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From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org,
	Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>,
	James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>,
	Lionel Landwerlin <lionel.g.landwerlin@intel.com>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>,
	Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
	intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-man@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 09/60] drm/i915/perf: Open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Date: Mon, 20 Apr 2020 08:52:25 -0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200420115316.18781-10-acme@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200420115316.18781-1-acme@kernel.org>

From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>

Open access to i915_perf monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process.
Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the
rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the
credentials and makes operation more secure.

CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
for the time that such privileges are actually required)

For backward compatibility reasons access to i915_events subsystem remains
open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for
secure i915_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON
capability.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Lionel Landwerlin <lionel.g.landwerlin@intel.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/e3e3292f-f765-ea98-e59c-fbe2db93fd34@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c | 13 ++++++-------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c
index 551be589d6f4..5fb174931231 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c
@@ -3433,10 +3433,10 @@ i915_perf_open_ioctl_locked(struct i915_perf *perf,
 	/* Similar to perf's kernel.perf_paranoid_cpu sysctl option
 	 * we check a dev.i915.perf_stream_paranoid sysctl option
 	 * to determine if it's ok to access system wide OA counters
-	 * without CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges.
+	 * without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges.
 	 */
 	if (privileged_op &&
-	    i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+	    i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !perfmon_capable()) {
 		DRM_DEBUG("Insufficient privileges to open i915 perf stream\n");
 		ret = -EACCES;
 		goto err_ctx;
@@ -3629,9 +3629,8 @@ static int read_properties_unlocked(struct i915_perf *perf,
 			} else
 				oa_freq_hz = 0;
 
-			if (oa_freq_hz > i915_oa_max_sample_rate &&
-			    !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
-				DRM_DEBUG("OA exponent would exceed the max sampling frequency (sysctl dev.i915.oa_max_sample_rate) %uHz without root privileges\n",
+			if (oa_freq_hz > i915_oa_max_sample_rate && !perfmon_capable()) {
+				DRM_DEBUG("OA exponent would exceed the max sampling frequency (sysctl dev.i915.oa_max_sample_rate) %uHz without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges\n",
 					  i915_oa_max_sample_rate);
 				return -EACCES;
 			}
@@ -4052,7 +4051,7 @@ int i915_perf_add_config_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+	if (i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !perfmon_capable()) {
 		DRM_DEBUG("Insufficient privileges to add i915 OA config\n");
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
@@ -4199,7 +4198,7 @@ int i915_perf_remove_config_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
 		return -ENOTSUPP;
 	}
 
-	if (i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+	if (i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !perfmon_capable()) {
 		DRM_DEBUG("Insufficient privileges to remove i915 OA config\n");
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
-- 
2.21.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-04-20 11:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20200420115316.18781-1-acme@kernel.org>
2020-04-20 11:52 ` [PATCH 05/60] capabilities: Introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-20 11:52 ` [PATCH 06/60] perf/core: Open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-20 11:52 ` [PATCH 07/60] perf/core: open access to probes " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-20 11:52 ` [PATCH 08/60] perf tools: Support CAP_PERFMON capability Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-20 11:52 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo [this message]
2020-04-20 11:52 ` [PATCH 10/60] trace/bpf_trace: Open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-20 11:52 ` [PATCH 11/60] powerpc/perf: open " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-20 11:52 ` [PATCH 12/60] parisc/perf: " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-20 11:52 ` [PATCH 13/60] drivers/perf: Open " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-20 11:52 ` [PATCH 14/60] drivers/oprofile: " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-20 11:52 ` [PATCH 15/60] doc/admin-guide: Update perf-security.rst with CAP_PERFMON information Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-20 11:52 ` [PATCH 16/60] doc/admin-guide: update kernel.rst " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo

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