From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.3 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1EA10C43331 for ; Thu, 2 Apr 2020 08:53:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EDBDC208E4 for ; Thu, 2 Apr 2020 08:53:16 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2387749AbgDBIxQ (ORCPT ); Thu, 2 Apr 2020 04:53:16 -0400 Received: from mga14.intel.com ([192.55.52.115]:59751 "EHLO mga14.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2387526AbgDBIxQ (ORCPT ); Thu, 2 Apr 2020 04:53:16 -0400 IronPort-SDR: rnwHdNA+Fr5C7bHgERAITFGXL0VKvn2Ucr8GT4eCffLFZJQj7Kv8yKIV+DyD1i/F5G2t9ybpXa 78kxA+g6yWBw== X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga008.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.65]) by fmsmga103.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 02 Apr 2020 01:53:15 -0700 IronPort-SDR: 0d09LmQxjwdOTwQhwodxomnqmvwvXp3uLhsrsNBHN8aidh3hD0dbxAdS3Rx/o5gXv7RdtTYUV/ 78nLAMk/cjvw== X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.72,335,1580803200"; d="scan'208";a="243005477" Received: from linux.intel.com ([10.54.29.200]) by orsmga008.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 02 Apr 2020 01:53:15 -0700 Received: from [10.249.226.252] (abudanko-mobl.ccr.corp.intel.com [10.249.226.252]) by linux.intel.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6FA66580544; Thu, 2 Apr 2020 01:53:08 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [PATCH v8 10/12] drivers/oprofile: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process From: Alexey Budankov To: Peter Zijlstra , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Alexei Starovoitov , Ingo Molnar , James Morris , Namhyung Kim Cc: Serge Hallyn , Jiri Olsa , Song Liu , Andi Kleen , Stephane Eranian , Igor Lubashev , Thomas Gleixner , linux-kernel , "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" , "selinux@vger.kernel.org" , "intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org" , "linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" , linux-man@vger.kernel.org References: Organization: Intel Corp. Message-ID: <691f1096-b15f-9b12-50a0-c2b93918149e@linux.intel.com> Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2020 11:53:07 +0300 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.6.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-man-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-man@vger.kernel.org Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure. CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required) For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability. Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov Acked-by: James Morris --- drivers/oprofile/event_buffer.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/oprofile/event_buffer.c b/drivers/oprofile/event_buffer.c index 12ea4a4ad607..6c9edc8bbc95 100644 --- a/drivers/oprofile/event_buffer.c +++ b/drivers/oprofile/event_buffer.c @@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static int event_buffer_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { int err = -EPERM; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!perfmon_capable()) return -EPERM; if (test_and_set_bit_lock(0, &buffer_opened)) -- 2.24.1