From: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@canonical.com>
To: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
linux-man <linux-man@vger.kernel.org>,
Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>,
Robert Sesek <rsesek@google.com>,
Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
"Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Subject: Re: For review: seccomp_user_notif(2) manual page
Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2020 19:12:06 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201001171206.jvkdx4htqux5agdv@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201001165850.GC1260245@cisco>
On Thu, Oct 01, 2020 at 10:58:50AM -0600, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 01, 2020 at 05:47:54PM +0200, Jann Horn via Containers wrote:
> > On Thu, Oct 1, 2020 at 2:54 PM Christian Brauner
> > <christian.brauner@canonical.com> wrote:
> > > On Wed, Sep 30, 2020 at 05:53:46PM +0200, Jann Horn via Containers wrote:
> > > > On Wed, Sep 30, 2020 at 1:07 PM Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
> > > > <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > > > NOTES
> > > > > The file descriptor returned when seccomp(2) is employed with the
> > > > > SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER flag can be monitored using
> > > > > poll(2), epoll(7), and select(2). When a notification is pend‐
> > > > > ing, these interfaces indicate that the file descriptor is read‐
> > > > > able.
> > > >
> > > > We should probably also point out somewhere that, as
> > > > include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h says:
> > > >
> > > > * Similar precautions should be applied when stacking SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF
> > > > * or SECCOMP_RET_TRACE. For SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF filters acting on the
> > > > * same syscall, the most recently added filter takes precedence. This means
> > > > * that the new SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF filter can override any
> > > > * SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND from earlier filters, essentially allowing all
> > > > * such filtered syscalls to be executed by sending the response
> > > > * SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE. Note that SECCOMP_RET_TRACE can equally
> > > > * be overriden by SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE.
> > > >
> > > > In other words, from a security perspective, you must assume that the
> > > > target process can bypass any SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF (or
> > > > SECCOMP_RET_TRACE) filters unless it is completely prohibited from
> > > > calling seccomp(). This should also be noted over in the main
> > > > seccomp(2) manpage, especially the SECCOMP_RET_TRACE part.
> > >
> > > So I was actually wondering about this when I skimmed this and a while
> > > ago but forgot about this again... Afaict, you can only ever load a
> > > single filter with SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER set. If there
> > > already is a filter with the SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER property
> > > in the tasks filter hierarchy then the kernel will refuse to load a new
> > > one?
> > >
> > > static struct file *init_listener(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
> > > {
> > > struct file *ret = ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
> > > struct seccomp_filter *cur;
> > >
> > > for (cur = current->seccomp.filter; cur; cur = cur->prev) {
> > > if (cur->notif)
> > > goto out;
> > > }
> > >
> > > shouldn't that be sufficient to guarantee that USER_NOTIF filters can't
> > > override each other for the same task simply because there can only ever
> > > be a single one?
> >
> > Good point. Exceeeept that that check seems ineffective because this
> > happens before we take the locks that guard against TSYNC, and also
> > before we decide to which existing filter we want to chain the new
> > filter. So if two threads race with TSYNC, I think they'll be able to
> > chain two filters with listeners together.
>
> Yep, seems the check needs to also be in seccomp_can_sync_threads() to
> be totally effective,
>
> > I don't know whether we want to eternalize this "only one listener
> > across all the filters" restriction in the manpage though, or whether
> > the man page should just say that the kernel currently doesn't support
> > it but that security-wise you should assume that it might at some
> > point.
>
> This requirement originally came from Andy, arguing that the semantics
> of this were/are confusing, which still makes sense to me. Perhaps we
> should do something like the below?
I think we should either keep up this restriction and then cement it in
the manpage or add a flag to indicate that the notifier is
non-overridable.
I don't care about the default too much, i.e. whether it's overridable
by default and exclusive if opting in or the other way around doesn't
matter too much. But from a supervisor's perspective it'd be quite nice
to be able to be sure that a notifier can't be overriden by another
notifier.
I think having a flag would provide the greatest flexibility but I agree
that the semantics of multiple listeners are kinda odd.
Below looks sane to me though again, I'm not sitting in fron of source
code.
Christian
> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> index 3ee59ce0a323..7b107207c2b0 100644
> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> @@ -376,6 +376,18 @@ static int is_ancestor(struct seccomp_filter *parent,
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static bool has_listener_parent(struct seccomp_filter *child)
> +{
> + struct seccomp_filter *cur;
> +
> + for (cur = current->seccomp.filter; cur; cur = cur->prev) {
> + if (cur->notif)
> + return true;
> + }
> +
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> /**
> * seccomp_can_sync_threads: checks if all threads can be synchronized
> *
> @@ -385,7 +397,7 @@ static int is_ancestor(struct seccomp_filter *parent,
> * either not in the correct seccomp mode or did not have an ancestral
> * seccomp filter.
> */
> -static inline pid_t seccomp_can_sync_threads(void)
> +static inline pid_t seccomp_can_sync_threads(unsigned int flags)
> {
> struct task_struct *thread, *caller;
>
> @@ -407,6 +419,11 @@ static inline pid_t seccomp_can_sync_threads(void)
> caller->seccomp.filter)))
> continue;
>
> + /* don't allow TSYNC to install multiple listeners */
> + if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER &&
> + !has_listener_parent(thread->seccomp.filter))
> + continue;
> +
> /* Return the first thread that cannot be synchronized. */
> failed = task_pid_vnr(thread);
> /* If the pid cannot be resolved, then return -ESRCH */
> @@ -637,7 +654,7 @@ static long seccomp_attach_filter(unsigned int flags,
> if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC) {
> int ret;
>
> - ret = seccomp_can_sync_threads();
> + ret = seccomp_can_sync_threads(flags);
> if (ret) {
> if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC_ESRCH)
> return -ESRCH;
> @@ -1462,12 +1479,9 @@ static const struct file_operations seccomp_notify_ops = {
> static struct file *init_listener(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
> {
> struct file *ret = ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
> - struct seccomp_filter *cur;
>
> - for (cur = current->seccomp.filter; cur; cur = cur->prev) {
> - if (cur->notif)
> - goto out;
> - }
> + if (has_listener_parent(current->seccomp.filter))
> + goto out;
>
> ret = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> filter->notif = kzalloc(sizeof(*(filter->notif)), GFP_KERNEL);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-10-01 17:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-09-30 11:07 For review: seccomp_user_notif(2) manual page Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2020-09-30 15:03 ` Tycho Andersen
2020-09-30 15:11 ` Tycho Andersen
2020-09-30 20:34 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2020-09-30 23:03 ` Tycho Andersen
2020-09-30 23:11 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-30 23:24 ` Tycho Andersen
2020-10-01 1:52 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-01 2:14 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-25 16:31 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2020-10-26 15:54 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-27 6:14 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2020-10-27 10:28 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-28 6:31 ` Sargun Dhillon
2020-10-28 9:43 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-28 17:43 ` Sargun Dhillon
2020-10-28 18:20 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-01 7:49 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2020-10-26 0:32 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-26 9:51 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-26 10:31 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-28 22:56 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-29 1:11 ` Jann Horn
[not found] ` <20201029021348.GB25673@cisco>
2020-10-29 4:26 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-28 22:53 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-29 1:25 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-01 7:45 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2020-10-14 4:40 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2020-09-30 15:53 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-01 12:54 ` Christian Brauner
2020-10-01 15:47 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-01 16:58 ` Tycho Andersen
2020-10-01 17:12 ` Christian Brauner [this message]
2020-10-14 5:41 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2020-10-01 18:18 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-01 18:56 ` Tycho Andersen
2020-10-01 17:05 ` Christian Brauner
2020-10-15 11:24 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2020-10-15 20:32 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-16 18:29 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2020-10-17 0:25 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-24 12:52 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2020-10-26 9:32 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-26 9:47 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2020-09-30 23:39 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-15 11:24 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2020-10-26 0:19 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-26 9:39 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2020-10-01 12:36 ` Christian Brauner
2020-10-15 11:23 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2020-10-01 21:06 ` Sargun Dhillon
2020-10-01 23:19 ` Tycho Andersen
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