From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
To: "Raj, Ashok" <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Cc: Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@linaro.org>,
linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, alex.williamson@redhat.com,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, bhelgaas@google.com,
robin.murphy@arm.com, dwmw2@infradead.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] PCI, iommu: Factor 'untrusted' check for ATS enablement
Date: Fri, 15 May 2020 18:21:53 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200515172152.GC23334@willie-the-truck> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200515171948.GC75440@otc-nc-03>
Hi,
On Fri, May 15, 2020 at 10:19:49AM -0700, Raj, Ashok wrote:
> On Fri, May 15, 2020 at 08:43:51AM -0700, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> > Can you please lift the untrusted flag into struct device? It really
> > isn't a PCI specific concept, and we should not have code poking into
> > pci_dev all over the iommu code.
>
> Just for clarification: All IOMMU's today mostly pertain to only PCI devices
> and for devices that aren't PCI like HPET for instance we give a PCI
> identifier. Facilities like ATS for instance require the platform to have
> an IOMMU.
>
> what additional problems does moving this to struct device solve?
ATS is PCI specific, but IOMMUs certainly aren't! The vast majority of
IOMMUs deployed in arm/arm64 SoCs are /not/ using any sort of PCI.
Will
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-05-15 17:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-05-15 10:43 [PATCH 0/4] PCI, iommu: Factor 'untrusted' check for ATS enablement Jean-Philippe Brucker
2020-05-15 10:43 ` [PATCH 1/4] PCI/ATS: Only enable ATS for trusted devices Jean-Philippe Brucker
2020-05-15 11:57 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-05-15 21:18 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-05-15 10:44 ` [PATCH 2/4] iommu/amd: Use pci_ats_supported() Jean-Philippe Brucker
2020-05-15 12:01 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-05-15 12:11 ` Jean-Philippe Brucker
2020-05-15 12:21 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-05-15 10:44 ` [PATCH 3/4] iommu/arm-smmu-v3: " Jean-Philippe Brucker
2020-05-18 15:37 ` Will Deacon
2020-05-15 10:44 ` [PATCH 4/4] iommu/vt-d: " Jean-Philippe Brucker
2020-05-15 15:43 ` [PATCH 0/4] PCI, iommu: Factor 'untrusted' check for ATS enablement Christoph Hellwig
2020-05-15 17:19 ` Raj, Ashok
2020-05-15 17:21 ` Will Deacon [this message]
2020-05-18 15:47 ` David Woodhouse
2020-05-18 16:29 ` Raj, Ashok
2020-05-18 16:36 ` Jean-Philippe Brucker
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