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Shutemov" X-Google-Original-From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" Received: by box.localdomain (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 2C437104602; Wed, 31 Jul 2019 18:08:17 +0300 (+03) To: Andrew Morton , x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , "H. Peter Anvin" , Borislav Petkov , Peter Zijlstra , Andy Lutomirski , David Howells Cc: Kees Cook , Dave Hansen , Kai Huang , Jacob Pan , Alison Schofield , linux-mm@kvack.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Kirill A . Shutemov" Subject: [PATCHv2 44/59] mm: Add the encrypt_mprotect() system call for MKTME Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2019 18:07:58 +0300 Message-Id: <20190731150813.26289-45-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0 In-Reply-To: <20190731150813.26289-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> References: <20190731150813.26289-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: From: Alison Schofield Implement memory encryption for MKTME (Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption) with a new system call that is an extension of the legacy mprotect() system call. In encrypt_mprotect the caller must pass a handle to a previously allocated and programmed MKTME encryption key. The key can be obtained through the kernel key service type "mktme". The caller must have KEY_NEED_VIEW permission on the key. MKTME places an additional restriction on the protected data: The length of the data must be page aligned. This is in addition to the existing mprotect restriction that the addr must be page aligned. encrypt_mprotect() will lookup the hardware keyid for the given userspace key. It will use previously defined helpers to insert that keyid in the VMAs during legacy mprotect() execution. Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov --- fs/exec.c | 4 +-- include/linux/mm.h | 3 +- mm/mprotect.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index c71cbfe6826a..261e81b7e3a4 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -756,8 +756,8 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm, vm_flags |= mm->def_flags; vm_flags |= VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP; - ret = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, - vm_flags); + ret = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vm_flags, + -1); if (ret) goto out_unlock; BUG_ON(prev != vma); diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h index 98a6d2bd66a6..8551b5ebdedf 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm.h +++ b/include/linux/mm.h @@ -1660,7 +1660,8 @@ extern unsigned long change_protection(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long int dirty_accountable, int prot_numa); extern int mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev, unsigned long start, - unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags); + unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags, + int newkeyid); /* * doesn't attempt to fault and will return short. diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c index 4d55725228e3..518d75582e7b 100644 --- a/mm/mprotect.c +++ b/mm/mprotect.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -348,7 +349,8 @@ static int prot_none_walk(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start, int mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev, - unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags) + unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags, + int newkeyid) { struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm; unsigned long oldflags = vma->vm_flags; @@ -358,7 +360,14 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev, int error; int dirty_accountable = 0; - if (newflags == oldflags) { + /* + * Flags match and Keyids match or we have NO_KEY. + * This _fixup is usually called from do_mprotect_ext() except + * for one special case: caller fs/exec.c/setup_arg_pages() + * In that case, newkeyid is passed as -1 (NO_KEY). + */ + if (newflags == oldflags && + (newkeyid == vma_keyid(vma) || newkeyid == NO_KEY)) { *pprev = vma; return 0; } @@ -424,6 +433,8 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev, } success: + if (newkeyid != NO_KEY) + mprotect_set_encrypt(vma, newkeyid, start, end); /* * vm_flags and vm_page_prot are protected by the mmap_sem * held in write mode. @@ -455,10 +466,15 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev, } /* - * When pkey==NO_KEY we get legacy mprotect behavior here. + * do_mprotect_ext() supports the legacy mprotect behavior plus extensions + * for Protection Keys and Memory Encryption Keys. These extensions are + * mutually exclusive and the behavior is: + * (pkey==NO_KEY && keyid==NO_KEY) ==> legacy mprotect + * (pkey is valid) ==> legacy mprotect plus Protection Key extensions + * (keyid is valid) ==> legacy mprotect plus Encryption Key extensions */ static int do_mprotect_ext(unsigned long start, size_t len, - unsigned long prot, int pkey) + unsigned long prot, int pkey, int keyid) { unsigned long nstart, end, tmp, reqprot; struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev; @@ -556,7 +572,8 @@ static int do_mprotect_ext(unsigned long start, size_t len, tmp = vma->vm_end; if (tmp > end) tmp = end; - error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags); + error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags, + keyid); if (error) goto out; nstart = tmp; @@ -581,7 +598,7 @@ static int do_mprotect_ext(unsigned long start, size_t len, SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mprotect, unsigned long, start, size_t, len, unsigned long, prot) { - return do_mprotect_ext(start, len, prot, NO_KEY); + return do_mprotect_ext(start, len, prot, NO_KEY, NO_KEY); } #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS @@ -589,7 +606,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mprotect, unsigned long, start, size_t, len, SYSCALL_DEFINE4(pkey_mprotect, unsigned long, start, size_t, len, unsigned long, prot, int, pkey) { - return do_mprotect_ext(start, len, prot, pkey); + return do_mprotect_ext(start, len, prot, pkey, NO_KEY); } SYSCALL_DEFINE2(pkey_alloc, unsigned long, flags, unsigned long, init_val) @@ -638,3 +655,40 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(pkey_free, int, pkey) } #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME + +extern int mktme_keyid_from_key(struct key *key); + +SYSCALL_DEFINE4(encrypt_mprotect, unsigned long, start, size_t, len, + unsigned long, prot, key_serial_t, serial) +{ + key_ref_t key_ref; + struct key *key; + int ret, keyid; + + /* MKTME restriction */ + if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(len)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * key_ref prevents the destruction of the key + * while the memory encryption is being set up. + */ + + key_ref = lookup_user_key(serial, 0, KEY_NEED_VIEW); + if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) + return PTR_ERR(key_ref); + + key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); + keyid = mktme_keyid_from_key(key); + if (!keyid) { + key_ref_put(key_ref); + return -EINVAL; + } + ret = do_mprotect_ext(start, len, prot, NO_KEY, keyid); + key_ref_put(key_ref); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME */ -- 2.21.0