From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com>,
Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>, Nosh Minwalla <nosh@google.com>,
Pavel Emelyanov <ovzxemul@gmail.com>,
Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH 0/1] userfaultfd: require CAP_SYS_PTRACE for UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2019 17:29:36 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1572967777-8812-1-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
Hi,
A while ago Andy noticed [1] that UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK used by an
unprivileged user may have security implications.
As the first step of the solution the following patch limits the
availably of UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK only for those having CAP_SYS_PTRACE.
The usage of CAP_SYS_PTRACE ensures compatibility with CRIU.
Yet, if there are other users of non-cooperative userfaultfd that run
without CAP_SYS_PTRACE, they would be broken :(
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CALCETrWY+5ynDct7eU_nDUqx=okQvjm=Y5wJvA4ahBja=CQXGw@mail.gmail.com
Mike Rapoport (1):
userfaultfd: require CAP_SYS_PTRACE for UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK
fs/userfaultfd.c | 18 +++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--
2.7.4
next reply other threads:[~2019-11-05 15:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-11-05 15:29 Mike Rapoport [this message]
2019-11-05 15:29 ` [PATCH 1/1] userfaultfd: require CAP_SYS_PTRACE for UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK Mike Rapoport
2019-11-05 15:37 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2019-11-05 15:55 ` Daniel Colascione
2019-11-05 16:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-11-05 16:06 ` Daniel Colascione
2019-11-05 16:33 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2019-11-05 16:39 ` Daniel Colascione
2019-11-05 16:55 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2019-11-05 17:02 ` Daniel Colascione
2019-11-05 17:30 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2019-11-05 22:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-11-05 22:10 ` Daniel Colascione
2019-11-05 16:24 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2019-11-05 16:41 ` Daniel Colascione
2019-11-07 8:39 ` Mike Rapoport
2019-11-07 8:54 ` Daniel Colascione
2019-11-07 15:38 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2019-11-07 16:15 ` Daniel Colascione
2019-11-07 18:22 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2019-11-07 18:50 ` Daniel Colascione
2019-11-07 19:27 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2019-11-10 17:02 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-11-05 15:59 ` Aleksa Sarai
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