From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-11.4 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_MED,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 232ECC4CECD for ; Tue, 17 Sep 2019 21:30:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DE0EB214AF for ; Tue, 17 Sep 2019 21:30:56 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=google.com header.i=@google.com header.b="jUgafeXo" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728104AbfIQVav (ORCPT ); Tue, 17 Sep 2019 17:30:51 -0400 Received: from mail-oi1-f196.google.com ([209.85.167.196]:44869 "EHLO mail-oi1-f196.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727994AbfIQVav (ORCPT ); Tue, 17 Sep 2019 17:30:51 -0400 Received: by mail-oi1-f196.google.com with SMTP id w6so4165248oie.11 for ; Tue, 17 Sep 2019 14:30:50 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=ESCnXX2tcIZXxoYYdwBnYQ13kyLGDQXAfzDyU1IsljM=; b=jUgafeXoQWRROVQcTu6YfyeHgWxQgQnh4jo0vXJb9gmwfB60c9yL42Xud+pRnhazvu I55/SWoMFVopXjb7HLBe3ZwDp8YJ8AIZ8yE+MZ1ol1jCwWnIpfYZUGgVJMSnV8dTUt6g Fj+f3RqGjAClmuMaYSKTGHkK+kbzWWV2PGu8pnhEDzRe1H1j/2nUdgWnUmqKQJs9XJhD bcgWdPhYUHXwS43uDaRjRrlqwvcEMFzpAIgQXR+SQCsx7w3nXgWKc6kAeP7uC4P5GOpV geTEa7Nd78q01D+rHdE0lfUUKO0VvNzXAoY9/ESlMRu9nFZIkRllJNqARaqGkFjsJcK8 RCrQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=ESCnXX2tcIZXxoYYdwBnYQ13kyLGDQXAfzDyU1IsljM=; b=jES4EY86dpZRZaxwbUsoENSchpMlsVQsa+jUuqiG7GzRtjB2ZhbRArGTJUB2rZUKZd i+eg+3Injxecj2IIEuZSuLxX6MMsR7zz7mUKeskMMVZvmS22CPGcezwe+7Zgm/uRzmVk oM+b4NMnBMzmIUuFLRsG7wURILxQuZtxGjC8+bZBchTdT+dPQv6yyEN8M90PVCY85a1Y 9Vr0+9ZRhe/+Gj8cLUmsrUsvECtroif3f9bJK02pmvXIk71chZ5EjBJe0VWAaTcLDi8L wmoOgQDtZGuXQivlQZHUmQjKDLuN+unc1cBdK0K3rHYd0H909dvn5tDH+RRf4qsaopo1 3PGA== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAWtgl/0G2gqGLImAEffeRaZFGLhPfaDZ99usBZZv9gy8LktFreg gGkT7MUzeUBSOlEv2L0DggbVHVFbs4syl+d6KlHUag== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqwxm+0NJ68SJt1aKiZMUXpTcHLshnMGNY9q+/BgS9qyQqvS1IrxODCZyEWbmarv3+IaDknKyiL8F7FGSmCNufY= X-Received: by 2002:aca:ed52:: with SMTP id l79mr129659oih.47.1568755849487; Tue, 17 Sep 2019 14:30:49 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20190904201933.10736-1-cyphar@cyphar.com> <20190904201933.10736-6-cyphar@cyphar.com> In-Reply-To: <20190904201933.10736-6-cyphar@cyphar.com> From: Jann Horn Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2019 23:30:23 +0200 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 05/12] namei: obey trailing magic-link DAC permissions To: Aleksa Sarai Cc: Al Viro , Jeff Layton , "J. Bruce Fields" , Arnd Bergmann , David Howells , Shuah Khan , Shuah Khan , Ingo Molnar , Peter Zijlstra , Christian Brauner , Andy Lutomirski , Eric Biederman , Andrew Morton , Alexei Starovoitov , Kees Cook , Tycho Andersen , David Drysdale , Chanho Min , Oleg Nesterov , Rasmus Villemoes , Alexander Shishkin , Jiri Olsa , Namhyung Kim , Aleksa Sarai , Linus Torvalds , Linux Containers , linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, Linux API , linux-arch , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel , linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, kernel list , "open list:KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK" , linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-s390 , linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-kselftest-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Sep 4, 2019 at 10:21 PM Aleksa Sarai wrote: > The ability for userspace to "re-open" file descriptors through > /proc/self/fd has been a very useful tool for all sorts of usecases > (container runtimes are one common example). However, the current > interface for doing this has resulted in some pretty subtle security > holes. Userspace can re-open a file descriptor with more permissions > than the original, which can result in cases such as /proc/$pid/exe > being re-opened O_RDWR at a later date even though (by definition) > /proc/$pid/exe cannot be opened for writing. When combined with O_PATH > the results can get even more confusing. [...] > Instead we have to restrict it in such a way that it doesn't break > (good) users but does block potential attackers. The solution applied in > this patch is to restrict *re-opening* (not resolution through) > magic-links by requiring that mode of the link be obeyed. Normal > symlinks have modes of a+rwx but magic-links have other modes. These > magic-link modes were historically ignored during path resolution, but > they've now been re-purposed for more useful ends. Thanks for dealing with this issue! [...] > diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c > index 209c51a5226c..54d57dad0f91 100644 > --- a/fs/namei.c > +++ b/fs/namei.c > @@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ void nd_jump_link(struct path *path) > > nd->path = *path; > nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode; > - nd->flags |= LOOKUP_JUMPED; > + nd->flags |= LOOKUP_JUMPED | LOOKUP_MAGICLINK_JUMPED; > } [...] > +static int trailing_magiclink(struct nameidata *nd, int acc_mode, > + fmode_t *opath_mask) > +{ > + struct inode *inode = nd->link_inode; > + fmode_t upgrade_mask = 0; > + > + /* Was the trailing_symlink() a magic-link? */ > + if (!(nd->flags & LOOKUP_MAGICLINK_JUMPED)) > + return 0; > + > + /* > + * Figure out the upgrade-mask of the link_inode. Since these aren't > + * strictly POSIX semantics we don't do an acl_permission_check() here, > + * so we only care that at least one bit is set for each upgrade-mode. > + */ > + if (inode->i_mode & S_IRUGO) > + upgrade_mask |= FMODE_PATH_READ; > + if (inode->i_mode & S_IWUGO) > + upgrade_mask |= FMODE_PATH_WRITE; > + /* Restrict the O_PATH upgrade-mask of the caller. */ > + if (opath_mask) > + *opath_mask &= upgrade_mask; > + return may_open_magiclink(upgrade_mask, acc_mode); > } This looks racy because entries in the file descriptor table can be switched out as long as task->files->file_lock isn't held. Unless I'm missing something, something like the following (untested) would bypass this restriction: int readonly_fd = ...; /* some read-only fd we want to reopen as writable */ int writable_fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDWR); int flippy_fd = dup(writable_fd); char flippy_fd_path[100]; sprintf(flippy_fd_path, "/proc/%d/fd/%d", getpid(), flippy_fd); if (fork() == 0) { while (1) { int reopened_fd = open(flippy_fd_path, O_RDWR); if (reopened_fd == -1) continue; char reopened_fd_path[100]; sprintf(reopened_fd_path, "/proc/self/fd/%d", reopened_fd); char reopened_fd_target[1000]; int target_len = readlink(reopened_fd_path, reopened_fd_target, sizeof(reopened_fd_target)-1); reopened_fd_target[target_len] = 0; if (strcmp(reopened_fd_target, "/dev/null")) printf("managed to reopen as writable\n"); close(reopened_fd); } } else { while (1) { dup2(readonly_fd, flippy_fd); dup2(writable_fd, flippy_fd); } } Perhaps you could change nd_jump_link() to "void nd_jump_link(struct path *path, umode_t link_mode)", and let proc_pid_get_link() pass the link_mode through from an out-argument of .proc_get_link()? Then proc_fd_link() could grab the proper mode in a race-free manner. And nd_jump_link() could stash the mode in the nameidata. A sketch of how I imagine that: =============================== diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index 6b936038319b..14c6790203c7 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -506,6 +506,7 @@ struct nameidata { struct inode *link_inode; unsigned root_seq; int dfd; + umode_t last_link_mode; } __randomize_layout; static void set_nameidata(struct nameidata *p, int dfd, struct filename *name) @@ -890,7 +891,7 @@ static int nd_jump_root(struct nameidata *nd) * Helper to directly jump to a known parsed path from ->get_link, * caller must have taken a reference to path beforehand. */ -void nd_jump_link(struct path *path) +void nd_jump_link(struct path *path, umode_t link_mode) { struct nameidata *nd = current->nameidata; path_put(&nd->path); @@ -898,6 +899,7 @@ void nd_jump_link(struct path *path) nd->path = *path; nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode; nd->flags |= LOOKUP_JUMPED | LOOKUP_MAGICLINK_JUMPED; + nd->last_link_mode = link_mode; } static inline void put_link(struct nameidata *nd) @@ -3654,9 +3656,9 @@ static int trailing_magiclink(struct nameidata *nd, int acc_mode, * strictly POSIX semantics we don't do an acl_permission_check() here, * so we only care that at least one bit is set for each upgrade-mode. */ - if (inode->i_mode & S_IRUGO) + if (nd->last_link_mode & S_IRUGO) upgrade_mask |= FMODE_PATH_READ; - if (inode->i_mode & S_IWUGO) + if (nd->last_link_mode & S_IWUGO) upgrade_mask |= FMODE_PATH_WRITE; /* Restrict the O_PATH upgrade-mask of the caller. */ if (opath_mask) diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index 297242174402..af0218447571 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -1614,6 +1614,7 @@ static const char *proc_pid_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, { struct path path; int error = -EACCES; + umode_t link_mode; if (!dentry) return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD); @@ -1622,11 +1623,11 @@ static const char *proc_pid_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, if (!proc_fd_access_allowed(inode)) goto out; - error = PROC_I(inode)->op.proc_get_link(dentry, &path); + error = PROC_I(inode)->op.proc_get_link(dentry, &path, &link_mode); if (error) goto out; - nd_jump_link(&path); + nd_jump_link(&path, link_mode); return NULL; out: return ERR_PTR(error); diff --git a/fs/proc/fd.c b/fs/proc/fd.c index 9b7d8becb002..9c1d247177b1 100644 --- a/fs/proc/fd.c +++ b/fs/proc/fd.c @@ -163,7 +163,8 @@ static const struct dentry_operations tid_fd_dentry_operations = { .d_delete = pid_delete_dentry, }; -static int proc_fd_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path) +static int proc_fd_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path, + umode_t *link_mode) { struct files_struct *files = NULL; struct task_struct *task; @@ -184,6 +185,7 @@ static int proc_fd_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path) if (fd_file) { *path = fd_file->f_path; path_get(&fd_file->f_path); + *link_mode = /* something based on fd_file->f_mode */; ret = 0; } spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); diff --git a/fs/proc/internal.h b/fs/proc/internal.h index cd0c8d5ce9a1..a090fff984ed 100644 --- a/fs/proc/internal.h +++ b/fs/proc/internal.h @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ extern struct kmem_cache *proc_dir_entry_cache; void pde_free(struct proc_dir_entry *pde); union proc_op { - int (*proc_get_link)(struct dentry *, struct path *); + int (*proc_get_link)(struct dentry *, struct path *, umode_t *); int (*proc_show)(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task); ===============================