From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.2 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, UNPARSEABLE_RELAY,USER_AGENT_SANE_2 autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AEB6CC47404 for ; Fri, 4 Oct 2019 09:44:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: from kanga.kvack.org (kanga.kvack.org [205.233.56.17]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 60EA7207FF for ; Fri, 4 Oct 2019 09:44:32 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 60EA7207FF Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=mediatek.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) id E9BEA6B0003; Fri, 4 Oct 2019 05:44:31 -0400 (EDT) Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 40) id E4CED6B0005; Fri, 4 Oct 2019 05:44:31 -0400 (EDT) X-Delivered-To: int-list-linux-mm@kvack.org Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 63042) id D3CFD6B0007; Fri, 4 Oct 2019 05:44:31 -0400 (EDT) X-Delivered-To: linux-mm@kvack.org Received: from forelay.hostedemail.com (smtprelay0086.hostedemail.com [216.40.44.86]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B2DB46B0003 for ; Fri, 4 Oct 2019 05:44:31 -0400 (EDT) Received: from smtpin07.hostedemail.com (10.5.19.251.rfc1918.com [10.5.19.251]) by forelay01.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 498B3180AD801 for ; Fri, 4 Oct 2019 09:44:31 +0000 (UTC) X-FDA: 76005617142.07.flag99_274677df76948 X-HE-Tag: flag99_274677df76948 X-Filterd-Recvd-Size: 13427 Received: from mailgw01.mediatek.com (unknown [210.61.82.183]) by imf04.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP for ; Fri, 4 Oct 2019 09:44:29 +0000 (UTC) X-UUID: f67b3a2d9d194aad9b6e4888dd33f68f-20191004 X-UUID: f67b3a2d9d194aad9b6e4888dd33f68f-20191004 Received: from mtkmrs01.mediatek.inc [(172.21.131.159)] by mailgw01.mediatek.com (envelope-from ) (Cellopoint E-mail Firewall v4.1.10 Build 0809 with TLS) with ESMTP id 753597374; Fri, 04 Oct 2019 17:44:18 +0800 Received: from MTKCAS06.mediatek.inc (172.21.101.30) by mtkmbs07n1.mediatek.inc (172.21.101.16) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 15.0.1395.4; Fri, 4 Oct 2019 17:44:16 +0800 Received: from [172.21.84.99] (172.21.84.99) by MTKCAS06.mediatek.inc (172.21.101.73) with Microsoft SMTP Server id 15.0.1395.4 via Frontend Transport; Fri, 4 Oct 2019 17:44:15 +0800 Message-ID: <1570182257.19702.109.camel@mtksdccf07> Subject: Re: [PATCH] kasan: fix the missing underflow in memmove and memcpy with CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC=y From: Walter Wu To: Dmitry Vyukov CC: Andrey Ryabinin , Alexander Potapenko , Matthias Brugger , LKML , kasan-dev , Linux-MM , Linux ARM , , wsd_upstream Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2019 17:44:17 +0800 In-Reply-To: References: <20190927034338.15813-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> <1569594142.9045.24.camel@mtksdccf07> <1569818173.17361.19.camel@mtksdccf07> <1570018513.19702.36.camel@mtksdccf07> <1570069078.19702.57.camel@mtksdccf07> <1570095525.19702.59.camel@mtksdccf07> <1570110681.19702.64.camel@mtksdccf07> <1570164140.19702.97.camel@mtksdccf07> <1570176131.19702.105.camel@mtksdccf07> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.2.3-0ubuntu6 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit MIME-Version: 1.0 X-MTK: N X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: On Fri, 2019-10-04 at 11:18 +0200, Dmitry Vyukov wrote: > On Fri, Oct 4, 2019 at 10:02 AM Walter Wu wrote: > > > > On Fri, 2019-10-04 at 12:42 +0800, Walter Wu wrote: > > > On Thu, 2019-10-03 at 16:53 +0200, Dmitry Vyukov wrote: > > > > On Thu, Oct 3, 2019 at 3:51 PM Walter Wu wrote:> > > > > > > > > > > static void print_error_description(struct kasan_access_info *info) > > > > > { > > > > > - pr_err("BUG: KASAN: %s in %pS\n", > > > > > - get_bug_type(info), (void *)info->ip); > > > > > - pr_err("%s of size %zu at addr %px by task %s/%d\n", > > > > > - info->is_write ? "Write" : "Read", info->access_size, > > > > > - info->access_addr, current->comm, task_pid_nr(current)); > > > > > + if ((long)info->access_size < 0) { > > > > > + pr_err("BUG: KASAN: invalid size %zu in %pS\n", > > > > > + info->access_size, (void *)info->ip); > > > > > > > > I would not introduce a new bug type. > > > > These are parsed and used by some systems, e.g. syzbot. If size is > > > > user-controllable, then a new bug type for this will mean 2 bug > > > > reports. > > > > It also won't harm to print Read/Write, definitely the address, so no > > > > reason to special case this out of a dozen of report formats. > > > > This can qualify as out-of-bounds (definitely will cross some > > > > bounds!), so I would change get_bug_type() to return > > > > "slab-out-of-bounds" (as the most common OOB) in such case (with a > > > > comment). > > > > > > > Print Read/Write and address information, it is ok. > > > But if we can directly point to the root cause of this problem, why we > > > not do it? see 1) and 2) to get a point, if we print OOB, then user > > > needs one minute to think what is root case of this problem, but if we > > > print invalid size, then user can directly get root case. this is my > > > original thinking. > > > 1)Invalid size is true then OOB is true. > > > 2)OOB is true then invalid size may be true or false. > > > > > > But I see you say some systems have used bug report so that avoid this > > > trouble, i will print the wrong type is "out-of-bound" in a unified way > > > when size<0. > > > > > > > Updated my patch, please help to review it. > > thanks. > > > > commit 13e10a7e4264eb25c5a14193068027afc9c261f6 > > Author: Walter-zh Wu > > Date: Fri Oct 4 15:27:17 2019 +0800 > > > > kasan: detect negative size in memory operation function > > > > It is an undefined behavior to pass a negative value to > > memset()/memcpy()/memmove() > > , so need to be detected by KASAN. > > > > If size is negative value, then it will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2, > > so that we will qualify as out-of-bounds issue. > > > > KASAN report: > > > > BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0 > > Read of size 18446744073709551608 at addr ffffff8069660904 by task > > cat/72 > > > > CPU: 2 PID: 72 Comm: cat Not tainted > > 5.4.0-rc1-next-20191004ajb-00001-gdb8af2f372b2-dirty #1 > > Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) > > Call trace: > > dump_backtrace+0x0/0x288 > > show_stack+0x14/0x20 > > dump_stack+0x10c/0x164 > > print_address_description.isra.9+0x68/0x378 > > __kasan_report+0x164/0x1a0 > > kasan_report+0xc/0x18 > > check_memory_region+0x174/0x1d0 > > memmove+0x34/0x88 > > kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0 > > > > [1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199341 > > > > Signed-off-by: Walter Wu > > Reported -by: Dmitry Vyukov > > Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov > > > > diff --git a/lib/test_kasan.c b/lib/test_kasan.c > > index 49cc4d570a40..06942cf585cc 100644 > > --- a/lib/test_kasan.c > > +++ b/lib/test_kasan.c > > @@ -283,6 +283,23 @@ static noinline void __init > > kmalloc_oob_in_memset(void) > > kfree(ptr); > > } > > > > +static noinline void __init kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size(void) > > +{ > > + char *ptr; > > + size_t size = 64; > > + > > + pr_info("invalid size in memmove\n"); > > + ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); > > + if (!ptr) { > > + pr_err("Allocation failed\n"); > > + return; > > + } > > + > > + memset((char *)ptr, 0, 64); > > + memmove((char *)ptr, (char *)ptr + 4, -2); > > + kfree(ptr); > > +} > > + > > static noinline void __init kmalloc_uaf(void) > > { > > char *ptr; > > @@ -773,6 +790,7 @@ static int __init kmalloc_tests_init(void) > > kmalloc_oob_memset_4(); > > kmalloc_oob_memset_8(); > > kmalloc_oob_memset_16(); > > + kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size(); > > kmalloc_uaf(); > > kmalloc_uaf_memset(); > > kmalloc_uaf2(); > > diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c > > index 6814d6d6a023..97dd6eecc3e7 100644 > > --- a/mm/kasan/common.c > > +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c > > @@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_check_write); > > #undef memset > > void *memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len) > > { > > - check_memory_region((unsigned long)addr, len, true, _RET_IP_); > > + if (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)addr, len, true, _RET_IP_)) > > + return NULL; > > > > return __memset(addr, c, len); > > } > > @@ -110,7 +111,8 @@ void *memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len) > > #undef memmove > > void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len) > > { > > - check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_); > > + if (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_)) > > + return NULL; > > check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_); > > I would check both calls. > The current code seems to be over-specialized for handling of invalid > size (you assume that if it's invalid size, then the first > check_memory_region will detect it and checking the second one is > pointless, right?). > But check_memory_region can return false in other cases too. > Also seeing first call checked, but the second not checked just hurts > my eyes when reading code (whenever I will read such code my first > reaction will be "why?"). > I can't agree with you any more about second point. #undef memmove void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len) { if (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_) ||) !check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_); return NULL; return __memmove(dest, src, len); } > > > > > return __memmove(dest, src, len); > > @@ -119,7 +121,8 @@ void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t > > len) > > #undef memcpy > > void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len) > > { > > - check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_); > > + if (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_)) > > + return NULL; > > check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_); > > > > return __memcpy(dest, src, len); > > diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c > > index 616f9dd82d12..02148a317d27 100644 > > --- a/mm/kasan/generic.c > > +++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c > > @@ -173,6 +173,11 @@ static __always_inline bool > > check_memory_region_inline(unsigned long addr, > > if (unlikely(size == 0)) > > return true; > > > > + if (unlikely((long)size < 0)) { > > + kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip); > > + return false; > > + } > > + > > if (unlikely((void *)addr < > > kasan_shadow_to_mem((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START))) { > > kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip); > > diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c > > index 36c645939bc9..ae9596210394 100644 > > --- a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c > > +++ b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c > > @@ -107,6 +107,13 @@ static const char *get_wild_bug_type(struct > > kasan_access_info *info) > > > > const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info) > > { > > + /* > > + * if access_size < 0, then it will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2, > > + * so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds. > > + */ > > + if ((long)info->access_size < 0) > > + return "out-of-bounds"; > > "out-of-bounds" is the _least_ frequent KASAN bug type. So saying > "out-of-bounds" has downsides of both approaches and won't prevent > duplicate reports by syzbot... > maybe i should add your comment into the comment in get_bug_type? > > + > > if (addr_has_shadow(info->access_addr)) > > return get_shadow_bug_type(info); > > return get_wild_bug_type(info); > > diff --git a/mm/kasan/tags.c b/mm/kasan/tags.c > > index 0e987c9ca052..b829535a3ad7 100644 > > --- a/mm/kasan/tags.c > > +++ b/mm/kasan/tags.c > > @@ -86,6 +86,11 @@ bool check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t > > size, bool write, > > if (unlikely(size == 0)) > > return true; > > > > + if (unlikely((long)size < 0)) { > > + kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip); > > + return false; > > + } > > + > > tag = get_tag((const void *)addr); > > > > /* > > diff --git a/mm/kasan/tags_report.c b/mm/kasan/tags_report.c > > index 969ae08f59d7..1e1ca81214b5 100644 > > --- a/mm/kasan/tags_report.c > > +++ b/mm/kasan/tags_report.c > > @@ -36,6 +36,13 @@ > > > > const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info) > > { > > + /* > > + * if access_size < 0, then it will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2, > > + * so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds. > > + */ > > + if ((long)info->access_size < 0) > > + return "out-of-bounds"; > > + > > #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS_IDENTIFY > > struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta; > > struct kmem_cache *cache; > > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "kasan-dev" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to kasan-dev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. > > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/kasan-dev/1570176131.19702.105.camel%40mtksdccf07.