From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 30B03C636CC for ; Wed, 15 Feb 2023 17:32:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230012AbjBORcG convert rfc822-to-8bit (ORCPT ); Wed, 15 Feb 2023 12:32:06 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:37354 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229504AbjBORcF (ORCPT ); Wed, 15 Feb 2023 12:32:05 -0500 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-44.mimecast.com (unknown [207.211.30.44]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3D35C44A3 for ; Wed, 15 Feb 2023 09:32:03 -0800 (PST) Received: from mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (mimecast-mx02.redhat.com [66.187.233.88]) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP with STARTTLS (version=TLSv1.2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id us-mta-113-MZiEU821NGujPuqPa2Nd3A-1; Wed, 15 Feb 2023 12:31:42 -0500 X-MC-Unique: MZiEU821NGujPuqPa2Nd3A-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx09.intmail.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com [10.11.54.9]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 39E39101A55E; Wed, 15 Feb 2023 17:31:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: from hog (ovpn-195-113.brq.redhat.com [10.40.195.113]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 22980492B0E; Wed, 15 Feb 2023 17:31:37 +0000 (UTC) Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2023 18:29:50 +0100 From: Sabrina Dubroca To: Jakub Kicinski Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, Vadim Fedorenko , Frantisek Krenzelok , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Apoorv Kothari , Boris Pismenny , John Fastabend , Shuah Khan , linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Gal Pressman , Marcel Holtmann Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v2 0/5] tls: implement key updates for TLS1.3 Message-ID: References: <20230214210811.448b5ec4@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20230214210811.448b5ec4@kernel.org> X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 3.1 on 10.11.54.9 X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: queasysnail.net Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org 2023-02-14, 21:08:11 -0800, Jakub Kicinski wrote: > On Tue, 14 Feb 2023 12:17:37 +0100 Sabrina Dubroca wrote: > > Changes in v2 > > use reverse xmas tree ordering in tls_set_sw_offload and > > do_tls_setsockopt_conf > > turn the alt_crypto_info into an else if > > selftests: add rekey_fail test > > > > Vadim suggested simplifying tls_set_sw_offload by copying the new > > crypto_info in the context in do_tls_setsockopt_conf, and then > > detecting the rekey in tls_set_sw_offload based on whether the iv was > > already set, but I don't think we can have a common error path > > (otherwise we'd free the aead etc on rekey failure). I decided instead > > to reorganize tls_set_sw_offload so that the context is unmodified > > until we know the rekey cannot fail. Some fields will be touched > > during the rekey, but they will be set to the same value they had > > before the rekey (prot->rec_seq_size, etc). > > > > Apoorv suggested to name the struct tls_crypto_info_keys "tls13" > > rather than "tls12". Since we're using the same crypto_info data for > > TLS1.3 as for 1.2, even if the tests only run for TLS1.3, I'd rather > > keep the "tls12" name, in case we end up adding a > > "tls13_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128" type in the future. > > > > Kuniyuki and Apoorv also suggested preventing rekeys on RX when we > > haven't received a matching KeyUpdate message, but I'd rather let > > userspace handle this and have a symmetric API between TX and RX on > > the kernel side. It's a bit of a foot-gun, but we can't really stop a > > broken userspace from rolling back the rec_seq on an existing > > crypto_info either, and that seems like a worse possible breakage. > > And how will we handle re-keying in offload? Sorry for the stupid question... do you mean that I need to solve that problem before this series can progress, or that the cover letter should summarize the state of the discussion? > > include/net/tls.h | 4 + > > net/tls/tls.h | 3 +- > > net/tls/tls_device.c | 2 +- > > net/tls/tls_main.c | 37 +++- > > net/tls/tls_sw.c | 189 +++++++++++++---- > > tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c | 336 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > > Documentation please. Ok, I'll add a paragraph to Documentation/networking/tls.rst in the next version. -- Sabrina