From: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@gmail.com>
To: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: "jean-philippe@linaro.org" <jean-philippe@linaro.org>,
"Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
"Raj, Ashok" <ashok.raj@intel.com>,
"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
"Sun, Yi Y" <yi.y.sun@intel.com>,
"iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org"
<iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"alex.williamson@redhat.com" <alex.williamson@redhat.com>,
"Wu, Hao" <hao.wu@intel.com>,
"Tian, Jun J" <jun.j.tian@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 00/15] vfio: expose virtual Shared Virtual Addressing to VMs
Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2020 13:49:22 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200622124922.GB15683@stefanha-x1.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200616160916.GC11838@xz-x1>
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On Tue, Jun 16, 2020 at 12:09:16PM -0400, Peter Xu wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 16, 2020 at 04:49:28PM +0100, Stefan Hajnoczi wrote:
> > Isolation between applications is preserved but there is no isolation
> > between the device and the application itself. The application needs to
> > trust the device.
> >
> > Examples:
> >
> > 1. The device can snoop secret data from readable pages in the
> > application's virtual memory space.
> >
> > 2. The device can gain arbitrary execution on the CPU by overwriting
> > control flow addresses (e.g. function pointers, stack return
> > addresses) in writable pages.
>
> To me, SVA seems to be that "middle layer" of secure where it's not as safe as
> VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA which has buffer level granularity of control (but of course
> we pay overhead on buffer setups and on-the-fly translations), however it's far
> better than DMA with no IOMMU which can ruin the whole host/guest, because
> after all we do a lot of isolations as process based.
>
> IMHO it's the same as when we see a VM (or the QEMU process) as a whole along
> with the guest code. In some cases we don't care if the guest did some bad
> things to mess up with its own QEMU process. It is still ideal if we can even
> stop the guest from doing so, but when it's not easy to do it the ideal way, we
> just lower the requirement to not spread the influence to the host and other
> VMs.
Makes sense.
Stefan
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-06-22 12:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-06-11 12:15 [PATCH v2 00/15] vfio: expose virtual Shared Virtual Addressing to VMs Liu Yi L
2020-06-11 12:15 ` [PATCH v2 01/15] vfio/type1: Refactor vfio_iommu_type1_ioctl() Liu Yi L
2020-06-11 12:15 ` [PATCH v2 02/15] iommu: Report domain nesting info Liu Yi L
2020-06-11 19:30 ` Alex Williamson
2020-06-12 9:05 ` Liu, Yi L
2020-06-15 1:22 ` Tian, Kevin
2020-06-15 6:04 ` Liu, Yi L
2020-06-16 1:56 ` Tian, Kevin
2020-06-16 2:24 ` Liu, Yi L
2020-06-17 14:39 ` Jean-Philippe Brucker
2020-06-18 11:46 ` Liu, Yi L
2020-06-11 12:15 ` [PATCH v2 03/15] vfio/type1: Report iommu nesting info to userspace Liu Yi L
2020-06-11 12:15 ` [PATCH v2 04/15] vfio: Add PASID allocation/free support Liu Yi L
2020-06-11 12:15 ` [PATCH v2 05/15] iommu/vt-d: Support setting ioasid set to domain Liu Yi L
2020-06-11 12:15 ` [PATCH v2 06/15] vfio/type1: Add VFIO_IOMMU_PASID_REQUEST (alloc/free) Liu Yi L
2020-06-11 12:15 ` [PATCH v2 07/15] iommu/uapi: Add iommu_gpasid_unbind_data Liu Yi L
2020-06-11 12:15 ` [PATCH v2 08/15] iommu: Pass domain and unbind_data to sva_unbind_gpasid() Liu Yi L
2020-06-11 12:15 ` [PATCH v2 09/15] iommu/vt-d: Check ownership for PASIDs from user-space Liu Yi L
2020-06-11 12:15 ` [PATCH v2 10/15] vfio/type1: Support binding guest page tables to PASID Liu Yi L
2020-06-11 12:15 ` [PATCH v2 11/15] vfio/type1: Allow invalidating first-level/stage IOMMU cache Liu Yi L
2020-06-11 12:15 ` [PATCH v2 12/15] vfio/type1: Add vSVA support for IOMMU-backed mdevs Liu Yi L
2020-06-11 12:15 ` [PATCH v2 13/15] vfio/pci: Expose PCIe PASID capability to guest Liu Yi L
2020-06-11 12:15 ` [PATCH v2 14/15] vfio: Document dual stage control Liu Yi L
2020-06-15 9:41 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-06-17 6:27 ` Liu, Yi L
2020-06-22 12:51 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-06-23 6:43 ` Liu, Yi L
2020-06-11 12:15 ` [PATCH v2 15/15] iommu/vt-d: Support reporting nesting capability info Liu Yi L
2020-06-15 10:02 ` [PATCH v2 00/15] vfio: expose virtual Shared Virtual Addressing to VMs Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-06-15 12:39 ` Liu, Yi L
2020-06-16 15:34 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-06-16 2:26 ` Tian, Kevin
2020-06-16 15:49 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-06-16 16:09 ` Peter Xu
2020-06-22 12:49 ` Stefan Hajnoczi [this message]
2020-06-16 17:00 ` Raj, Ashok
2020-06-22 12:49 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
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