From: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
To: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com,
Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, luto@amacapital.net,
Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>,
mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com, tglx@linutronix.de
Subject: Re: [PATCH 07/13] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub
Date: Fri, 16 Oct 2020 16:51:51 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201016205151.GA1618249@rani.riverdale.lan> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201015182654.lgtht5fd2aaunczu@tomti.i.net-space.pl>
On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 08:26:54PM +0200, Daniel Kiper wrote:
>
> I am discussing with Ross the other option. We can create
> .rodata.mle_header section and put it at fixed offset as
> kernel_info is. So, we would have, e.g.:
>
> arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux.lds.S:
> .rodata.kernel_info KERNEL_INFO_OFFSET : {
> *(.rodata.kernel_info)
> }
> ASSERT(ABSOLUTE(kernel_info) == KERNEL_INFO_OFFSET, "kernel_info at bad address!")
>
> .rodata.mle_header MLE_HEADER_OFFSET : {
> *(.rodata.mle_header)
> }
> ASSERT(ABSOLUTE(mle_header) == MLE_HEADER_OFFSET, "mle_header at bad address!")
>
> arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_stub.S:
> #define mleh_rva(X) (((X) - mle_header) + MLE_HEADER_OFFSET)
>
> .section ".rodata.mle_header", "a"
>
> SYM_DATA_START(mle_header)
> .long 0x9082ac5a /* UUID0 */
> .long 0x74a7476f /* UUID1 */
> .long 0xa2555c0f /* UUID2 */
> .long 0x42b651cb /* UUID3 */
> .long 0x00000034 /* MLE header size */
> .long 0x00020002 /* MLE version 2.2 */
> .long mleh_rva(sl_stub_entry) /* Linear entry point of MLE (virt. address) */
> .long 0x00000000 /* First valid page of MLE */
> .long 0x00000000 /* Offset within binary of first byte of MLE */
> .long 0x00000000 /* Offset within binary of last byte + 1 of MLE */
> .long 0x00000223 /* Bit vector of MLE-supported capabilities */
> .long 0x00000000 /* Starting linear address of command line (unused) */
> .long 0x00000000 /* Ending linear address of command line (unused) */
> SYM_DATA_END(mle_header)
>
> Of course MLE_HEADER_OFFSET has to be defined as a constant somewhere.
> Anyway, is it acceptable?
>
> There is also another problem. We have to put into mle_header size of
> the Linux kernel image. Currently it is done by the bootloader but
> I think it is not a role of the bootloader. The kernel image should
> provide all data describing its properties and do not rely on the
> bootloader to do that. Ross and I investigated various options but we
> did not find a good/simple way to do that. Could you suggest how we
> should do that or at least where we should take a look to get some
> ideas?
>
> Daniel
What exactly is the size you need here? Is it just the size of the
protected mode image, that's startup_32 to _edata. Or is it the size of
the whole bzImage file, or something else? I guess the same question
applies to "first valid page of MLE" and "first byte of MLE", and the
linear entry point -- are those all relative to startup_32 or do they
need to be relative to the start of the bzImage, i.e. you have to add
the size of the real-mode boot stub?
If you need to include the size of the bzImage file, that's not known
when the files in boot/compressed are built. It's only known after the
real-mode stub is linked. arch/x86/boot/tools/build.c fills in various
details in the setup header and creates the bzImage file, but it does
not currently modify anything in the protected-mode portion of the
compressed kernel (i.e. arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux, which then
gets converted to binary format as arch/x86/boot/vmlinux.bin), so it
would need to be extended if you need to modify the MLE header to
include the bzImage size or anything depending on the size of the
real-mode stub.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-10-16 20:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-09-24 14:58 [PATCH 00/13] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 01/13] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2020-09-25 2:08 ` Randy Dunlap
2020-09-25 14:59 ` Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 02/13] x86: Secure Launch main header file Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 03/13] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2020-09-29 17:26 ` Jason Andryuk
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 04/13] x86: Add early TPM TIS/CRB interface support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 05/13] x86: Add early TPM1.2/TPM2.0 " Ross Philipson
2020-09-25 5:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-29 23:47 ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-09-30 3:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-30 3:24 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-20 0:33 ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 06/13] x86: Add early general TPM " Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 07/13] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 17:38 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-09-25 14:56 ` Ross Philipson
2020-09-25 19:18 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-09-29 14:03 ` Ross Philipson
2020-09-29 14:53 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-10-15 18:26 ` Daniel Kiper
2020-10-16 20:51 ` Arvind Sankar [this message]
2020-10-19 14:38 ` Ross Philipson
2020-10-19 17:06 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-10-19 19:00 ` Ross Philipson
2020-10-19 14:51 ` Daniel Kiper
2020-10-19 17:18 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-10-21 15:28 ` Daniel Kiper
2020-10-21 16:18 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-10-21 20:36 ` Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 08/13] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 09/13] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 10/13] x86: Secure Launch adding event log securityfs Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 11/13] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 12/13] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 13/13] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2020-09-25 5:30 ` [PATCH 00/13] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-25 21:32 ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-09-27 23:59 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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