From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>, madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com
Cc: paulmck@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
joel@joelfernandes.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel-mentees@lists.linuxfoundation.org, serge@hallyn.com
Subject: Re: [Linux-kernel-mentees] [PATCH] integrity: evm: Fix RCU list related warnings.
Date: Thu, 07 May 2020 20:23:41 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1588897421.5685.152.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200508101402.267ca0f2@canb.auug.org.au>
Hi Stephen,
On Fri, 2020-05-08 at 10:14 +1000, Stephen Rothwell wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> On Thu, 30 Apr 2020 21:32:05 +0530 madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com wrote:
> >
> > From: Madhuparna Bhowmik <madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com>
> >
> > This patch fixes the following warning and few other
> > instances of traversal of evm_config_xattrnames list:
> >
> > [ 32.848432] =============================
> > [ 32.848707] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
> > [ 32.848966] 5.7.0-rc1-00006-ga8d5875ce5f0b #1 Not tainted
> > [ 32.849308] -----------------------------
> > [ 32.849567] security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c:231 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
> >
> > Since entries are only added to the list and never deleted,
> > use list_For_each_entry_lockless() instead of
> > list_for_each_entry_rcu() for traversing the list.
> > Also, add a relevant comment in evm_secfs.c to indicate this fact.
> >
> > Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
> > Suggested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Madhuparna Bhowmik <madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com>
> > Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
> > ---
> > security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 2 +-
> > security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 4 ++--
> > security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 9 ++++++++-
> > 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> > index 35682852ddea..b2dc87da5f50 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> > @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
> > data->hdr.length = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
> >
> > error = -ENODATA;
> > - list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
> > + list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
> > bool is_ima = false;
> >
> > if (strcmp(xattr->name, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0)
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> > index d361d7fdafc4..0d36259b690d 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> > @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry)
> > if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
> > return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> >
> > - list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
> > + list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
> > error = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, xattr->name, NULL, 0);
> > if (error < 0) {
> > if (error == -ENODATA)
> > @@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
> > struct xattr_list *xattr;
> >
> > namelen = strlen(req_xattr_name);
> > - list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
> > + list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
> > if ((strlen(xattr->name) == namelen)
> > && (strncmp(req_xattr_name, xattr->name, namelen) == 0)) {
> > found = 1;
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
> > index 39ad1038d45d..cfc3075769bb 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
> > @@ -232,7 +232,14 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_xattrs(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> > goto out;
> > }
> >
> > - /* Guard against races in evm_read_xattrs */
> > + /*
> > + * xattr_list_mutex guards against races in evm_read_xattrs().
> > + * Entries are only added to the evm_config_xattrnames list
> > + * and never deleted. Therefore, the list is traversed
> > + * using list_for_each_entry_lockless() without holding
> > + * the mutex in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(), evm_find_protected_xattrs()
> > + * and evm_protected_xattr().
> > + */
> > mutex_lock(&xattr_list_mutex);
> > list_for_each_entry(tmp, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
> > if (strcmp(xattr->name, tmp->name) == 0) {
>
> I will apply this to linux-next today.
>
> Is there something stopping this being applied to a tree? And does it
> need to be sent to Linus soon?
Sorry for the delay in pushing this and other fixes to the next-
integrity branch. It's in my next-integrity-testing branch.
This isn't a bug per-se, just annotating the reason for the lack of
locking.
thanks,
Mimi
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-05-08 0:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-04-30 16:02 [Linux-kernel-mentees] [PATCH] integrity: evm: Fix RCU list related warnings madhuparnabhowmik10
2020-04-30 16:25 ` Paul E. McKenney
2020-05-08 0:14 ` Stephen Rothwell
2020-05-08 0:23 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2020-05-08 1:21 ` Stephen Rothwell
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