From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-pg0-f69.google.com (mail-pg0-f69.google.com [74.125.83.69]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0FD436B025E for ; Tue, 21 Nov 2017 18:17:19 -0500 (EST) Received: by mail-pg0-f69.google.com with SMTP id m4so1581320pgc.23 for ; Tue, 21 Nov 2017 15:17:19 -0800 (PST) Received: from mga09.intel.com (mga09.intel.com. [134.134.136.24]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id e14si12034403pga.447.2017.11.21.15.17.17 for (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Tue, 21 Nov 2017 15:17:17 -0800 (PST) Subject: Re: [PATCH 12/30] x86, kaiser: map GDT into user page tables References: <20171110193058.BECA7D88@viggo.jf.intel.com> <20171110193125.EBF58596@viggo.jf.intel.com> From: Dave Hansen Message-ID: <02e48e97-5842-6a19-1ea2-cee4ed5910f4@linux.intel.com> Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2017 15:17:15 -0800 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org List-ID: To: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Andy Lutomirski , Thomas Gleixner , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-mm@kvack.org" , moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at, Daniel Gruss , michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at, richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at, Linus Torvalds , Kees Cook , Hugh Dickins , X86 ML On 11/21/2017 02:46 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >> GDT: R/O TSS: R/W at least because of trampoline stack entry code: >> EXEC+R/O exception stacks: R/W > Can you avoid code duplication by adding some logic right after the > kernel cpu_entry_area is set up to iterate page by page over the PTEs > in the cpu_entry_area for that CPU and just install exactly the same > PTEs into the kaiser table? E.g. just call kaiser_add_mapping once > per page but with the parameters read out from the fixmap PTEs > instead of hard coded? Yes, we could do that. But, what's the gain? We end up removing effectively three (long) lines of code from three kaiser_add_mapping() calls. To do this, we need to special-case the kernel page table walker to deal with PTEs only since we can't just grab PMD or PUD flags and stick them in a PTE. We would only be able to use this path when populating things that we know are 4k-mapped in the kernel. I guess the upside is that we don't open-code the permissions in the KAISER code that *have* to match the permissions that the kernel itself established. It also means that theoretically you could not touch the KAISER code the next time we expand the cpu entry area. -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Don't email: email@kvack.org