From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> To: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Cc: DRI Development <dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-samsung-soc@vger.kernel.org, linux-media@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@intel.com>, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>, J??r??me Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 08/15] mm: Add unsafe_follow_pfn Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2020 08:56:44 +0000 Message-ID: <20201029085644.GA25658@infradead.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20201026105818.2585306-9-daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> > +int unsafe_follow_pfn(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, > + unsigned long *pfn) The one tab indent here looks weird, normally tis would be two tabs or aligned aftetthe opening brace. > +{ > +#ifdef CONFIG_STRICT_FOLLOW_PFN > + pr_info("unsafe follow_pfn usage rejected, see CONFIG_STRICT_FOLLOW_PFN\n"); > + return -EINVAL; > +#else > + WARN_ONCE(1, "unsafe follow_pfn usage\n"); > + add_taint(TAINT_USER, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); > + > + return follow_pfn(vma, address, pfn); > +#endif Woudn't this be a pretty good use case of "if (IS_ENABLED(...)))"? Also I'd expect the inverse polarity of the config option, that is a USAFE_FOLLOW_PFN option to enable to unsafe behavior. > +/** > + * unsafe_follow_pfn - look up PFN at a user virtual address > + * @vma: memory mapping > + * @address: user virtual address > + * @pfn: location to store found PFN > + * > + * Only IO mappings and raw PFN mappings are allowed. > + * > + * Returns zero and the pfn at @pfn on success, -ve otherwise. > + */ > +int unsafe_follow_pfn(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, > + unsigned long *pfn) > +{ > + return follow_pfn(vma, address, pfn); > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(unsafe_follow_pfn); Any reason this doesn't use the warn and disable logic?
next prev parent reply index Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-10-26 10:58 [PATCH v4 00/15] follow_pfn and other iomap races Daniel Vetter 2020-10-26 10:58 ` [PATCH v4 01/15] drm/exynos: Stop using frame_vector helpers Daniel Vetter 2020-10-26 10:58 ` [PATCH v4 02/15] drm/exynos: Use FOLL_LONGTERM for g2d cmdlists Daniel Vetter 2020-10-26 10:58 ` [PATCH v4 03/15] misc/habana: Stop using frame_vector helpers Daniel Vetter 2020-10-26 10:58 ` [PATCH v4 04/15] misc/habana: Use FOLL_LONGTERM for userptr Daniel Vetter 2020-10-26 10:58 ` [PATCH v4 05/15] mm/frame-vector: Use FOLL_LONGTERM Daniel Vetter 2020-10-26 22:15 ` Tomasz Figa 2020-10-27 8:05 ` Daniel Vetter 2020-10-26 10:58 ` [PATCH v4 06/15] media: videobuf2: Move frame_vector into media subsystem Daniel Vetter 2020-10-26 22:03 ` Tomasz Figa 2020-10-26 10:58 ` [PATCH v4 07/15] mm: Close race in generic_access_phys Daniel Vetter 2020-10-26 10:58 ` [PATCH v4 08/15] mm: Add unsafe_follow_pfn Daniel Vetter 2020-10-29 8:56 ` Christoph Hellwig [this message] 2020-10-29 9:23 ` Daniel Vetter 2020-10-26 10:58 ` [PATCH v4 09/15] media/videbuf1|2: Mark follow_pfn usage as unsafe Daniel Vetter 2020-10-26 22:02 ` Tomasz Figa 2020-10-26 10:58 ` [PATCH v4 10/15] vfio/type1: Mark follow_pfn " Daniel Vetter 2020-10-26 10:58 ` [PATCH v4 11/15] PCI: Obey iomem restrictions for procfs mmap Daniel Vetter 2020-10-26 10:58 ` [PATCH v4 12/15] /dev/mem: Only set filp->f_mapping Daniel Vetter 2020-10-26 10:58 ` [PATCH v4 13/15] resource: Move devmem revoke code to resource framework Daniel Vetter 2020-10-26 10:58 ` [PATCH v4 14/15] sysfs: Support zapping of binary attr mmaps Daniel Vetter 2020-10-26 10:58 ` [PATCH v4 15/15] PCI: Revoke mappings like devmem Daniel Vetter 2020-10-29 8:57 ` [PATCH v4 00/15] follow_pfn and other iomap races Christoph Hellwig 2020-10-29 9:25 ` Daniel Vetter 2020-10-29 9:28 ` Christoph Hellwig 2020-10-29 9:38 ` Daniel Vetter 2020-10-29 10:01 ` Christoph Hellwig
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