From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-oi0-f72.google.com (mail-oi0-f72.google.com [209.85.218.72]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7DB9A6B03B2 for ; Thu, 2 Mar 2017 10:17:33 -0500 (EST) Received: by mail-oi0-f72.google.com with SMTP id s132so33794488oie.1 for ; Thu, 02 Mar 2017 07:17:33 -0800 (PST) Received: from NAM02-BL2-obe.outbound.protection.outlook.com (mail-bl2nam02on0048.outbound.protection.outlook.com. [104.47.38.48]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id o110si2491547ota.66.2017.03.02.07.17.31 for (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA bits=128/128); Thu, 02 Mar 2017 07:17:32 -0800 (PST) Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 24/32] kvm: x86: prepare for SEV guest management API support From: Brijesh Singh Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2017 10:17:22 -0500 Message-ID: <148846784278.2349.17771314083820274411.stgit@brijesh-build-machine> In-Reply-To: <148846752022.2349.13667498174822419498.stgit@brijesh-build-machine> References: <148846752022.2349.13667498174822419498.stgit@brijesh-build-machine> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org List-ID: To: simon.guinot@sequanux.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, brijesh.singh@amd.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, rkrcmar@redhat.com, matt@codeblueprint.co.uk, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, linus.walleij@linaro.org, gary.hook@amd.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, paul.gortmaker@windriver.com, hpa@zytor.com, cl@linux.com, dan.j.williams@intel.com, aarcange@redhat.com, sfr@canb.auug.org.au, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, bhe@redhat.com, xemul@parallels.com, joro@8bytes.org, x86@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org, piotr.luc@intel.com, mingo@redhat.com, msalter@redhat.com, ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com, bp@suse.de, dyoung@redhat.com, thomas.lendacky@amd.com, jroedel@suse.de, keescook@chromium.org, arnd@arndb.de, toshi.kani@hpe.com, mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com, luto@kernel.org, devel@linuxdriverproject.org, bhelgaas@google.com, tglx@linutronix.de, mchehab@kernel.org, iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com, labbott@fedoraproject.org, tony.luck@intel.com, alexandre.bounine@idt.com, kuleshovmail@gmail.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mcgrof@kernel.org, mst@redhat.com, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, tj@kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org, davem@davemloft.net The patch adds initial support required to integrate Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) feature. ASID management: - Reserve asid range for SEV guest, SEV asid range is obtained through CPUID Fn8000_001f[ECX]. A non-SEV guest can use any asid outside the SEV asid range. - SEV guest must have asid value within asid range obtained through CPUID. - SEV guest must have the same asid for all vcpu's. A TLB flush is required if different vcpu for the same ASID is to be run on the same host CPU. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh --- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 8 ++ arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 189 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 294 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h index 62651ad..fcc4710 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -719,6 +719,12 @@ struct kvm_hv { HV_REFERENCE_TSC_PAGE tsc_ref; }; +struct kvm_sev_info { + unsigned int handle; /* firmware handle */ + unsigned int asid; /* asid for this guest */ + int sev_fd; /* SEV device fd */ +}; + struct kvm_arch { unsigned int n_used_mmu_pages; unsigned int n_requested_mmu_pages; @@ -805,6 +811,8 @@ struct kvm_arch { bool x2apic_format; bool x2apic_broadcast_quirk_disabled; + + struct kvm_sev_info sev_info; }; struct kvm_vm_stat { diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c index 8d8fe62..fb63398 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -211,6 +212,9 @@ struct vcpu_svm { */ struct list_head ir_list; spinlock_t ir_list_lock; + + /* which host cpu was used for running this vcpu */ + bool last_cpuid; }; /* @@ -490,6 +494,64 @@ static inline bool gif_set(struct vcpu_svm *svm) return !!(svm->vcpu.arch.hflags & HF_GIF_MASK); } +/* Secure Encrypted Virtualization */ +static unsigned int max_sev_asid; +static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap; + +static bool kvm_sev_enabled(void) +{ + return max_sev_asid ? 1 : 0; +} + +static inline struct kvm_sev_info *sev_get_info(struct kvm *kvm) +{ + struct kvm_arch *vm_data = &kvm->arch; + + return &vm_data->sev_info; +} + +static unsigned int sev_get_handle(struct kvm *kvm) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev_info = sev_get_info(kvm); + + return sev_info->handle; +} + +static inline int sev_guest(struct kvm *kvm) +{ + return sev_get_handle(kvm); +} + +static inline int sev_get_asid(struct kvm *kvm) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev_info = sev_get_info(kvm); + + if (!sev_info) + return -EINVAL; + + return sev_info->asid; +} + +static inline int sev_get_fd(struct kvm *kvm) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev_info = sev_get_info(kvm); + + if (!sev_info) + return -EINVAL; + + return sev_info->sev_fd; +} + +static inline void sev_set_asid(struct kvm *kvm, int asid) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev_info = sev_get_info(kvm); + + if (!sev_info) + return; + + sev_info->asid = asid; +} + static unsigned long iopm_base; struct kvm_ldttss_desc { @@ -511,6 +573,8 @@ struct svm_cpu_data { struct kvm_ldttss_desc *tss_desc; struct page *save_area; + + struct vmcb **sev_vmcbs; /* index = sev_asid, value = vmcb pointer */ }; static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct svm_cpu_data *, svm_data); @@ -764,7 +828,7 @@ static int svm_hardware_enable(void) sd->asid_generation = 1; sd->max_asid = cpuid_ebx(SVM_CPUID_FUNC) - 1; sd->next_asid = sd->max_asid + 1; - sd->min_asid = 1; + sd->min_asid = max_sev_asid + 1; native_store_gdt(&gdt_descr); gdt = (struct desc_struct *)gdt_descr.address; @@ -825,6 +889,7 @@ static void svm_cpu_uninit(int cpu) per_cpu(svm_data, raw_smp_processor_id()) = NULL; __free_page(sd->save_area); + kfree(sd->sev_vmcbs); kfree(sd); } @@ -842,6 +907,14 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu) if (!sd->save_area) goto err_1; + if (kvm_sev_enabled()) { + sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc((max_sev_asid + 1) * sizeof(void *), + GFP_KERNEL); + r = -ENOMEM; + if (!sd->sev_vmcbs) + goto err_1; + } + per_cpu(svm_data, cpu) = sd; return 0; @@ -1017,6 +1090,61 @@ static int avic_ga_log_notifier(u32 ga_tag) return 0; } +static __init void sev_hardware_setup(void) +{ + int ret, error, nguests; + struct sev_data_init *init; + struct sev_data_status *status; + + /* + * Get maximum number of encrypted guest supported: Fn8001_001F[ECX] + * Bit 31:0: Number of supported guest + */ + nguests = cpuid_ecx(0x8000001F); + if (!nguests) + return; + + init = kzalloc(sizeof(*init), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!init) + return; + + status = kzalloc(sizeof(*status), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!status) + goto err_1; + + /* Initialize SEV firmware */ + ret = sev_platform_init(init, &error); + if (ret) { + pr_err("SEV: PLATFORM_INIT ret=%d (%#x)\n", ret, error); + goto err_2; + } + + /* Initialize SEV ASID bitmap */ + sev_asid_bitmap = kcalloc(BITS_TO_LONGS(nguests), + sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL); + if (IS_ERR(sev_asid_bitmap)) { + sev_platform_shutdown(&error); + goto err_2; + } + + /* Query the platform status and print API version */ + ret = sev_platform_status(status, &error); + if (ret) { + printk(KERN_ERR "SEV: PLATFORM_STATUS ret=%#x\n", error); + goto err_2; + } + + max_sev_asid = nguests; + + printk(KERN_INFO "kvm: SEV enabled\n"); + printk(KERN_INFO "SEV API: %d.%d\n", + status->api_major, status->api_minor); +err_2: + kfree(status); +err_1: + kfree(init); +} + static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void) { int cpu; @@ -1052,6 +1180,9 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void) kvm_enable_efer_bits(EFER_SVME | EFER_LMSLE); } + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV)) + sev_hardware_setup(); + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { r = svm_cpu_init(cpu); if (r) @@ -1094,10 +1225,25 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void) return r; } +static __exit void sev_hardware_unsetup(void) +{ + int ret, err; + + ret = sev_platform_shutdown(&err); + if (ret) + printk(KERN_ERR "failed to shutdown PSP rc=%d (%#0x10x)\n", + ret, err); + + kfree(sev_asid_bitmap); +} + static __exit void svm_hardware_unsetup(void) { int cpu; + if (kvm_sev_enabled()) + sev_hardware_unsetup(); + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) svm_cpu_uninit(cpu); @@ -1157,6 +1303,11 @@ static void avic_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm) svm->vcpu.arch.apicv_active = true; } +static void sev_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm) +{ + svm->vmcb->control.nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ENABLE; +} + static void init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm) { struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control; @@ -1271,6 +1422,9 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm) if (avic) avic_init_vmcb(svm); + if (sev_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) + sev_init_vmcb(svm); + mark_all_dirty(svm->vmcb); enable_gif(svm); @@ -2084,6 +2238,11 @@ static int pf_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm) default: error_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1; + /* In SEV mode, the guest physical address will have C-bit + * set. C-bit must be cleared before handling the fault. + */ + if (sev_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) + fault_address &= ~sme_me_mask; trace_kvm_page_fault(fault_address, error_code); if (!npt_enabled && kvm_event_needs_reinjection(&svm->vcpu)) kvm_mmu_unprotect_page_virt(&svm->vcpu, fault_address); @@ -4258,12 +4417,40 @@ static void reload_tss(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) load_TR_desc(); } +static void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm) +{ + int asid = sev_get_asid(svm->vcpu.kvm); + int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id(); + struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu); + + /* Assign the asid allocated for this SEV guest */ + svm->vmcb->control.asid = asid; + + /* Flush guest TLB: + * - when different VMCB for the same ASID is to be run on the + * same host CPU + * or + * - this VMCB was executed on different host cpu in previous VMRUNs. + */ + if (sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] != (void *)svm->vmcb || + svm->last_cpuid != cpu) + svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ALL_ASID; + + svm->last_cpuid = cpu; + sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] = (void *)svm->vmcb; + + mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_ASID); +} + static void pre_svm_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm) { int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id(); struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu); + if (sev_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) + return pre_sev_run(svm); + /* FIXME: handle wraparound of asid_generation */ if (svm->asid_generation != sd->asid_generation) new_asid(svm, sd); diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h index fef7d83..9df37a2 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h @@ -1284,6 +1284,104 @@ struct kvm_s390_ucas_mapping { /* Memory Encryption Commands */ #define KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP _IOWR(KVMIO, 0xb8, unsigned long) +/* Secure Encrypted Virtualization mode */ +enum sev_cmd_id { + /* Guest launch commands */ + KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START = 0, + KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, + KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE, + KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH, + /* Guest migration commands (outgoing) */ + KVM_SEV_SEND_START, + KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA, + KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH, + /* Guest migration commands (incoming) */ + KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START, + KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA, + KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH, + /* Guest status and debug commands */ + KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, + KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT, + KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT, + + KVM_SEV_NR_MAX, +}; + +struct kvm_sev_cmd { + __u32 id; + __u64 data; + __u32 error; + __u32 sev_fd; +}; + +struct kvm_sev_launch_start { + __u32 handle; + __u32 policy; + __u64 dh_cert_data; + __u32 dh_cert_length; + __u64 session_data; + __u32 session_length; +}; + +struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data { + __u64 address; + __u32 length; +}; + +struct kvm_sev_launch_measure { + __u64 address; + __u32 length; +}; + +struct kvm_sev_send_start { + __u64 pdh_cert_data; + __u32 pdh_cert_length; + __u64 plat_cert_data; + __u32 plat_cert_length; + __u64 amd_cert_data; + __u32 amd_cert_length; + __u64 session_data; + __u32 session_length; +}; + +struct kvm_sev_send_update_data { + __u64 hdr_data; + __u32 hdr_length; + __u64 guest_address; + __u32 guest_length; + __u64 host_address; + __u32 host_length; +}; + +struct kvm_sev_receive_start { + __u32 handle; + __u64 pdh_cert_data; + __u32 pdh_cert_length; + __u64 session_data; + __u32 session_length; +}; + +struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data { + __u64 hdr_data; + __u32 hdr_length; + __u64 guest_address; + __u32 guest_length; + __u64 host_address; + __u32 host_length; +}; + +struct kvm_sev_guest_status { + __u32 handle; + __u32 policy; + __u32 state; +}; + +struct kvm_sev_dbg { + __u64 src_addr; + __u64 dst_addr; + __u32 length; +}; + #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0) #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1) #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2) -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@kvack.org. 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