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From: "Adalbert Lazăr" <alazar@bitdefender.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Tamas K Lengyel" <tamas@tklengyel.com>,
	"Mathieu Tarral" <mathieu.tarral@protonmail.com>,
	"Samuel Laurén" <samuel.lauren@iki.fi>,
	"Patrick Colp" <patrick.colp@oracle.com>,
	"Jan Kiszka" <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>,
	"Stefan Hajnoczi" <stefanha@redhat.com>,
	"Weijiang Yang" <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	Zhang@kvack.org, "Yu C" <yu.c.zhang@intel.com>,
	"Mihai Donțu" <mdontu@bitdefender.com>,
	"Adalbert Lazăr" <alazar@bitdefender.com>,
	"Nicușor Cîțu" <ncitu@bitdefender.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v6 31/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_PF
Date: Fri,  9 Aug 2019 18:59:46 +0300
Message-ID: <20190809160047.8319-32-alazar@bitdefender.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190809160047.8319-1-alazar@bitdefender.com>

From: Mihai Donțu <mdontu@bitdefender.com>

This event is sent when a #PF occurs due to a failed permission check
in the shadow page tables, for a page in which the introspection tool
has shown interest.

The introspection tool can respond to a KVMI_EVENT_PF event with custom
input for the current instruction. This input is used to trick the guest
software into believing it has read certain data, in order to hide the
content of certain memory areas (eg. hide injected code from integrity
checkers).

Signed-off-by: Mihai Donțu <mdontu@bitdefender.com>
Co-developed-by: Nicușor Cîțu <ncitu@bitdefender.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicușor Cîțu <ncitu@bitdefender.com>
Co-developed-by: Adalbert Lazăr <alazar@bitdefender.com>
Signed-off-by: Adalbert Lazăr <alazar@bitdefender.com>
---
 Documentation/virtual/kvm/kvmi.rst |  63 ++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/kvmi.c                |  38 ++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                 |   7 +-
 include/linux/kvmi.h               |   4 ++
 include/uapi/linux/kvmi.h          |  18 +++++
 virt/kvm/kvmi.c                    | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 virt/kvm/kvmi_int.h                |  13 ++++
 virt/kvm/kvmi_msg.c                |  55 +++++++++++++++
 8 files changed, 298 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/kvmi.rst b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/kvmi.rst
index 957641802cac..0fc51b57b1e8 100644
--- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/kvmi.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/kvmi.rst
@@ -618,3 +618,66 @@ The introspection tool has a chance to unhook and close the KVMI channel
 This event is sent when a new vCPU is created and the introspection has
 been enabled for this event (see *KVMI_CONTROL_VM_EVENTS*).
 
+3. KVMI_EVENT_PF
+----------------
+
+:Architectures: x86
+:Versions: >= 1
+:Actions: CONTINUE, CRASH, RETRY
+:Parameters:
+
+::
+
+	struct kvmi_event;
+	struct kvmi_event_pf {
+		__u64 gva;
+		__u64 gpa;
+		__u8 access;
+		__u8 padding1;
+		__u16 view;
+		__u32 padding2;
+	};
+
+:Returns:
+
+::
+
+	struct kvmi_vcpu_hdr;
+	struct kvmi_event_reply;
+	struct kvmi_event_pf_reply {
+		__u64 ctx_addr;
+		__u32 ctx_size;
+		__u8 singlestep;
+		__u8 rep_complete;
+		__u16 padding;
+		__u8 ctx_data[256];
+	};
+
+This event is sent when a hypervisor page fault occurs due to a failed
+permission check in the shadow page tables, the introspection has
+been enabled for this event (see *KVMI_CONTROL_EVENTS*) and the event was
+generated for a page in which the introspector has shown interest
+(ie. has previously touched it by adjusting the spte permissions).
+
+The shadow page tables can be used by the introspection tool to guarantee
+the purpose of code areas inside the guest (code, rodata, stack, heap
+etc.) Each attempt at an operation unfitting for a certain memory
+range (eg. execute code in heap) triggers a page fault and gives the
+introspection tool the chance to audit the code attempting the operation.
+
+``kvmi_event``, guest virtual address (or 0xffffffff/UNMAPPED_GVA),
+guest physical address, access flags (eg. KVMI_PAGE_ACCESS_R) and the
+EPT view are sent to the introspector.
+
+The *CONTINUE* action will continue the page fault handling via emulation
+(with custom input if ``ctx_size`` > 0). The use of custom input is
+to trick the guest software into believing it has read certain data,
+in order to hide the content of certain memory areas (eg. hide injected
+code from integrity checkers). If ``rep_complete`` is not zero, the REP
+prefixed instruction should be emulated just once (or at least no other
+*KVMI_EVENT_PF* event should be sent for the current instruction).
+
+The *RETRY* action is used by the introspector to retry the execution of
+the current instruction. Either using single-step (if ``singlestep`` is
+not zero) or return to guest (if the introspector changed the instruction
+pointer or the page restrictions).
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/kvmi.c b/arch/x86/kvm/kvmi.c
index d7b9201582b4..121819f9c487 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/kvmi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/kvmi.c
@@ -94,7 +94,43 @@ void kvmi_arch_setup_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvmi_event *ev)
 bool kvmi_arch_pf_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, gva_t gva,
 			u8 access)
 {
-	return KVMI_EVENT_ACTION_CONTINUE; /* TODO */
+	struct kvmi_vcpu *ivcpu;
+	u32 ctx_size;
+	u64 ctx_addr;
+	u32 action;
+	bool singlestep_ignored;
+	bool ret = false;
+
+	if (!kvm_spt_fault(vcpu))
+		/* We are only interested in EPT/NPT violations */
+		return true;
+
+	ivcpu = IVCPU(vcpu);
+	ctx_size = sizeof(ivcpu->ctx_data);
+
+	if (ivcpu->effective_rep_complete)
+		return true;
+
+	action = kvmi_msg_send_pf(vcpu, gpa, gva, access, &singlestep_ignored,
+				  &ivcpu->rep_complete, &ctx_addr,
+				  ivcpu->ctx_data, &ctx_size);
+
+	ivcpu->ctx_size = 0;
+	ivcpu->ctx_addr = 0;
+
+	switch (action) {
+	case KVMI_EVENT_ACTION_CONTINUE:
+		ivcpu->ctx_size = ctx_size;
+		ivcpu->ctx_addr = ctx_addr;
+		ret = true;
+		break;
+	case KVMI_EVENT_ACTION_RETRY:
+		break;
+	default:
+		kvmi_handle_common_event_actions(vcpu, action, "PF");
+	}
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
 int kvmi_arch_cmd_get_vcpu_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 257c4a262acd..ef6d9dd80086 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -6418,6 +6418,8 @@ int x86_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 
 	vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d = true;
 
+	kvmi_init_emulate(vcpu);
+
 	/*
 	 * Clear write_fault_to_shadow_pgtable here to ensure it is
 	 * never reused.
@@ -6523,9 +6525,10 @@ int x86_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 			writeback = false;
 		r = EMULATE_USER_EXIT;
 		vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_emulated_mmio;
-	} else if (r == EMULATION_RESTART)
+	} else if (r == EMULATION_RESTART) {
+		kvmi_activate_rep_complete(vcpu);
 		goto restart;
-	else
+	} else
 		r = EMULATE_DONE;
 
 	if (writeback) {
diff --git a/include/linux/kvmi.h b/include/linux/kvmi.h
index ae5de1905b55..80c15b9195e4 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvmi.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvmi.h
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ int kvmi_ioctl_unhook(struct kvm *kvm, bool force_reset);
 int kvmi_vcpu_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void kvmi_vcpu_uninit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void kvmi_handle_requests(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvmi_init_emulate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvmi_activate_rep_complete(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
 #else
 
@@ -27,6 +29,8 @@ static inline void kvmi_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm) { }
 static inline int kvmi_vcpu_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return 0; }
 static inline void kvmi_vcpu_uninit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { }
 static inline void kvmi_handle_requests(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { }
+static inline void kvmi_init_emulate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { }
+static inline void kvmi_activate_rep_complete(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { }
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KVM_INTROSPECTION */
 
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvmi.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvmi.h
index 934c0610140a..40a5c304c26f 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvmi.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvmi.h
@@ -155,4 +155,22 @@ struct kvmi_event_reply {
 	__u32 padding2;
 };
 
+struct kvmi_event_pf {
+	__u64 gva;
+	__u64 gpa;
+	__u8 access;
+	__u8 padding1;
+	__u16 view;
+	__u32 padding2;
+};
+
+struct kvmi_event_pf_reply {
+	__u64 ctx_addr;
+	__u32 ctx_size;
+	__u8 singlestep;
+	__u8 rep_complete;
+	__u16 padding;
+	__u8 ctx_data[256];
+};
+
 #endif /* _UAPI__LINUX_KVMI_H */
diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvmi.c b/virt/kvm/kvmi.c
index 14963474617e..0264115a7f4d 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvmi.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvmi.c
@@ -387,6 +387,52 @@ static bool is_pf_of_interest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u8 access)
 	return kvmi_restricted_access(IKVM(kvm), gpa, access);
 }
 
+/*
+ * The custom input is defined by a virtual address and size, and all reads
+ * must be within this space. Reads that are completely outside should be
+ * satisfyied using guest memory. Overlapping reads are erroneous.
+ */
+static int use_custom_input(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, u8 *new,
+			    int bytes)
+{
+	unsigned int offset;
+	struct kvmi_vcpu *ivcpu = IVCPU(vcpu);
+
+	if (!ivcpu->ctx_size || !bytes)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (bytes < 0 || bytes > ivcpu->ctx_size) {
+		kvmi_warn_once(IKVM(vcpu->kvm),
+			       "invalid range: %d (max: %u)\n",
+			       bytes, ivcpu->ctx_size);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (gva + bytes <= ivcpu->ctx_addr ||
+	    gva >= ivcpu->ctx_addr + ivcpu->ctx_size)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (gva < ivcpu->ctx_addr && gva + bytes > ivcpu->ctx_addr) {
+		kvmi_warn_once(IKVM(vcpu->kvm),
+			       "read ranges overlap: 0x%lx:%d, 0x%llx:%u\n",
+			       gva, bytes, ivcpu->ctx_addr, ivcpu->ctx_size);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (gva + bytes > ivcpu->ctx_addr + ivcpu->ctx_size) {
+		kvmi_warn_once(IKVM(vcpu->kvm),
+			       "read ranges overlap: 0x%lx:%d, 0x%llx:%u\n",
+			       gva, bytes, ivcpu->ctx_addr, ivcpu->ctx_size);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	offset = gva - ivcpu->ctx_addr;
+
+	memcpy(new, ivcpu->ctx_data + offset, bytes);
+
+	return bytes;
+}
+
 static bool __kvmi_track_preread(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, gva_t gva,
 	u8 *new, int bytes, struct kvm_page_track_notifier_node *node,
 	bool *data_ready)
@@ -396,9 +442,24 @@ static bool __kvmi_track_preread(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, gva_t gva,
 	if (!is_pf_of_interest(vcpu, gpa, KVMI_PAGE_ACCESS_R))
 		return true;
 
+	if (use_custom_input(vcpu, gva, new, bytes))
+		goto out_custom;
+
 	ret = kvmi_arch_pf_event(vcpu, gpa, gva, KVMI_PAGE_ACCESS_R);
 
+	if (ret && use_custom_input(vcpu, gva, new, bytes))
+		goto out_custom;
+
 	return ret;
+
+out_custom:
+	if (*data_ready)
+		kvmi_err(IKVM(vcpu->kvm),
+			"Override custom data from another tracker\n");
+
+	*data_ready = true;
+
+	return true;
 }
 
 static bool kvmi_track_preread(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, gva_t gva,
@@ -855,6 +916,48 @@ void kvmi_handle_common_event_actions(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 action,
 	}
 }
 
+void kvmi_init_emulate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvmi *ikvm;
+	struct kvmi_vcpu *ivcpu;
+
+	ikvm = kvmi_get(vcpu->kvm);
+	if (!ikvm)
+		return;
+
+	ivcpu = IVCPU(vcpu);
+
+	ivcpu->rep_complete = false;
+	ivcpu->effective_rep_complete = false;
+
+	ivcpu->ctx_size = 0;
+	ivcpu->ctx_addr = 0;
+
+	kvmi_put(vcpu->kvm);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kvmi_init_emulate);
+
+/*
+ * If the user has requested that events triggered by repetitive
+ * instructions be suppressed after the first cycle, then this
+ * function will effectively activate it. This ensures that we don't
+ * prematurely suppress potential events (second or later) triggerd
+ * by an instruction during a single pass.
+ */
+void kvmi_activate_rep_complete(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvmi *ikvm;
+
+	ikvm = kvmi_get(vcpu->kvm);
+	if (!ikvm)
+		return;
+
+	IVCPU(vcpu)->effective_rep_complete = IVCPU(vcpu)->rep_complete;
+
+	kvmi_put(vcpu->kvm);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kvmi_activate_rep_complete);
+
 static bool __kvmi_create_vcpu_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	u32 action;
diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvmi_int.h b/virt/kvm/kvmi_int.h
index c0044cae8089..d478d9a2e769 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvmi_int.h
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvmi_int.h
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
 
 #define IVCPU(vcpu) ((struct kvmi_vcpu *)((vcpu)->kvmi))
 
+#define KVMI_CTX_DATA_SIZE FIELD_SIZEOF(struct kvmi_event_pf_reply, ctx_data)
+
 #define KVMI_MSG_SIZE_ALLOC (sizeof(struct kvmi_msg_hdr) + KVMI_MSG_SIZE)
 
 #define KVMI_KNOWN_VCPU_EVENTS ( \
@@ -92,6 +94,12 @@ struct kvmi_vcpu_reply {
 };
 
 struct kvmi_vcpu {
+	u8 ctx_data[KVMI_CTX_DATA_SIZE];
+	u32 ctx_size;
+	u64 ctx_addr;
+	bool rep_complete;
+	bool effective_rep_complete;
+
 	bool reply_waiting;
 	struct kvmi_vcpu_reply reply;
 
@@ -141,6 +149,9 @@ bool kvmi_sock_get(struct kvmi *ikvm, int fd);
 void kvmi_sock_shutdown(struct kvmi *ikvm);
 void kvmi_sock_put(struct kvmi *ikvm);
 bool kvmi_msg_process(struct kvmi *ikvm);
+u32 kvmi_msg_send_pf(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gpa, u64 gva, u8 access,
+		     bool *singlestep, bool *rep_complete,
+		     u64 *ctx_addr, u8 *ctx, u32 *ctx_size);
 u32 kvmi_msg_send_create_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 int kvmi_msg_send_unhook(struct kvmi *ikvm);
 
@@ -156,6 +167,8 @@ int kvmi_run_jobs_and_wait(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 int kvmi_add_job(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		 void (*fct)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void *ctx),
 		 void *ctx, void (*free_fct)(void *ctx));
+void kvmi_handle_common_event_actions(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 action,
+				      const char *str);
 
 /* arch */
 void kvmi_arch_update_page_tracking(struct kvm *kvm,
diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvmi_msg.c b/virt/kvm/kvmi_msg.c
index a3c67af8674e..0642356d4e04 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvmi_msg.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvmi_msg.c
@@ -764,6 +764,61 @@ int kvmi_msg_send_unhook(struct kvmi *ikvm)
 	return kvmi_sock_write(ikvm, vec, n, msg_size);
 }
 
+u32 kvmi_msg_send_pf(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gpa, u64 gva, u8 access,
+		     bool *singlestep, bool *rep_complete, u64 *ctx_addr,
+		     u8 *ctx_data, u32 *ctx_size)
+{
+	u32 max_ctx_size = *ctx_size;
+	struct kvmi_event_pf e;
+	struct kvmi_event_pf_reply r;
+	int err, action;
+
+	memset(&e, 0, sizeof(e));
+	e.gpa = gpa;
+	e.gva = gva;
+	e.access = access;
+
+	err = kvmi_send_event(vcpu, KVMI_EVENT_PF, &e, sizeof(e),
+			      &r, sizeof(r), &action);
+	if (err)
+		return KVMI_EVENT_ACTION_CONTINUE;
+
+	if (e.padding1 || e.padding2) {
+		struct kvmi *ikvm = IKVM(vcpu->kvm);
+
+		kvmi_err(ikvm, "%s: non zero padding %u,%u\n",
+			__func__, e.padding1, e.padding2);
+		kvmi_sock_shutdown(ikvm);
+		return KVMI_EVENT_ACTION_CONTINUE;
+	}
+
+	*ctx_size = 0;
+
+	if (r.ctx_size > max_ctx_size) {
+		struct kvmi *ikvm = IKVM(vcpu->kvm);
+
+		kvmi_err(ikvm, "%s: ctx_size (recv:%u max:%u)\n",
+				__func__, r.ctx_size, max_ctx_size);
+
+		kvmi_sock_shutdown(ikvm);
+
+		*singlestep = false;
+		*rep_complete = 0;
+
+		return KVMI_EVENT_ACTION_CONTINUE;
+	}
+
+	*singlestep = r.singlestep;
+	*rep_complete = r.rep_complete;
+
+	*ctx_size = min_t(u32, r.ctx_size, sizeof(r.ctx_data));
+	*ctx_addr = r.ctx_addr;
+	if (*ctx_size)
+		memcpy(ctx_data, r.ctx_data, *ctx_size);
+
+	return action;
+}
+
 u32 kvmi_msg_send_create_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	int err, action;


  parent reply index

Thread overview: 154+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-08-09 15:59 [RFC PATCH v6 00/92] VM introspection Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 01/92] kvm: introduce KVMI (VM introspection subsystem) Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-12 20:20   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-13  9:11     ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 11:57     ` Adalbert Lazăr
     [not found]     ` <5d52a5ae.1c69fb81.5c260.1573SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2019-08-13 12:09       ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 15:01         ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-13 21:03           ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-14  9:48           ` Adalbert Lazăr
     [not found]           ` <5d53d8d1.1c69fb81.7d32.0bedSMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2019-08-14 10:37             ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 02/92] kvm: introspection: add basic ioctls (hook/unhook) Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  8:44   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 14:24     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 03/92] kvm: introspection: add permission access ioctls Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 04/92] kvm: introspection: add the read/dispatch message function Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 05/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_VERSION Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 06/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_CMD_RESPONSE Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  9:15   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 17:08     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 07/92] kvm: introspection: honor the reply option when handling the KVMI_GET_VERSION command Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  9:16   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 08/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CHECK_COMMAND and KVMI_CHECK_EVENT Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 09/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_GUEST_INFO Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 10/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_VM_EVENTS Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 11/92] kvm: introspection: add vCPU related data Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 12/92] kvm: introspection: add a jobs list to every introspected vCPU Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 13/92] kvm: introspection: make the vCPU wait even when its jobs list is empty Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  8:43   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 14:19     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 14/92] kvm: introspection: handle introspection commands before returning to guest Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  8:26   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 13:54     ` Adalbert Lazăr
     [not found]     ` <5d52c10e.1c69fb81.26904.fd34SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2019-08-13 14:45       ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-14  9:39         ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 15/92] kvm: introspection: handle vCPU related introspection commands Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 16/92] kvm: introspection: handle events and event replies Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  8:55   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 15:25     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 17/92] kvm: introspection: introduce event actions Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 18/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_UNHOOK Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 19/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_CREATE_VCPU Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 20/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_VCPU_INFO Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 21/92] kvm: page track: add track_create_slot() callback Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 22/92] kvm: x86: provide all page tracking hooks with the guest virtual address Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 23/92] kvm: page track: add support for preread, prewrite and preexec Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 24/92] kvm: x86: wire in the preread/prewrite/preexec page trackers Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 25/92] kvm: x86: intercept the write access on sidt and other emulated instructions Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 26/92] kvm: x86: add kvm_mmu_nested_pagefault() Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  8:12   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 27/92] kvm: introspection: use page track Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  9:06   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 28/92] kvm: x86: consult the page tracking from kvm_mmu_get_page() and __direct_map() Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 29/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_EVENTS Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 30/92] kvm: x86: add kvm_spt_fault() Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` Adalbert Lazăr [this message]
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 32/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_PAGE_ACCESS Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 33/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_SET_PAGE_ACCESS Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 34/92] Documentation: Introduce EPT based Subpage Protection Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 35/92] KVM: VMX: Add control flags for SPP enabling Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 36/92] KVM: VMX: Implement functions for SPPT paging setup Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 37/92] KVM: VMX: Introduce SPP access bitmap and operation functions Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 38/92] KVM: VMX: Add init/set/get functions for SPP Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 39/92] KVM: VMX: Introduce SPP user-space IOCTLs Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 40/92] KVM: VMX: Handle SPP induced vmexit and page fault Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 41/92] KVM: MMU: Enable Lazy mode SPPT setup Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 42/92] KVM: MMU: Handle host memory remapping and reclaim Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 43/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_SPP Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 44/92] kvm: introspection: extend the internal database of tracked pages with write_bitmap info Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 45/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_PAGE_WRITE_BITMAP Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 46/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_SET_PAGE_WRITE_BITMAP Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 47/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_READ_PHYSICAL and KVMI_WRITE_PHYSICAL Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 48/92] kvm: add kvm_vcpu_kick_and_wait() Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 49/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_PAUSE_VCPU and KVMI_EVENT_PAUSE_VCPU Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 50/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_REGISTERS Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 51/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_SET_REGISTERS Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 52/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_CPUID Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 53/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_INJECT_EXCEPTION + KVMI_EVENT_TRAP Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 54/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_CR and KVMI_EVENT_CR Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 55/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_MSR and KVMI_EVENT_MSR Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-12 21:05   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-15  6:36     ` Nicusor CITU
2019-08-19 18:36       ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-20  8:44         ` Nicusor CITU
2019-08-20 11:43           ` Mihai Donțu
2019-08-21 15:18             ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-19 18:52   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 56/92] kvm: x86: block any attempt to disable MSR interception if tracked by introspection Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 57/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_XSAVE Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 58/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_MTRR_TYPE Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 59/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_XSETBV Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 60/92] kvm: x86: add kvm_arch_vcpu_set_guest_debug() Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 61/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_BREAKPOINT Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 62/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_HYPERCALL Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 63/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_DESCRIPTOR Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 64/92] kvm: introspection: add single-stepping Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-12 20:50   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-13 12:51     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-14 12:36     ` Nicusor CITU
2019-08-14 12:53       ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 65/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_SINGLESTEP Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 66/92] kvm: introspection: add custom input when single-stepping a vCPU Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 67/92] kvm: introspection: use single stepping on unimplemented instructions Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 68/92] kvm: x86: emulate a guest page table walk on SPT violations due to A/D bit updates Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 69/92] kvm: x86: keep the page protected if tracked by the introspection tool Adalbert Lazăr
2019-09-10 14:26   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-09-10 16:28     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 70/92] kvm: x86: filter out access rights only when " Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  9:08   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 16:06     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 71/92] mm: add support for remote mapping Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:24   ` DANGER WILL ROBINSON, DANGER Matthew Wilcox
2019-08-13  9:29     ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 11:24       ` Matthew Wilcox
2019-08-13 12:02         ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 11:01     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-15 19:19       ` Jerome Glisse
2019-08-15 20:16         ` Jerome Glisse
2019-08-16 17:45           ` Jason Gunthorpe
2019-08-23 12:39           ` Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU
2019-09-05 18:09             ` Jerome Glisse
2019-09-09 17:00               ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-09-10  7:49                 ` Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 72/92] kvm: introspection: add memory map/unmap support on the guest side Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 73/92] kvm: introspection: use remote mapping Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 74/92] kvm: x86: do not unconditionally patch the hypercall instruction during emulation Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  9:20   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-14 12:07     ` Adalbert Lazăr
     [not found]     ` <5d53f965.1c69fb81.cd952.035bSMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2019-08-14 12:33       ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 75/92] kvm: x86: disable gpa_available optimization in emulator_read_write_onepage() Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  8:47   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 14:33     ` Adalbert Lazăr
     [not found]     ` <5d52ca22.1c69fb81.4ceb8.e90bSMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2019-08-13 14:35       ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 76/92] kvm: x86: disable EPT A/D bits if introspection is present Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  9:18   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 77/92] kvm: introspection: add trace functions Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 78/92] kvm: x86: add tracepoints for interrupt and exception injections Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 79/92] kvm: x86: emulate movsd xmm, m64 Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  9:17   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 80/92] kvm: x86: emulate movss xmm, m32 Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 81/92] kvm: x86: emulate movq xmm, m64 Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 82/92] kvm: x86: emulate movq r, xmm Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 83/92] kvm: x86: emulate movd xmm, m32 Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 84/92] kvm: x86: enable the half part of movss, movsd, movups Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 85/92] kvm: x86: emulate lfence Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 86/92] kvm: x86: emulate xorpd xmm2/m128, xmm1 Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 87/92] kvm: x86: emulate xorps xmm/m128, xmm Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 88/92] kvm: x86: emulate fst/fstp m64fp Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 89/92] kvm: x86: make lock cmpxchg r, r/m atomic Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 90/92] kvm: x86: emulate lock cmpxchg8b atomically Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 91/92] kvm: x86: emulate lock cmpxchg16b m128 Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 92/92] kvm: x86: fallback to the single-step on multipage CMPXCHG emulation Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-12 18:23 ` [RFC PATCH v6 00/92] VM introspection Sean Christopherson
2019-08-12 21:40 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-13  9:34 ` Paolo Bonzini

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