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From: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>
To: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
	Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
	Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" 
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	"intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
	<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
	"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-man@vger.kernel.org,
	Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability
Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2020 19:01:21 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <76718dc6-5483-5e2e-85b8-64e70306ee1f@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f96f8f8a-e65c-3f36-dc85-fc3f5191e8c5@linux.intel.com>

Hi Alexey,

> Currently access to perf_events, i915_perf and other performance
> monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel is open only for
> a privileged process [1] with CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability enabled in the
> process effective set [2].
> 
> This patch set introduces CAP_PERFMON capability designed to secure
> system performance monitoring and observability operations so that
> CAP_PERFMON would assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role
> for performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel.

I'm seeing an issue with CAP_PERFMON when I try to record data for a
specific target. I don't know whether this is sort of a regression or
an expected behavior.

Without setting CAP_PERFMON:

   $ getcap ./perf
   $ ./perf stat -a ls
     Error:
     Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited.
   $ ./perf stat ls
     Performance counter stats for 'ls':
    
                  2.06 msec task-clock:u              #    0.418 CPUs utilized
                     0      context-switches:u        #    0.000 K/sec
                     0      cpu-migrations:u          #    0.000 K/sec

With CAP_PERFMON:

   $ getcap ./perf
     ./perf = cap_perfmon+ep
   $ ./perf stat -a ls
     Performance counter stats for 'system wide':
    
                142.42 msec cpu-clock                 #   25.062 CPUs utilized
                   182      context-switches          #    0.001 M/sec
                    48      cpu-migrations            #    0.337 K/sec
   $ ./perf stat ls
     Error:
     Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited.

Am I missing something silly?

Analysis:
---------
A bit more analysis lead me to below kernel code fs/exec.c:

   begin_new_exec()
   {
         ...
         if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP ||
             !(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) &&
               gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid())))
                 set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
         else
                 set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);

         ...
         commit_creds(bprm->cred);
   }

When I execute './perf stat ls', it's going into else condition and thus sets
dumpable flag as SUID_DUMP_USER. Then in commit_creds():

   int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
   {
         ...
         /* dumpability changes */
         if (...
             !cred_cap_issubset(old, new)) {
                 if (task->mm)
                         set_dumpable(task->mm, suid_dumpable);
   }

!cred_cap_issubset(old, new) fails for perf without any capability and thus
it doesn't execute set_dumpable(). Whereas that condition passes for perf
with CAP_PERFMON and thus it overwrites old value (SUID_DUMP_USER) with
suid_dumpable in mm_flags. On an Ubuntu, suid_dumpable default value is
SUID_DUMP_ROOT. On Fedora, it's SUID_DUMP_DISABLE. (/proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable).

Now while opening an event:

   perf_event_open()
     ptrace_may_access()
       __ptrace_may_access() {
                 ...
                 if (mm &&
                     ((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) &&
                      !ptrace_has_cap(cred, mm->user_ns, mode)))
                     return -EPERM;
       }

This if condition passes for perf with CAP_PERFMON and thus it returns -EPERM.
But it fails for perf without CAP_PERFMON and thus it goes ahead and returns
success. So opening an event fails when perf has CAP_PREFMON and tries to open
process specific event as normal user.

Workarounds:
------------
Based on above analysis, I found couple of workarounds (examples are on
Ubuntu 18.04.4 powerpc):

Workaround1:
Setting SUID_DUMP_USER as default (in /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable) solves the
issue.

   # echo 1 > /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable
   $ getcap ./perf
     ./perf = cap_perfmon+ep
   $ ./perf stat ls
     Performance counter stats for 'ls':
    
                  1.47 msec task-clock                #    0.806 CPUs utilized
                     0      context-switches          #    0.000 K/sec
                     0      cpu-migrations            #    0.000 K/sec

Workaround2:
Using CAP_SYS_PTRACE along with CAP_PERFMON solves the issue.

   $ cat /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable
     2
   # setcap "cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace=ep" ./perf
   $ ./perf stat ls
     Performance counter stats for 'ls':
    
                  1.41 msec task-clock                #    0.826 CPUs utilized
                     0      context-switches          #    0.000 K/sec
                     0      cpu-migrations            #    0.000 K/sec

Workaround3:
Adding CAP_PERFMON to parent of perf (/bin/bash) also solves the issue.

   $ cat /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable
     2
   # setcap "cap_perfmon=ep" /bin/bash
   # setcap "cap_perfmon=ep" ./perf
   $ bash
   $ ./perf stat ls
     Performance counter stats for 'ls':
    
                  1.47 msec task-clock                #    0.806 CPUs utilized
                     0      context-switches          #    0.000 K/sec
                     0      cpu-migrations            #    0.000 K/sec

- Ravi

  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-07-10 13:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-04-02  8:42 [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:45 ` [PATCH v8 01/12] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] capabilities: Introduce " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:46 ` [PATCH v8 02/12] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] perf/core: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:47 ` [PATCH v8 03/12] perf/core: open access to probes " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:47 ` [PATCH v8 04/12] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support Alexey Budankov
2020-04-03 11:08   ` Jiri Olsa
2020-04-03 13:08     ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-04  2:18   ` Namhyung Kim
2020-04-04  8:18     ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] perf tools: Support CAP_PERFMON capability tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:48 ` [PATCH v8 05/12] drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] drm/i915/perf: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:48 ` [PATCH v8 06/12] trace/bpf_trace: open " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] trace/bpf_trace: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:49 ` [PATCH v8 07/12] powerpc/perf: open " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:50 ` [PATCH v8 08/12] parisc/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:51 ` [PATCH v8 09/12] drivers/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] drivers/perf: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:53 ` [PATCH v8 10/12] drivers/oprofile: open " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] drivers/oprofile: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:54 ` [PATCH v8 11/12] doc/admin-guide: update perf-security.rst with CAP_PERFMON information Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] doc/admin-guide: Update " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:54 ` [PATCH v8 12/12] doc/admin-guide: update kernel.rst " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-05 14:10   ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-05 14:41     ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-05 14:54       ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-05 15:05         ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-05 15:51           ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 14:30 ` [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 14:35   ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 14:54     ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 16:36       ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 16:40         ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 17:17           ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 16:52         ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 17:02           ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 17:32             ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 16:56         ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 17:23           ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-10 13:31 ` Ravi Bangoria [this message]
2020-07-10 14:30   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-07-10 17:09     ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-13  9:48       ` Alexey Budankov
2020-07-13 12:17         ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-13 12:37           ` Alexey Budankov
2020-07-13 18:51             ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-14 10:59               ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-07-14 15:27                 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-21 13:06               ` Alexey Budankov
2020-07-22 11:30                 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo

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