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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Wed, 29 May 2019 08:21:53 +0100 Received: from d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.58]) by b06cxnps4074.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x4T7LqrD48693492 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Wed, 29 May 2019 07:21:52 GMT Received: from d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id CE5FC4C052; Wed, 29 May 2019 07:21:51 +0000 (GMT) Received: from d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7C0104C04E; Wed, 29 May 2019 07:21:50 +0000 (GMT) Received: from rapoport-lnx (unknown [9.148.8.53]) by d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS; Wed, 29 May 2019 07:21:50 +0000 (GMT) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 10:21:48 +0300 From: Mike Rapoport To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" Cc: Andrew Morton , x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , "H. Peter Anvin" , Borislav Petkov , Peter Zijlstra , Andy Lutomirski , David Howells , Kees Cook , Dave Hansen , Kai Huang , Jacob Pan , Alison Schofield , linux-mm@kvack.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH, RFC 57/62] x86/mktme: Overview of Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption References: <20190508144422.13171-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> <20190508144422.13171-58-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <20190508144422.13171-58-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30) X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19052907-0008-0000-0000-000002EB7A72 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19052907-0009-0000-0000-000022584A02 Message-Id: <20190529072148.GE3656@rapoport-lnx> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-05-29_04:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1810050000 definitions=main-1905290049 X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: On Wed, May 08, 2019 at 05:44:17PM +0300, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote: > From: Alison Schofield > > Provide an overview of MKTME on Intel Platforms. > > Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield > Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov > --- > Documentation/x86/mktme/index.rst | 8 +++ > Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_overview.rst | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++ I'd expect addition of mktme docs to Documentation/x86/index.rst > 2 files changed, 65 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/mktme/index.rst > create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_overview.rst > > diff --git a/Documentation/x86/mktme/index.rst b/Documentation/x86/mktme/index.rst > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..1614b52dd3e9 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/Documentation/x86/mktme/index.rst > @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ > + > +========================================= > +Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption (MKTME) > +========================================= > + > +.. toctree:: > + > + mktme_overview > diff --git a/Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_overview.rst b/Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_overview.rst > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..59c023965554 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_overview.rst > @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ > +Overview > +========= > +Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption (MKTME)[1] is a technology that > +allows transparent memory encryption in upcoming Intel platforms. > +It uses a new instruction (PCONFIG) for key setup and selects a > +key for individual pages by repurposing physical address bits in > +the page tables. > + > +Support for MKTME is added to the existing kernel keyring subsystem > +and via a new mprotect_encrypt() system call that can be used by > +applications to encrypt anonymous memory with keys obtained from > +the keyring. > + > +This architecture supports encrypting both normal, volatile DRAM > +and persistent memory. However, persistent memory support is > +not included in the Linux kernel implementation at this time. > +(We anticipate adding that support next.) > + > +Hardware Background > +=================== > + > +MKTME is built on top of an existing single-key technology called > +TME. TME encrypts all system memory using a single key generated > +by the CPU on every boot of the system. TME provides mitigation > +against physical attacks, such as physically removing a DIMM or > +watching memory bus traffic. > + > +MKTME enables the use of multiple encryption keys[2], allowing > +selection of the encryption key per-page using the page tables. > +Encryption keys are programmed into each memory controller and > +the same set of keys is available to all entities on the system > +with access to that memory (all cores, DMA engines, etc...). > + > +MKTME inherits many of the mitigations against hardware attacks > +from TME. Like TME, MKTME does not mitigate vulnerable or > +malicious operating systems or virtual machine managers. MKTME > +offers additional mitigations when compared to TME. > + > +TME and MKTME use the AES encryption algorithm in the AES-XTS > +mode. This mode, typically used for block-based storage devices, > +takes the physical address of the data into account when > +encrypting each block. This ensures that the effective key is > +different for each block of memory. Moving encrypted content > +across physical address results in garbage on read, mitigating > +block-relocation attacks. This property is the reason many of > +the discussed attacks require control of a shared physical page > +to be handed from the victim to the attacker. > + > +-- > +1. https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/a5/16/Multi-Key-Total-Memory-Encryption-Spec.pdf > +2. The MKTME architecture supports up to 16 bits of KeyIDs, so a > + maximum of 65535 keys on top of the “TME key” at KeyID-0. The > + first implementation is expected to support 5 bits, making 63 > + keys available to applications. However, this is not guaranteed. > + The number of available keys could be reduced if, for instance, > + additional physical address space is desired over additional > + KeyIDs. > -- > 2.20.1 > -- Sincerely yours, Mike.