From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-wm1-f70.google.com (mail-wm1-f70.google.com [209.85.128.70]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 30F9B6B000D for ; Tue, 13 Nov 2018 13:49:21 -0500 (EST) Received: by mail-wm1-f70.google.com with SMTP id y74so1467931wmc.0 for ; Tue, 13 Nov 2018 10:49:21 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail-sor-f65.google.com (mail-sor-f65.google.com. [209.85.220.65]) by mx.google.com with SMTPS id e2-v6sor13525194wru.38.2018.11.13.10.49.19 for (Google Transport Security); Tue, 13 Nov 2018 10:49:19 -0800 (PST) From: Michal Hocko Subject: [PATCH] l1tf: drop the swap storage limit restriction when l1tf=off Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2018 19:49:10 +0100 Message-Id: <20181113184910.26697-1-mhocko@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org List-ID: To: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Jiri Kosina , Linus Torvalds , Dave Hansen , Andi Kleen , Borislav Petkov , LKML , linux-mm@kvack.org, Michal Hocko From: Michal Hocko Swap storage is restricted to max_swapfile_size (~16TB on x86_64) whenever the system is deemed affected by L1TF vulnerability. Even though the limit is quite high for most deployments it seems to be too restrictive for deployments which are willing to live with the mitigation disabled. We have a customer to deploy 8x 6,4TB PCIe/NVMe SSD swap devices which is clearly out of the limit. Drop the swap restriction when l1tf=off is specified. It also doesn't make much sense to warn about too much memory for the l1tf mitigation when it is forcefully disabled by the administrator. Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 2 ++ Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst | 5 ++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 3 ++- arch/x86/mm/init.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 81d1d5a74728..a54f2bd39e77 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -2095,6 +2095,8 @@ off Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't emit any warnings. + It also drops the swap size and available + RAM limit restriction. Default is 'flush'. diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst index b85dd80510b0..b00464a9c09c 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst @@ -405,6 +405,8 @@ The kernel command line allows to control the L1TF mitigations at boot off Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't emit any warnings. + It also drops the swap size and available RAM limit restrictions. + ============ ============================================================= The default is 'flush'. For details about L1D flushing see :ref:`l1d_flush`. @@ -576,7 +578,8 @@ Default mitigations The kernel default mitigations for vulnerable processors are: - PTE inversion to protect against malicious user space. This is done - unconditionally and cannot be controlled. + unconditionally and cannot be controlled. The swap storage is limited + to ~16TB. - L1D conditional flushing on VMENTER when EPT is enabled for a guest. diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index c37e66e493bf..761100cd3eab 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -779,7 +779,8 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void) #endif half_pa = (u64)l1tf_pfn_limit() << PAGE_SHIFT; - if (e820__mapped_any(half_pa, ULLONG_MAX - half_pa, E820_TYPE_RAM)) { + if (l1tf_mitigation != L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF && + e820__mapped_any(half_pa, ULLONG_MAX - half_pa, E820_TYPE_RAM)) { pr_warn("System has more than MAX_PA/2 memory. L1TF mitigation not effective.\n"); pr_info("You may make it effective by booting the kernel with mem=%llu parameter.\n", half_pa); diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init.c b/arch/x86/mm/init.c index ef99f3892e1f..427a955a2cf2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/init.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/init.c @@ -931,7 +931,7 @@ unsigned long max_swapfile_size(void) pages = generic_max_swapfile_size(); - if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF)) { + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF) && l1tf_mitigation != L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF) { /* Limit the swap file size to MAX_PA/2 for L1TF workaround */ unsigned long long l1tf_limit = l1tf_pfn_limit(); /* -- 2.19.1