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From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	pbonzini@redhat.com, rkrcmar@redhat.com, mingo@redhat.com,
	bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
	luto@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	konrad.wilk@oracle.com, jan.setjeeilers@oracle.com,
	liran.alon@oracle.com, jwadams@google.com, graf@amazon.de,
	rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com, Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 00/27] Kernel Address Space Isolation
Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2019 21:06:20 +0200
Message-ID: <20190712190620.GX3419@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3ca70237-bf8e-57d9-bed5-bc2329d17177@oracle.com>

On Fri, Jul 12, 2019 at 06:37:47PM +0200, Alexandre Chartre wrote:
> On 7/12/19 5:16 PM, Thomas Gleixner wrote:

> > Right. If we decide to expose more parts of the kernel mappings then that's
> > just adding more stuff to the existing user (PTI) map mechanics.
> 
> If we expose more parts of the kernel mapping by adding them to the existing
> user (PTI) map, then we only control the mapping of kernel sensitive data but
> we don't control user mapping (with ASI, we exclude all user mappings).
> 
> How would you control the mapping of userland sensitive data and exclude them
> from the user map? Would you have the application explicitly identify sensitive
> data (like Andy suggested with a /dev/xpfo device)?

To what purpose do you want to exclude userspace from the kernel
mapping; that is, what are you mitigating against with that?


  parent reply index

Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-07-11 14:25 Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 01/26] mm/x86: Introduce kernel address space isolation Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 21:33   ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-07-12  7:43     ` Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 02/26] mm/asi: Abort isolation on interrupt, exception and context switch Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 20:11   ` Andi Kleen
2019-07-11 20:17     ` Mike Rapoport
2019-07-11 20:41       ` Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-12  0:05   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-12  7:50     ` Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 03/26] mm/asi: Handle page fault due to address space isolation Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 04/26] mm/asi: Functions to track buffers allocated for an ASI page-table Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 05/26] mm/asi: Add ASI page-table entry offset functions Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 06/26] mm/asi: Add ASI page-table entry allocation functions Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 07/26] mm/asi: Add ASI page-table entry set functions Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 08/26] mm/asi: Functions to populate an ASI page-table from a VA range Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 09/26] mm/asi: Helper functions to map module into ASI Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 10/26] mm/asi: Keep track of VA ranges mapped in ASI page-table Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 11/26] mm/asi: Functions to clear ASI page-table entries for a VA range Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 12/26] mm/asi: Function to copy page-table entries for percpu buffer Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 13/26] mm/asi: Add asi_remap() function Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 14/26] mm/asi: Handle ASI mapped range leaks and overlaps Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 15/26] mm/asi: Initialize the ASI page-table with core mappings Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 16/26] mm/asi: Option to map current task into ASI Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 17/26] rcu: Move tree.h static forward declarations to tree.c Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 18/26] rcu: Make percpu rcu_data non-static Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 19/26] mm/asi: Add option to map RCU data Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 20/26] mm/asi: Add option to map cpu_hw_events Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 21/26] mm/asi: Make functions to read cr3/cr4 ASI aware Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 22/26] KVM: x86/asi: Introduce address_space_isolation module parameter Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 23/26] KVM: x86/asi: Introduce KVM address space isolation Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 24/26] KVM: x86/asi: Populate the KVM ASI page-table Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 25/26] KVM: x86/asi: Switch to KVM address space on entry to guest Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 26/26] KVM: x86/asi: Map KVM memslots and IO buses into KVM ASI Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:40 ` [RFC v2 00/27] Kernel Address Space Isolation Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 22:38 ` Dave Hansen
2019-07-12  8:09   ` Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-12 13:51     ` Dave Hansen
2019-07-12 14:06       ` Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-12 15:23         ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-07-12 10:44   ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-07-12 11:56     ` Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-12 12:50       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-07-12 13:43         ` Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-12 13:58           ` Dave Hansen
2019-07-12 14:36           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-14 18:17             ` Alexander Graf
2019-07-12 13:54         ` Dave Hansen
2019-07-12 15:20           ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-07-12 15:16         ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-07-12 16:37           ` Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-12 16:45             ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-14 17:11               ` Mike Rapoport
2019-07-12 19:06             ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2019-07-14 15:06               ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-15 10:33                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-07-12 19:48             ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-07-15  8:23               ` Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-15  8:28                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-07-12 16:00       ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-07-12 11:44 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-07-12 12:17   ` Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-12 12:36     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-07-12 12:47       ` Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-12 13:07         ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-07-12 13:46           ` Alexandre Chartre

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