
leave it open coded.

>  /**
>   * security_kernfs_init_security() - Init LSM context for a kernfs node
>   * @kn_dir: parent kernfs node
> -- 
> 2.44.0

--
paul-moore.com

  reply	other threads:[~2024-03-19 23:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-03-16  3:35 [RFC PATCH v15 00/21] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 01/21] security: add ipe lsm Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 02/21] ipe: add policy parser Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 03/21] ipe: add evaluation loop Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 04/21] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 05/21] initramfs|security: Add a security hook to do_populate_rootfs() Fan Wu
2024-03-18  0:29   ` Casey Schaufler
2024-03-18  1:58     ` Paul Moore
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 06/21] ipe: introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 07/21] security: add new securityfs delete function Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 08/21] ipe: add userspace interface Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 09/21] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 10/21] ipe: add permissive toggle Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 11/21] block|security: add LSM blob to block_device Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 12/21] security: add security_bdev_setintegrity() hook Fan Wu
2024-03-19 23:00   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2024-03-20  8:28     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-03-20  8:31       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-03-20 20:31         ` Fan Wu
2024-03-21 17:25           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 13/21] dm: add finalize hook to target_type Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 14/21] dm verity: consume root hash digest and signature data via LSM hook Fan Wu
2024-03-19 23:00   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2024-03-20  2:19     ` Mike Snitzer
2024-03-20 17:23       ` Paul Moore
2024-03-20 18:49         ` Mike Snitzer
2024-03-20 17:56     ` Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 15/21] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 16/21] security: add security_inode_setintegrity() hook Fan Wu
2024-03-19 23:00   ` Paul Moore [this message]
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 17/21] fsverity: consume builtin signature via LSM hook Fan Wu
2024-03-18  5:29   ` Eric Biggers
2024-03-19 23:00     ` Paul Moore
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 18/21] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-03-18  5:17   ` Eric Biggers
2024-03-18  8:08     ` Roberto Sassu
2024-03-18 20:58       ` Fan Wu
2024-03-18 20:40     ` Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 19/21] scripts: add boot policy generation program Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 20/21] ipe: kunit test for parser Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 21/21] documentation: add ipe documentation Fan Wu

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