On Thu 2018-04-19 15:38:53, David Howells wrote:
> Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> wrote:
> 
> > > There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning
> > > from hibernate.  This might compromise the signed modules trust model,
> > > so until we can work with signed hibernate images we disable it when the
> > > kernel is locked down.
> > 
> > I'd rather see hibernation fixed than disabled like this.
> 
> The problem is that you have to store the hibernated kernel image encrypted,
> but you can't store the decryption key on disk unencrypted or you've just
> wasted the effort.

That's not how the crypto needs to work. Talk to Jiri Kosina, ok?

Firmware gives you a key, you keep it secret, use it to sign the
hibernation image on suspend, and verify the signature on resume. Or
something like that.

									Pavel
-- 
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