From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
To: dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net,
jarkko@kernel.org, ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net,
andrii@kernel.org, martin.lau@linux.dev, song@kernel.org,
yhs@fb.com, john.fastabend@gmail.com, kpsingh@kernel.org,
sdf@google.com, haoluo@google.com, jolsa@kernel.org,
rostedt@goodmis.org, mhiramat@kernel.org, mykolal@fb.com,
shuah@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Subject: [RFC][PATCH 3/6] verification: Introduce verify_umd_signature() and verify_umd_message_sig()
Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2023 19:35:54 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230425173557.724688-4-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230425173557.724688-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Introduce verify_umd_signature() and verify_umd_message_sig(), to verify
UMD-parsed signatures from detached data. It aims to be used by kernel
subsystems wishing to verify the authenticity of system data, with
system-defined keyrings as trust anchor.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
---
certs/system_keyring.c | 125 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/verification.h | 48 ++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 173 insertions(+)
diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c
index a7a49b17ceb..d4c0de4dceb 100644
--- a/certs/system_keyring.c
+++ b/certs/system_keyring.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
+#include <crypto/umd_sig.h>
static struct key *builtin_trusted_keys;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
@@ -339,6 +340,130 @@ int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(verify_pkcs7_signature);
+#ifdef CONFIG_UMD_SIG_PARSER
+/**
+ * verify_umd_message_sig - Verify a UMD-parsed signature on system data.
+ * @data: The data to be verified (must be provided)
+ * @len: Size of @data
+ * @umd_sig: The UMD-parsed signature
+ * @trusted_keys: Trusted keys to use (NULL for builtin trusted keys only,
+ * (void *)1UL for all trusted keys)
+ * (void *)2UL for platform keys)
+ * @usage: The use to which the key is being put
+ * @view_content: Callback to gain access to content
+ * @ctx: Context for callback
+ *
+ * Verify the UMD-parsed signature of the supplied system data, against a
+ * key (if found) in the supplied trusted keyring.
+ *
+ * Return: Zero on successful verification, a negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int verify_umd_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len,
+ struct umd_sig_message *umd_sig,
+ struct key *trusted_keys,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage,
+ int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
+ const void *data, size_t len,
+ size_t asn1hdrlen),
+ void *ctx)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ /* The data should be detached - so we need to supply it. */
+ if (data && umd_sig_supply_detached_data(umd_sig, data, len)) {
+ pr_err("Failed to supply data for UMD-parsed signature\n");
+ ret = -EBADMSG;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (!trusted_keys) {
+ trusted_keys = builtin_trusted_keys;
+ } else if (trusted_keys == VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ trusted_keys = secondary_trusted_keys;
+#else
+ trusted_keys = builtin_trusted_keys;
+#endif
+ } else if (trusted_keys == VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+ trusted_keys = platform_trusted_keys;
+#else
+ trusted_keys = NULL;
+#endif
+ if (!trusted_keys) {
+ ret = -ENOKEY;
+ pr_devel("Platform keyring is not available\n");
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = umd_sig_verify_message(umd_sig, trusted_keys);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ if (view_content) {
+ size_t sig_data_len;
+
+ ret = umd_sig_get_content_data(umd_sig, &data, &len,
+ &sig_data_len);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ if (ret == -ENODATA)
+ pr_devel("UMD-parsed signature does not contain data\n");
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ ret = view_content(ctx, data, len, sig_data_len);
+ kfree(data);
+ }
+error:
+ pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(verify_umd_message_sig);
+
+/**
+ * verify_umd_signature - Verify a UMD-parsed signature on system data.
+ * @data: The data to be verified (must be provided)
+ * @len: Size of @data
+ * @raw_umd_sig: The raw signature to be parsed with UMD
+ * @raw_umd_sig_len: The size of @raw_umd_sig
+ * @trusted_keys: Trusted keys to use (NULL for builtin trusted keys only,
+ * (void *)1UL for all trusted keys)
+ * (void *)2UL for platform keys)
+ * @usage: The use to which the key is being put
+ * @view_content: Callback to gain access to content
+ * @ctx: Context for callback
+ *
+ * Verify the UMD-parsed signature of the supplied system data, against a
+ * key (if found) in the supplied trusted keyring.
+ *
+ * Return: Zero on successful verification, a negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int verify_umd_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
+ const void *raw_umd_sig, size_t raw_umd_sig_len,
+ struct key *trusted_keys,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage,
+ int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
+ const void *data, size_t len,
+ size_t asn1hdrlen),
+ void *ctx)
+{
+ struct umd_sig_message *umd_sig;
+ int ret;
+
+ umd_sig = umd_sig_parse_message(raw_umd_sig, raw_umd_sig_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(umd_sig))
+ return PTR_ERR(umd_sig);
+
+ ret = verify_umd_message_sig(data, len, umd_sig, trusted_keys, usage,
+ view_content, ctx);
+
+ umd_sig_free_message(umd_sig);
+ pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(verify_umd_signature);
+#endif /* CONFIG_UMD_SIG_PARSER */
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h
index f34e50ebcf6..2e44ea17f23 100644
--- a/include/linux/verification.h
+++ b/include/linux/verification.h
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ extern const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR];
struct key;
struct pkcs7_message;
+struct umd_sig_message;
extern int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
@@ -62,6 +63,53 @@ extern int verify_pkcs7_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len,
size_t asn1hdrlen),
void *ctx);
+#ifdef CONFIG_UMD_SIG_PARSER
+extern int verify_umd_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len,
+ struct umd_sig_message *umd_sig,
+ struct key *trusted_keys,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage,
+ int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
+ const void *data,
+ size_t len,
+ size_t asn1hdrlen),
+ void *ctx);
+extern int verify_umd_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
+ const void *raw_pgp, size_t pgp_len,
+ struct key *trusted_keys,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage,
+ int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
+ const void *data, size_t len,
+ size_t asn1hdrlen),
+ void *ctx);
+#else
+static inline int verify_umd_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len,
+ struct umd_sig_message *umd_sig,
+ struct key *trusted_keys,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage,
+ int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
+ const void *data,
+ size_t len,
+ size_t asn1hdrlen),
+ void *ctx)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static inline int verify_umd_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
+ const void *raw_umd_sig,
+ size_t raw_umd_sig_len,
+ struct key *trusted_keys,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage,
+ int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
+ const void *data,
+ size_t len,
+ size_t asn1hdrlen),
+ void *ctx)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_UMD_SIG_PARSER */
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
struct key *trusted_keys,
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-04-25 17:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-04-25 17:35 [RFC][PATCH 0/6] KEYS: Introduce user mode key and signature parsers Roberto Sassu
2023-04-25 17:35 ` [RFC][PATCH 1/6] KEYS: asymmetric: Introduce UMD-based asymmetric key parser Roberto Sassu
2023-04-25 17:35 ` [RFC][PATCH 2/6] KEYS: asymmetric: Introduce UMD-based asymmetric key signature parser Roberto Sassu
2023-04-25 17:35 ` Roberto Sassu [this message]
2023-04-26 0:28 ` [RFC][PATCH 3/6] verification: Introduce verify_umd_signature() and verify_umd_message_sig() Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-04-26 11:42 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-26 18:25 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-04-26 18:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-04-25 17:35 ` [RFC][PATCH 4/6] bpf: Introduce bpf_verify_umd_signature() kfunc Roberto Sassu
2023-04-25 21:25 ` Yonghong Song
2023-04-26 11:44 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-25 17:35 ` [RFC][PATCH 5/6] selftests/bpf: Prepare a test for UMD-parsed signatures Roberto Sassu
2023-04-25 17:35 ` [RFC][PATCH 6/6] KEYS: asymmetric: Add UMD handler Roberto Sassu
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