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From: "Adalbert Lazăr" <alazar@bitdefender.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Tamas K Lengyel" <tamas@tklengyel.com>,
	"Mathieu Tarral" <mathieu.tarral@protonmail.com>,
	"Samuel Laurén" <samuel.lauren@iki.fi>,
	"Patrick Colp" <patrick.colp@oracle.com>,
	"Jan Kiszka" <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>,
	"Stefan Hajnoczi" <stefanha@redhat.com>,
	"Weijiang Yang" <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	Zhang@kvack.org, "Yu C" <yu.c.zhang@intel.com>,
	"Mihai Donțu" <mdontu@bitdefender.com>,
	"Adalbert Lazăr" <alazar@bitdefender.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v6 32/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_PAGE_ACCESS
Date: Fri,  9 Aug 2019 18:59:47 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190809160047.8319-33-alazar@bitdefender.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190809160047.8319-1-alazar@bitdefender.com>

From: Mihai Donțu <mdontu@bitdefender.com>

Returns the spte access bits (rwx) for an array of guest physical
addresses.

It does this by checking the radix tree in which only the spte bits
"enforced" by the introspection tool are saved. This information should
already be known by the tool. Not to mention that the KVMI_EVENT_PF
events are sent only for EPT violation caused by these restrictions.
So, we might drop this command.

Signed-off-by: Mihai Donțu <mdontu@bitdefender.com>
Signed-off-by: Adalbert Lazăr <alazar@bitdefender.com>
---
 Documentation/virtual/kvm/kvmi.rst | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/kvmi.c                | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/uapi/linux/kvmi.h          | 11 ++++++
 virt/kvm/kvmi.c                    |  9 +++++
 virt/kvm/kvmi_int.h                |  6 ++++
 virt/kvm/kvmi_msg.c                | 17 ++++++++++
 6 files changed, 138 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/kvmi.rst b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/kvmi.rst
index 0fc51b57b1e8..c27fea73ccfb 100644
--- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/kvmi.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/kvmi.rst
@@ -509,6 +509,60 @@ by the *KVMI_CONTROL_VM_EVENTS* command.
 * -KVM_EPERM - the access is restricted by the host
 * -KVM_EOPNOTSUPP - one the events can't be intercepted in the current setup
 
+9. KVMI_GET_PAGE_ACCESS
+-----------------------
+
+:Architectures: all
+:Versions: >= 1
+:Parameters:
+
+::
+
+	struct kvmi_get_page_access {
+		__u16 view;
+		__u16 count;
+		__u32 padding;
+		__u64 gpa[0];
+	};
+
+:Returns:
+
+::
+
+	struct kvmi_error_code;
+	struct kvmi_get_page_access_reply {
+		__u8 access[0];
+	};
+
+Returns the spte access bits (rwx) for an array of ``count`` guest
+physical addresses.
+
+The valid access bits for *KVMI_GET_PAGE_ACCESS* and *KVMI_SET_PAGE_ACCESS*
+are::
+
+	KVMI_PAGE_ACCESS_R
+	KVMI_PAGE_ACCESS_W
+	KVMI_PAGE_ACCESS_X
+
+By default, for any guest physical address, the returned access mode will
+be 'rwx' (all the above bits). If the introspection tool must prevent
+the code execution from a guest page, for example, it should use the
+KVMI_SET_PAGE_ACCESS command to set the 'rw' bits for any guest physical
+addresses contained in that page. Of course, in order to receive
+page fault events when these violations take place, the KVMI_CONTROL_EVENTS
+command must be used to enable this type of event (KVMI_EVENT_PF).
+
+On Intel hardware with multiple EPT views, the ``view`` argument selects the
+EPT view (0 is primary). On all other hardware it must be zero.
+
+:Errors:
+
+* -KVM_EINVAL - the selected SPT view is invalid
+* -KVM_EINVAL - padding is not zero
+* -KVM_EOPNOTSUPP - a SPT view was selected but the hardware doesn't support it
+* -KVM_EAGAIN - the selected vCPU can't be introspected yet
+* -KVM_ENOMEM - not enough memory to allocate the reply
+
 Events
 ======
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/kvmi.c b/arch/x86/kvm/kvmi.c
index 121819f9c487..59cf33127b4b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/kvmi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/kvmi.c
@@ -183,3 +183,44 @@ void kvmi_arch_update_page_tracking(struct kvm *kvm,
 		}
 	}
 }
+
+int kvmi_arch_cmd_get_page_access(struct kvmi *ikvm,
+				  const struct kvmi_msg_hdr *msg,
+				  const struct kvmi_get_page_access *req,
+				  struct kvmi_get_page_access_reply **dest,
+				  size_t *dest_size)
+{
+	struct kvmi_get_page_access_reply *rpl = NULL;
+	size_t rpl_size = 0;
+	size_t k, n = req->count;
+	int ec = 0;
+
+	if (req->padding)
+		return -KVM_EINVAL;
+
+	if (msg->size < sizeof(*req) + req->count * sizeof(req->gpa[0]))
+		return -KVM_EINVAL;
+
+	if (req->view != 0)	/* TODO */
+		return -KVM_EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	rpl_size = sizeof(*rpl) + sizeof(rpl->access[0]) * n;
+	rpl = kvmi_msg_alloc_check(rpl_size);
+	if (!rpl)
+		return -KVM_ENOMEM;
+
+	for (k = 0; k < n && ec == 0; k++)
+		ec = kvmi_cmd_get_page_access(ikvm, req->gpa[k],
+					      &rpl->access[k]);
+
+	if (ec) {
+		kvmi_msg_free(rpl);
+		return ec;
+	}
+
+	*dest = rpl;
+	*dest_size = rpl_size;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvmi.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvmi.h
index 40a5c304c26f..047436a0bdc0 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvmi.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvmi.h
@@ -116,6 +116,17 @@ struct kvmi_get_guest_info_reply {
 	__u32 padding[3];
 };
 
+struct kvmi_get_page_access {
+	__u16 view;
+	__u16 count;
+	__u32 padding;
+	__u64 gpa[0];
+};
+
+struct kvmi_get_page_access_reply {
+	__u8 access[0];
+};
+
 struct kvmi_get_vcpu_info_reply {
 	__u64 tsc_speed;
 };
diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvmi.c b/virt/kvm/kvmi.c
index 0264115a7f4d..20505e4c4b5f 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvmi.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvmi.c
@@ -1072,6 +1072,15 @@ void kvmi_handle_requests(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	kvmi_put(vcpu->kvm);
 }
 
+int kvmi_cmd_get_page_access(struct kvmi *ikvm, u64 gpa, u8 *access)
+{
+	gfn_t gfn = gpa_to_gfn(gpa);
+
+	kvmi_get_gfn_access(ikvm, gfn, access);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 int kvmi_cmd_control_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int event_id,
 			    bool enable)
 {
diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvmi_int.h b/virt/kvm/kvmi_int.h
index d478d9a2e769..00dc5cf72f88 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvmi_int.h
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvmi_int.h
@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ int kvmi_msg_send_unhook(struct kvmi *ikvm);
 void *kvmi_msg_alloc(void);
 void *kvmi_msg_alloc_check(size_t size);
 void kvmi_msg_free(void *addr);
+int kvmi_cmd_get_page_access(struct kvmi *ikvm, u64 gpa, u8 *access);
 int kvmi_cmd_control_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int event_id,
 			    bool enable);
 int kvmi_cmd_control_vm_events(struct kvmi *ikvm, unsigned int event_id,
@@ -174,6 +175,11 @@ void kvmi_handle_common_event_actions(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 action,
 void kvmi_arch_update_page_tracking(struct kvm *kvm,
 				    struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
 				    struct kvmi_mem_access *m);
+int kvmi_arch_cmd_get_page_access(struct kvmi *ikvm,
+				  const struct kvmi_msg_hdr *msg,
+				  const struct kvmi_get_page_access *req,
+				  struct kvmi_get_page_access_reply **dest,
+				  size_t *dest_size);
 void kvmi_arch_setup_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvmi_event *ev);
 bool kvmi_arch_pf_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, gva_t gva,
 			u8 access);
diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvmi_msg.c b/virt/kvm/kvmi_msg.c
index 0642356d4e04..09ad17479abb 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvmi_msg.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvmi_msg.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ static const char *const msg_IDs[] = {
 	[KVMI_EVENT]                 = "KVMI_EVENT",
 	[KVMI_EVENT_REPLY]           = "KVMI_EVENT_REPLY",
 	[KVMI_GET_GUEST_INFO]        = "KVMI_GET_GUEST_INFO",
+	[KVMI_GET_PAGE_ACCESS]       = "KVMI_GET_PAGE_ACCESS",
 	[KVMI_GET_VCPU_INFO]         = "KVMI_GET_VCPU_INFO",
 	[KVMI_GET_VERSION]           = "KVMI_GET_VERSION",
 };
@@ -323,6 +324,21 @@ static int handle_control_cmd_response(struct kvmi *ikvm,
 	return err;
 }
 
+static int handle_get_page_access(struct kvmi *ikvm,
+				  const struct kvmi_msg_hdr *msg,
+				  const void *req)
+{
+	struct kvmi_get_page_access_reply *rpl = NULL;
+	size_t rpl_size = 0;
+	int err, ec;
+
+	ec = kvmi_arch_cmd_get_page_access(ikvm, msg, req, &rpl, &rpl_size);
+
+	err = kvmi_msg_vm_maybe_reply(ikvm, msg, ec, rpl, rpl_size);
+	kvmi_msg_free(rpl);
+	return err;
+}
+
 static bool invalid_vcpu_hdr(const struct kvmi_vcpu_hdr *hdr)
 {
 	return hdr->padding1 || hdr->padding2;
@@ -338,6 +354,7 @@ static int(*const msg_vm[])(struct kvmi *, const struct kvmi_msg_hdr *,
 	[KVMI_CONTROL_CMD_RESPONSE]  = handle_control_cmd_response,
 	[KVMI_CONTROL_VM_EVENTS]     = handle_control_vm_events,
 	[KVMI_GET_GUEST_INFO]        = handle_get_guest_info,
+	[KVMI_GET_PAGE_ACCESS]       = handle_get_page_access,
 	[KVMI_GET_VERSION]           = handle_get_version,
 };
 


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-08-09 16:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 168+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-08-09 15:59 [RFC PATCH v6 00/92] VM introspection Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 01/92] kvm: introduce KVMI (VM introspection subsystem) Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-12 20:20   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-13  9:11     ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 11:57     ` Adalbert Lazăr
     [not found]     ` <5d52a5ae.1c69fb81.5c260.1573SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2019-08-13 12:09       ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 15:01         ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-13 21:03           ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-14  9:48           ` Adalbert Lazăr
     [not found]           ` <5d53d8d1.1c69fb81.7d32.0bedSMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2019-08-14 10:37             ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 02/92] kvm: introspection: add basic ioctls (hook/unhook) Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  8:44   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 14:24     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 03/92] kvm: introspection: add permission access ioctls Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 04/92] kvm: introspection: add the read/dispatch message function Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 05/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_VERSION Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 06/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_CMD_RESPONSE Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  9:15   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 17:08     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 07/92] kvm: introspection: honor the reply option when handling the KVMI_GET_VERSION command Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  9:16   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 08/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CHECK_COMMAND and KVMI_CHECK_EVENT Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 09/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_GUEST_INFO Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 10/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_VM_EVENTS Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 11/92] kvm: introspection: add vCPU related data Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 12/92] kvm: introspection: add a jobs list to every introspected vCPU Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 13/92] kvm: introspection: make the vCPU wait even when its jobs list is empty Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  8:43   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 14:19     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 14/92] kvm: introspection: handle introspection commands before returning to guest Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  8:26   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 13:54     ` Adalbert Lazăr
     [not found]     ` <5d52c10e.1c69fb81.26904.fd34SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2019-08-13 14:45       ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-14  9:39         ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 15/92] kvm: introspection: handle vCPU related introspection commands Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 16/92] kvm: introspection: handle events and event replies Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  8:55   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 15:25     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 17/92] kvm: introspection: introduce event actions Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 18/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_UNHOOK Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 19/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_CREATE_VCPU Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 20/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_VCPU_INFO Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 21/92] kvm: page track: add track_create_slot() callback Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 22/92] kvm: x86: provide all page tracking hooks with the guest virtual address Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 23/92] kvm: page track: add support for preread, prewrite and preexec Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 24/92] kvm: x86: wire in the preread/prewrite/preexec page trackers Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 25/92] kvm: x86: intercept the write access on sidt and other emulated instructions Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 26/92] kvm: x86: add kvm_mmu_nested_pagefault() Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  8:12   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 27/92] kvm: introspection: use page track Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  9:06   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 28/92] kvm: x86: consult the page tracking from kvm_mmu_get_page() and __direct_map() Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 29/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_EVENTS Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 30/92] kvm: x86: add kvm_spt_fault() Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 31/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_PF Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` Adalbert Lazăr [this message]
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 33/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_SET_PAGE_ACCESS Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 34/92] Documentation: Introduce EPT based Subpage Protection Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 35/92] KVM: VMX: Add control flags for SPP enabling Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 36/92] KVM: VMX: Implement functions for SPPT paging setup Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 37/92] KVM: VMX: Introduce SPP access bitmap and operation functions Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 38/92] KVM: VMX: Add init/set/get functions for SPP Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 39/92] KVM: VMX: Introduce SPP user-space IOCTLs Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 40/92] KVM: VMX: Handle SPP induced vmexit and page fault Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 41/92] KVM: MMU: Enable Lazy mode SPPT setup Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 42/92] KVM: MMU: Handle host memory remapping and reclaim Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 43/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_SPP Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 44/92] kvm: introspection: extend the internal database of tracked pages with write_bitmap info Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 45/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_PAGE_WRITE_BITMAP Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 46/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_SET_PAGE_WRITE_BITMAP Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 47/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_READ_PHYSICAL and KVMI_WRITE_PHYSICAL Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 48/92] kvm: add kvm_vcpu_kick_and_wait() Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 49/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_PAUSE_VCPU and KVMI_EVENT_PAUSE_VCPU Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 50/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_REGISTERS Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 51/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_SET_REGISTERS Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 52/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_CPUID Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 53/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_INJECT_EXCEPTION + KVMI_EVENT_TRAP Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 54/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_CR and KVMI_EVENT_CR Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 55/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_MSR and KVMI_EVENT_MSR Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-12 21:05   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-15  6:36     ` Nicusor CITU
2019-08-19 18:36       ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-20  8:44         ` Nicusor CITU
2019-08-20 11:43           ` Mihai Donțu
2019-08-21 15:18             ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-19 18:52   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 56/92] kvm: x86: block any attempt to disable MSR interception if tracked by introspection Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 57/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_XSAVE Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 58/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_MTRR_TYPE Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 59/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_XSETBV Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 60/92] kvm: x86: add kvm_arch_vcpu_set_guest_debug() Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 61/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_BREAKPOINT Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 62/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_HYPERCALL Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 63/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_DESCRIPTOR Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 64/92] kvm: introspection: add single-stepping Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-12 20:50   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-13 12:51     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-14 12:36     ` Nicusor CITU
2019-08-14 12:53       ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 65/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_SINGLESTEP Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 66/92] kvm: introspection: add custom input when single-stepping a vCPU Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 67/92] kvm: introspection: use single stepping on unimplemented instructions Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 68/92] kvm: x86: emulate a guest page table walk on SPT violations due to A/D bit updates Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 69/92] kvm: x86: keep the page protected if tracked by the introspection tool Adalbert Lazăr
2019-09-10 14:26   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-09-10 16:28     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 70/92] kvm: x86: filter out access rights only when " Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  9:08   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 16:06     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 71/92] mm: add support for remote mapping Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:24   ` DANGER WILL ROBINSON, DANGER Matthew Wilcox
2019-08-13  9:29     ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 11:24       ` Matthew Wilcox
2019-08-13 12:02         ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 11:01     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-15 19:19       ` Jerome Glisse
2019-08-15 20:16         ` Jerome Glisse
2019-08-16 17:45           ` Jason Gunthorpe
2019-08-23 12:39           ` Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU
2019-09-05 18:09             ` Jerome Glisse
2019-09-09 17:00               ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-09-10  7:49                 ` Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU
2019-10-02 19:27                   ` Jerome Glisse
2019-10-02 13:46                     ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-10-02 14:15                       ` Jerome Glisse
2019-10-02 16:18                         ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-10-02 17:04                           ` Jerome Glisse
2019-10-02 20:10                             ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-10-03 15:42                               ` Jerome Glisse
2019-10-03 15:50                                 ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-10-03 16:42                                   ` Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU
2019-10-03 18:31                                     ` Jerome Glisse
2019-10-03 19:38                                       ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-10-04  9:41                                         ` Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU
2019-10-04 11:46                                           ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-10-03 16:36                               ` Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 72/92] kvm: introspection: add memory map/unmap support on the guest side Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 73/92] kvm: introspection: use remote mapping Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 74/92] kvm: x86: do not unconditionally patch the hypercall instruction during emulation Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  9:20   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-14 12:07     ` Adalbert Lazăr
     [not found]     ` <5d53f965.1c69fb81.cd952.035bSMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2019-08-14 12:33       ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 75/92] kvm: x86: disable gpa_available optimization in emulator_read_write_onepage() Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  8:47   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 14:33     ` Adalbert Lazăr
     [not found]     ` <5d52ca22.1c69fb81.4ceb8.e90bSMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2019-08-13 14:35       ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 76/92] kvm: x86: disable EPT A/D bits if introspection is present Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  9:18   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 77/92] kvm: introspection: add trace functions Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 78/92] kvm: x86: add tracepoints for interrupt and exception injections Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 79/92] kvm: x86: emulate movsd xmm, m64 Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  9:17   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 80/92] kvm: x86: emulate movss xmm, m32 Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 81/92] kvm: x86: emulate movq xmm, m64 Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 82/92] kvm: x86: emulate movq r, xmm Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 83/92] kvm: x86: emulate movd xmm, m32 Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 84/92] kvm: x86: enable the half part of movss, movsd, movups Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 85/92] kvm: x86: emulate lfence Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 86/92] kvm: x86: emulate xorpd xmm2/m128, xmm1 Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 87/92] kvm: x86: emulate xorps xmm/m128, xmm Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 88/92] kvm: x86: emulate fst/fstp m64fp Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 89/92] kvm: x86: make lock cmpxchg r, r/m atomic Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 90/92] kvm: x86: emulate lock cmpxchg8b atomically Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 91/92] kvm: x86: emulate lock cmpxchg16b m128 Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 92/92] kvm: x86: fallback to the single-step on multipage CMPXCHG emulation Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-12 18:23 ` [RFC PATCH v6 00/92] VM introspection Sean Christopherson
2019-08-12 21:40 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-13  9:34 ` Paolo Bonzini

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