From: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
To: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>,
"J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
Chanho Min <chanho.min@lge.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
containers@lists.linux-foundation.org,
linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org,
linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org,
linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v9 06/10] namei: LOOKUP_IN_ROOT: chroot-like path resolution
Date: Sun, 7 Jul 2019 00:57:33 +1000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190706145737.5299-7-cyphar@cyphar.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190706145737.5299-1-cyphar@cyphar.com>
The primary motivation for the need for this flag is container runtimes
which have to interact with malicious root filesystems in the host
namespaces. One of the first requirements for a container runtime to be
secure against a malicious rootfs is that they correctly scope symlinks
(that is, they should be scoped as though they are chroot(2)ed into the
container's rootfs) and ".."-style paths[*]. The already-existing
LOOKUP_XDEV and LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS help defend against other potential
attacks in a malicious rootfs scenario.
Currently most container runtimes try to do this resolution in
userspace[1], causing many potential race conditions. In addition, the
"obvious" alternative (actually performing a {ch,pivot_}root(2))
requires a fork+exec (for some runtimes) which is *very* costly if
necessary for every filesystem operation involving a container.
[*] At the moment, ".." and magic-link jumping are disallowed for the
same reason it is disabled for LOOKUP_BENEATH -- currently it is not
safe to allow it. Future patches may enable it unconditionally once
we have resolved the possible races (for "..") and semantics (for
magic-link jumping).
The most significant *at(2) semantic change with LOOKUP_IN_ROOT is that
absolute pathnames no longer cause dirfd to be ignored completely. The
rationale is that LOOKUP_IN_ROOT must necessarily chroot-scope symlinks
with absolute paths to dirfd, and so doing it for the base path seems to
be the most consistent behaviour (and also avoids foot-gunning users who
want to scope paths that are absolute).
[1]: https://github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin
Co-developed-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
---
fs/namei.c | 6 +++---
include/linux/namei.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 9c3ed597466b..ff016b9e9082 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -1149,7 +1149,7 @@ const char *get_link(struct nameidata *nd, bool trailing)
if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS))
return ERR_PTR(-ELOOP);
/* Not currently safe. */
- if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_BENEATH))
+ if (unlikely(nd->flags & (LOOKUP_BENEATH | LOOKUP_IN_ROOT)))
return ERR_PTR(-EXDEV);
/*
* For trailing_symlink we check whether the symlink's
@@ -1833,7 +1833,7 @@ static inline int handle_dots(struct nameidata *nd, int type)
* cause our parent to have moved outside of the root and us to skip
* over it.
*/
- if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_BENEATH))
+ if (unlikely(nd->flags & (LOOKUP_BENEATH | LOOKUP_IN_ROOT)))
return -EXDEV;
if (!nd->root.mnt)
set_root(nd);
@@ -2384,7 +2384,7 @@ static const char *path_init(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags)
nd->m_seq = read_seqbegin(&mount_lock);
- if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_BENEATH)) {
+ if (unlikely(nd->flags & (LOOKUP_BENEATH | LOOKUP_IN_ROOT))) {
error = dirfd_path_init(nd);
if (unlikely(error))
return ERR_PTR(error);
diff --git a/include/linux/namei.h b/include/linux/namei.h
index 7bc819ad0cd3..4b1ee717cb14 100644
--- a/include/linux/namei.h
+++ b/include/linux/namei.h
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ enum {LAST_NORM, LAST_ROOT, LAST_DOT, LAST_DOTDOT, LAST_BIND};
#define LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS 0x040000 /* No /proc/$pid/fd/ "symlink" crossing. */
#define LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS 0x080000 /* No symlink crossing *at all*.
Implies LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS. */
+#define LOOKUP_IN_ROOT 0x100000 /* Treat dirfd as %current->fs->root. */
extern int path_pts(struct path *path);
--
2.22.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-07-06 15:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-07-06 14:57 [PATCH v9 00/10] namei: openat2(2) path resolution restrictions Aleksa Sarai
2019-07-06 14:57 ` [PATCH v9 01/10] namei: obey trailing magic-link DAC permissions Aleksa Sarai
2019-07-12 4:14 ` Al Viro
2019-07-12 6:36 ` Al Viro
2019-07-12 12:20 ` Aleksa Sarai
2019-07-12 13:10 ` Al Viro
2019-07-14 7:11 ` Aleksa Sarai
2019-07-06 14:57 ` [PATCH v9 02/10] procfs: switch magic-link modes to be more sane Aleksa Sarai
2019-07-06 14:57 ` [PATCH v9 03/10] open: O_EMPTYPATH: procfs-less file descriptor re-opening Aleksa Sarai
2019-07-06 14:57 ` [PATCH v9 04/10] namei: split out nd->dfd handling to dirfd_path_init Aleksa Sarai
2019-07-12 4:20 ` Al Viro
2019-07-12 12:07 ` Aleksa Sarai
2019-07-12 12:12 ` Aleksa Sarai
2019-07-06 14:57 ` [PATCH v9 05/10] namei: O_BENEATH-style path resolution flags Aleksa Sarai
2019-07-12 4:33 ` Al Viro
2019-07-12 10:57 ` Aleksa Sarai
2019-07-12 12:39 ` Al Viro
2019-07-12 12:55 ` Al Viro
2019-07-12 13:25 ` Al Viro
2019-07-12 15:00 ` Al Viro
2019-07-13 2:41 ` Al Viro
2019-07-14 3:58 ` Al Viro
2019-07-16 8:03 ` Aleksa Sarai
2019-07-14 7:00 ` Aleksa Sarai
2019-07-14 14:36 ` Al Viro
2019-07-18 3:17 ` Aleksa Sarai
2019-07-14 10:31 ` Aleksa Sarai
2019-07-06 14:57 ` Aleksa Sarai [this message]
2019-07-06 14:57 ` [PATCH v9 07/10] namei: aggressively check for nd->root escape on ".." resolution Aleksa Sarai
2019-07-06 14:57 ` [PATCH v9 08/10] open: openat2(2) syscall Aleksa Sarai
2019-07-18 14:48 ` Rasmus Villemoes
2019-07-18 15:21 ` Aleksa Sarai
2019-07-18 15:10 ` Arnd Bergmann
2019-07-18 16:12 ` Aleksa Sarai
2019-07-18 21:29 ` Arnd Bergmann
2019-07-19 2:12 ` Dmitry V. Levin
2019-07-19 10:29 ` Christian Brauner
2019-07-19 1:59 ` Dmitry V. Levin
2019-07-19 2:19 ` Aleksa Sarai
2019-07-06 14:57 ` [PATCH v9 09/10] kselftest: save-and-restore errno to allow for %m formatting Aleksa Sarai
2019-07-06 14:57 ` [PATCH v9 10/10] selftests: add openat2(2) selftests Aleksa Sarai
2019-07-08 1:15 ` Michael Ellerman
2019-07-08 5:47 ` Aleksa Sarai
2019-07-12 15:11 ` [PATCH v9 00/10] namei: openat2(2) path resolution restrictions Al Viro
2019-07-12 15:32 ` Aleksa Sarai
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