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* [PATCH v2] riscv: add support for SECCOMP and SECCOMP_FILTER
@ 2019-08-22 20:55 David Abdurachmanov
  2019-08-23 22:54 ` Carlos Eduardo de Paula
                   ` (4 more replies)
  0 siblings, 5 replies; 26+ messages in thread
From: David Abdurachmanov @ 2019-08-22 20:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Paul Walmsley, Palmer Dabbelt, Albert Ou, Oleg Nesterov,
	Kees Cook, Andy Lutomirski, Will Drewry, Shuah Khan,
	Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Martin KaFai Lau, Song Liu,
	Yonghong Song, David Abdurachmanov, Thomas Gleixner,
	Allison Randal, Alexios Zavras, Anup Patel, Vincent Chen,
	Alan Kao, linux-riscv, linux-kernel, linux-kselftest, netdev,
	bpf
  Cc: david.abdurachmanov, me

This patch was extensively tested on Fedora/RISCV (applied by default on
top of 5.2-rc7 kernel for <2 months). The patch was also tested with 5.3-rc
on QEMU and SiFive Unleashed board.

libseccomp (userspace) was rebased:
https://github.com/seccomp/libseccomp/pull/134

Fully passes libseccomp regression testing (simulation and live).

There is one failing kernel selftest: global.user_notification_signal

v1 -> v2:
  - return immediatly if secure_computing(NULL) returns -1
  - fixed whitespace issues
  - add missing seccomp.h
  - remove patch #2 (solved now)
  - add riscv to seccomp kernel selftest

Cc: keescook@chromium.org
Cc: me@carlosedp.com

Signed-off-by: David Abdurachmanov <david.abdurachmanov@sifive.com>
---
 arch/riscv/Kconfig                            | 14 ++++++++++
 arch/riscv/include/asm/seccomp.h              | 10 +++++++
 arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h          |  5 +++-
 arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S                     | 27 +++++++++++++++++--
 arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c                    | 10 +++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c |  8 +++++-
 6 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/riscv/include/asm/seccomp.h

diff --git a/arch/riscv/Kconfig b/arch/riscv/Kconfig
index 59a4727ecd6c..441e63ff5adc 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/riscv/Kconfig
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ config RISCV
 	select GENERIC_SMP_IDLE_THREAD
 	select GENERIC_ATOMIC64 if !64BIT
 	select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
+	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
 	select HAVE_MEMBLOCK_NODE_MAP
 	select HAVE_DMA_CONTIGUOUS
 	select HAVE_FUTEX_CMPXCHG if FUTEX
@@ -235,6 +236,19 @@ menu "Kernel features"
 
 source "kernel/Kconfig.hz"
 
+config SECCOMP
+	bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
+	help
+	  This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
+	  that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
+	  execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
+	  the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
+	  syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
+	  their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
+	  enabled via prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP), it cannot be disabled
+	  and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
+	  defined by each seccomp mode.
+
 endmenu
 
 menu "Boot options"
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/seccomp.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/seccomp.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bf7744ee3b3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/seccomp.h
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#ifndef _ASM_SECCOMP_H
+#define _ASM_SECCOMP_H
+
+#include <asm/unistd.h>
+
+#include <asm-generic/seccomp.h>
+
+#endif /* _ASM_SECCOMP_H */
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h
index 905372d7eeb8..a0b2a29a0da1 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ struct thread_info {
 #define TIF_MEMDIE		5	/* is terminating due to OOM killer */
 #define TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT  6       /* syscall tracepoint instrumentation */
 #define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT	7	/* syscall auditing */
+#define TIF_SECCOMP		8	/* syscall secure computing */
 
 #define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE	(1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
 #define _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME	(1 << TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)
@@ -82,11 +83,13 @@ struct thread_info {
 #define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED	(1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
 #define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT	(1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)
 #define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT	(1 << TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)
+#define _TIF_SECCOMP		(1 << TIF_SECCOMP)
 
 #define _TIF_WORK_MASK \
 	(_TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | _TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
 
 #define _TIF_SYSCALL_WORK \
-	(_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE | _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT | _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)
+	(_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE | _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT | _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT | \
+	 _TIF_SECCOMP )
 
 #endif /* _ASM_RISCV_THREAD_INFO_H */
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
index bc7a56e1ca6f..0bbedfa3e47d 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
@@ -203,8 +203,25 @@ check_syscall_nr:
 	/* Check to make sure we don't jump to a bogus syscall number. */
 	li t0, __NR_syscalls
 	la s0, sys_ni_syscall
-	/* Syscall number held in a7 */
-	bgeu a7, t0, 1f
+	/*
+	 * The tracer can change syscall number to valid/invalid value.
+	 * We use syscall_set_nr helper in syscall_trace_enter thus we
+	 * cannot trust the current value in a7 and have to reload from
+	 * the current task pt_regs.
+	 */
+	REG_L a7, PT_A7(sp)
+	/*
+	 * Syscall number held in a7.
+	 * If syscall number is above allowed value, redirect to ni_syscall.
+	 */
+	bge a7, t0, 1f
+	/*
+	 * Check if syscall is rejected by tracer or seccomp, i.e., a7 == -1.
+	 * If yes, we pretend it was executed.
+	 */
+	li t1, -1
+	beq a7, t1, ret_from_syscall_rejected
+	/* Call syscall */
 	la s0, sys_call_table
 	slli t0, a7, RISCV_LGPTR
 	add s0, s0, t0
@@ -215,6 +232,12 @@ check_syscall_nr:
 ret_from_syscall:
 	/* Set user a0 to kernel a0 */
 	REG_S a0, PT_A0(sp)
+	/*
+	 * We didn't execute the actual syscall.
+	 * Seccomp already set return value for the current task pt_regs.
+	 * (If it was configured with SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO/TRACE)
+	 */
+ret_from_syscall_rejected:
 	/* Trace syscalls, but only if requested by the user. */
 	REG_L t0, TASK_TI_FLAGS(tp)
 	andi t0, t0, _TIF_SYSCALL_WORK
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c
index 368751438366..63e47c9f85f0 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -154,6 +154,16 @@ void do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 		if (tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
 			syscall_set_nr(current, regs, -1);
 
+	/*
+	 * Do the secure computing after ptrace; failures should be fast.
+	 * If this fails we might have return value in a0 from seccomp
+	 * (via SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO/TRACE).
+	 */
+	if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1) {
+		syscall_set_nr(current, regs, -1);
+		return;
+	}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT))
 		trace_sys_enter(regs, syscall_get_nr(current, regs));
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
index 6ef7f16c4cf5..492e0adad9d3 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
@@ -112,6 +112,8 @@ struct seccomp_data {
 #  define __NR_seccomp 383
 # elif defined(__aarch64__)
 #  define __NR_seccomp 277
+# elif defined(__riscv)
+#  define __NR_seccomp 277
 # elif defined(__hppa__)
 #  define __NR_seccomp 338
 # elif defined(__powerpc__)
@@ -1582,6 +1584,10 @@ TEST_F(TRACE_poke, getpid_runs_normally)
 # define ARCH_REGS	struct user_pt_regs
 # define SYSCALL_NUM	regs[8]
 # define SYSCALL_RET	regs[0]
+#elif defined(__riscv) && __riscv_xlen == 64
+# define ARCH_REGS	struct user_regs_struct
+# define SYSCALL_NUM	a7
+# define SYSCALL_RET	a0
 #elif defined(__hppa__)
 # define ARCH_REGS	struct user_regs_struct
 # define SYSCALL_NUM	gr[20]
@@ -1671,7 +1677,7 @@ void change_syscall(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
 	EXPECT_EQ(0, ret) {}
 
 #if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__powerpc__) || \
-    defined(__s390__) || defined(__hppa__)
+    defined(__s390__) || defined(__hppa__) || defined(__riscv)
 	{
 		regs.SYSCALL_NUM = syscall;
 	}
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 26+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2019-10-15 16:27 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2019-08-22 20:55 [PATCH v2] riscv: add support for SECCOMP and SECCOMP_FILTER David Abdurachmanov
2019-08-23 22:54 ` Carlos Eduardo de Paula
2019-08-23 23:01 ` Carlos Eduardo de Paula
2019-08-24  0:30 ` Paul Walmsley
2019-08-24  1:04   ` David Abdurachmanov
2019-08-24  1:10     ` David Abdurachmanov
2019-08-24  1:18     ` Paul Walmsley
2019-08-25 21:51   ` Kees Cook
2019-08-28 21:39     ` David Abdurachmanov
2019-08-26 14:57   ` Tycho Andersen
2019-08-26 16:39     ` David Abdurachmanov
2019-08-26 17:48       ` Kees Cook
2019-08-29  1:30         ` Paul Walmsley
2019-09-27 17:20           ` Kees Cook
2019-10-05  1:24             ` Paul Walmsley
2019-08-25 21:59 ` Kees Cook
2019-08-28 17:52   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-28 18:01     ` Kees Cook
2019-09-03 22:27     ` Palmer Dabbelt
2019-09-27 20:58       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-10-06 19:18         ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-28 21:37   ` David Abdurachmanov
2019-08-28 23:44     ` Kees Cook
2019-10-05  1:20 ` Paul Walmsley
2019-10-14 21:06   ` Paul Walmsley
2019-10-15 16:27     ` Kees Cook

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