From: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] mm/slub.c: add a naive detection of double free or corruption
Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 22:56:23 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1edb137c-356f-81d6-4592-f5dfc68e8ea9@linux.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jK5j2pSVca9XGJhJ6pnF04p7S=K1Z432nzG2y4LfKhYjg@mail.gmail.com>
On 17.07.2017 22:11, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 17, 2017 at 12:01 PM, Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> wrote:
>> Hello Christopher,
>>
>> Thanks for your reply.
>>
>> On 17.07.2017 21:04, Christopher Lameter wrote:
>>> On Mon, 17 Jul 2017, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Mon, Jul 17, 2017 at 07:45:07PM +0300, Alexander Popov wrote:
>>>>> Add an assertion similar to "fasttop" check in GNU C Library allocator:
>>>>> an object added to a singly linked freelist should not point to itself.
>>>>> That helps to detect some double free errors (e.g. CVE-2017-2636) without
>>>>> slub_debug and KASAN. Testing with hackbench doesn't show any noticeable
>>>>> performance penalty.
>>>>
>>>>> {
>>>>> + BUG_ON(object == fp); /* naive detection of double free or corruption */
>>>>> *(void **)(object + s->offset) = fp;
>>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> Is BUG() the best response to this situation? If it's a corruption, then
>>>> yes, but if we spot a double-free, then surely we should WARN() and return
>>>> without doing anything?
>>>
>>> The double free debug checking already does the same thing in a more
>>> thourough way (this one only checks if the last free was the same
>>> address). So its duplicating a check that already exists.
>>
>> Yes, absolutely. Enabled slub_debug (or KASAN with its quarantine) can detect
>> more double-free errors. But it introduces much bigger performance penalty and
>> it's disabled by default.
>>
>>> However, this one is always on.
>>
>> Yes, I would propose to have this relatively cheap check enabled by default. I
>> think it will block a good share of double-free errors. Currently it's really
>> easy to turn such a double-free into use-after-free and exploit it, since, as I
>> wrote, next two kmalloc() calls return the same address. So we could make
>> exploiting harder for a relatively low price.
>>
>> Christopher, if I change BUG_ON() to VM_BUG_ON(), it will be disabled by default
>> again, right?
>
> Let's merge this with the proposed CONFIG_FREELIST_HARDENED, then the
> performance change is behind a config, and we gain the rest of the
> freelist protections at the same time:
>
> http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/07/06/1
Hello Kees,
If I change BUG_ON() to VM_BUG_ON(), this check will work at least on Fedora
since it has CONFIG_DEBUG_VM enabled. Debian based distros have this option
disabled. Do you like that more than having this check under
CONFIG_FREELIST_HARDENED?
If you insist on putting this check under CONFIG_FREELIST_HARDENED, should I
rebase onto your patch and send again?
Best regards,
Alexander
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-07-18 19:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-07-17 16:45 [PATCH 1/1] mm/slub.c: add a naive detection of double free or corruption Alexander Popov
2017-07-17 16:57 ` Christopher Lameter
2017-07-17 17:54 ` Matthew Wilcox
2017-07-17 18:04 ` Christopher Lameter
2017-07-17 19:01 ` Alexander Popov
2017-07-17 19:11 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-18 19:56 ` Alexander Popov [this message]
2017-07-18 20:04 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-19 8:38 ` Alexander Popov
2017-07-19 14:02 ` Christopher Lameter
2017-07-18 14:57 ` Christopher Lameter
2017-07-17 18:23 ` Alexander Popov
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