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From: One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	"linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>,
	Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Subject: Re: rowhammer and pagemap (was Re: [RFC, PATCH] pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 17:58:59 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150317175859.1d9555fc@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150317111653.GA23711@amd>

> > Can we just try getting rid of it except with global CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
> > 
> > (Hmm.  Rowhammer attacks targeting SMRAM could be interesting.)
> 

CAP_SYS_RAWIO is the protection for "can achieve anything". If you have
CAP_SYS_RAWIO you can attain any other capability, the reverse _should_
not be true.

> > The Intel people I asked last week weren't confident.  For one thing,
> > I fully expect that rowhammer can be exploited using only reads and
> > writes with some clever tricks involving cache associativity.  I don't
> > think there are any fully-associative caches, although the cache
> > replacement algorithm could make the attacks interesting.
> 
> We should definitely get Intel/AMD to disable CLFLUSH, then.

I doubt that would work, because you'd have to fix up all the faults from
userspace in things like graphics and video. Whether it is possible to
make the microcode do other accesses and delays I have no idea - but
that might also be quite horrible.

A serious system should be using ECC memory anyway. and on things like
shared boxes it is probably not a root compromise that is the worst case
scenario but subtle undetected corruption of someone elses data sets.

That's what ECC already exists to protect against whether its from flawed
memory and rowhammer or just a vindictive passing cosmic ray.

Alan


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  reply	other threads:[~2015-03-17 18:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-03-09 21:11 [RFC, PATCH] pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace Kirill A. Shutemov
2015-03-09 21:20 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2015-03-09 22:09 ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2015-03-10  0:11 ` Kees Cook
2015-03-10  0:19   ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-03-10  2:36     ` Dave Hansen
2015-03-16 21:11 ` Pavel Machek
2015-03-17  0:49   ` Mark Seaborn
2015-03-17  1:21     ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-03-17 11:16       ` rowhammer and pagemap (was Re: [RFC, PATCH] pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace) Pavel Machek
2015-03-17 17:58         ` One Thousand Gnomes [this message]
2015-03-23 21:26           ` Pavel Machek
2015-03-19 12:51       ` [RFC, PATCH] pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace Vlastimil Babka
2015-03-23 21:26         ` Pavel Machek
2015-03-23 22:36           ` Vlastimil Babka

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