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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
	"Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>,
	Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	"Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@gmail.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
	Ext4 Developers List <linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-man <linux-man@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/8] Rework random blocking
Date: Fri, 27 Dec 2019 18:06:56 -0800
Message-ID: <CALCETrUyVx_qb2yYH8D_z1T2bVu5RAEr71G0MTzEksBKKM1QsA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191227220857.GD70060@mit.edu>

On Fri, Dec 27, 2019 at 2:09 PM Theodore Y. Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> wrote:

> So if it's just for cryptographers, then let it all be done in
> userspace, and let's not make it easy for GPG, OpenSSL, etc., to all
> say, "We want TrueRandom(tm); we won't settle for less".  We can talk
> about how do we provide the interfaces so that those cryptographers
> can get the information they need so they can get access to the raw
> noise sources, separated out and named, and with possibly some way
> that the noise source can authenticate itself to the Cryptographer's
> userspace library/application.
>
> But all of this should probably not be in drivers/char/random.c, and
> we probably need to figure out a better kernel to userspace interface
> than what we have with /dev/hwrng.

I'm thinking of having a real class device and chardev for each hwrng
device.  Authentication is entirely in userspace: whatever user code
is involved can look at the sysfs hierarchy and decide to what extent
it trusts a given source.  This could be done based on bus topology or
based on anything else.

The kernel could also separately expose various noise sources, and the
user code can do whatever it wants with them.  But these should be
explicitly unconditioned, un-entropy-extracted sources -- user code
can run its favorite algorithm to extract something it believes to be
useful.  The only conceptually tricky bit is keeping user code like
this from interfering with the in-kernel RNG.

--Andy

  reply index

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-12-23  8:20 Andy Lutomirski
2019-12-23  8:20 ` [PATCH v3 1/8] random: Don't wake crng_init_wait when crng_init == 1 Andy Lutomirski
2020-01-07 20:42   ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-23  8:20 ` [PATCH v3 2/8] random: Add a urandom_read_nowait() for random APIs that don't warn Andy Lutomirski
2020-01-07 20:43   ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-23  8:20 ` [PATCH v3 3/8] random: Add GRND_INSECURE to return best-effort non-cryptographic bytes Andy Lutomirski
2020-01-07 20:44   ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-23  8:20 ` [PATCH v3 4/8] random: Ignore GRND_RANDOM in getentropy(2) Andy Lutomirski
2020-01-07 20:44   ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-23  8:20 ` [PATCH v3 5/8] random: Make /dev/random be almost like /dev/urandom Andy Lutomirski
2020-01-07 21:02   ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-23  8:20 ` [PATCH v3 6/8] random: Remove the blocking pool Andy Lutomirski
2020-01-07 21:03   ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-23  8:20 ` [PATCH v3 7/8] random: Delete code to pull data into pools Andy Lutomirski
2020-01-07 21:03   ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-23  8:20 ` [PATCH v3 8/8] random: Remove kernel.random.read_wakeup_threshold Andy Lutomirski
2020-01-07 21:04   ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-26  9:29 ` [PATCH v3 0/8] Rework random blocking Stephan Müller
2019-12-26 10:03   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-12-26 11:40     ` Stephan Mueller
2019-12-26 11:12   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-12-26 12:03     ` Stephan Mueller
2019-12-26 12:46       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-12-27  9:55         ` Stephan Mueller
2019-12-26 14:04       ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-26 23:29         ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-12-27 10:29           ` Stephan Mueller
2019-12-27 13:04             ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-27 21:22               ` Stephan Mueller
2019-12-27 22:08                 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-28  2:06                   ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2019-12-29 14:49                     ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-29 15:08                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-12-28  7:01                   ` Willy Tarreau
2020-01-09 22:02                   ` Kurt Roeckx
2020-01-09 22:40                     ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2020-01-09 23:02                       ` Kurt Roeckx
2020-01-10  7:53                         ` Stephan Mueller
2020-01-10  0:30                     ` Andy Lutomirski

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