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From: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
To: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Cc: kbuild-all@lists.01.org,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	airlied@linux.ie, daniel@ffwll.ch, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
	viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	keescook@chromium.org, hpa@zytor.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] uaccess: Rename user_access_begin/end() to user_full_access_begin/end()
Date: Sat, 4 Apr 2020 15:17:16 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202004041553.uP3dQtU7%lkp@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <42da416106d5c1cf92bda1e058434fe240b35f44.1585898438.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>

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Hi Christophe,

Thank you for the patch! Yet something to improve:

[auto build test ERROR on linus/master]
[also build test ERROR on next-20200403]
[cannot apply to powerpc/next drm-intel/for-linux-next tip/x86/core v5.6]
[if your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, please drop us a note to help
improve the system. BTW, we also suggest to use '--base' option to specify the
base tree in git format-patch, please see https://stackoverflow.com/a/37406982]

url:    https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Christophe-Leroy/uaccess-Add-user_read_access_begin-end-and-user_write_access_begin-end/20200404-080555
base:   https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git 5364abc57993b3bf60c41923cb98a8f1a594e749
config: i386-allyesconfig (attached as .config)
compiler: gcc-7 (Ubuntu 7.5.0-6ubuntu2) 7.5.0
reproduce:
        # save the attached .config to linux build tree
        make ARCH=i386 

If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>

All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):

   arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c: In function 'save_v86_state':
>> arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c:116:7: error: implicit declaration of function 'user_access_begin'; did you mean 'user_access_end'? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
     if (!user_access_begin(user, vm86->vm86plus.is_vm86pus ?
          ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
          user_access_end
   cc1: some warnings being treated as errors

vim +116 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c

^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c   Linus Torvalds      2005-04-16   95  
5ed92a8ab71f88 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst         2015-07-29   96  void save_v86_state(struct kernel_vm86_regs *regs, int retval)
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c   Linus Torvalds      2005-04-16   97  {
ed0b2edb61ba4e arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst         2015-07-19   98  	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
ed0b2edb61ba4e arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst         2015-07-19   99  	struct vm86plus_struct __user *user;
9fda6a0681e070 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst         2015-07-29  100  	struct vm86 *vm86 = current->thread.vm86;
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c   Linus Torvalds      2005-04-16  101  
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c   Linus Torvalds      2005-04-16  102  	/*
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c   Linus Torvalds      2005-04-16  103  	 * This gets called from entry.S with interrupts disabled, but
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c   Linus Torvalds      2005-04-16  104  	 * from process context. Enable interrupts here, before trying
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c   Linus Torvalds      2005-04-16  105  	 * to access user space.
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c   Linus Torvalds      2005-04-16  106  	 */
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c   Linus Torvalds      2005-04-16  107  	local_irq_enable();
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c   Linus Torvalds      2005-04-16  108  
1342635638cba9 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst         2015-07-29  109  	if (!vm86 || !vm86->user_vm86) {
1342635638cba9 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst         2015-07-29  110  		pr_alert("no user_vm86: BAD\n");
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c   Linus Torvalds      2005-04-16  111  		do_exit(SIGSEGV);
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c   Linus Torvalds      2005-04-16  112  	}
decd275e62d5ee arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst         2015-07-29  113  	set_flags(regs->pt.flags, VEFLAGS, X86_EFLAGS_VIF | vm86->veflags_mask);
1342635638cba9 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst         2015-07-29  114  	user = vm86->user_vm86;
ed0b2edb61ba4e arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst         2015-07-19  115  
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro             2020-02-15 @116  	if (!user_access_begin(user, vm86->vm86plus.is_vm86pus ?
ed0b2edb61ba4e arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst         2015-07-19  117  		       sizeof(struct vm86plus_struct) :
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro             2020-02-15  118  		       sizeof(struct vm86_struct)))
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro             2020-02-15  119  		goto Efault;
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro             2020-02-15  120  
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro             2020-02-15  121  	unsafe_put_user(regs->pt.bx, &user->regs.ebx, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro             2020-02-15  122  	unsafe_put_user(regs->pt.cx, &user->regs.ecx, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro             2020-02-15  123  	unsafe_put_user(regs->pt.dx, &user->regs.edx, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro             2020-02-15  124  	unsafe_put_user(regs->pt.si, &user->regs.esi, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro             2020-02-15  125  	unsafe_put_user(regs->pt.di, &user->regs.edi, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro             2020-02-15  126  	unsafe_put_user(regs->pt.bp, &user->regs.ebp, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro             2020-02-15  127  	unsafe_put_user(regs->pt.ax, &user->regs.eax, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro             2020-02-15  128  	unsafe_put_user(regs->pt.ip, &user->regs.eip, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro             2020-02-15  129  	unsafe_put_user(regs->pt.cs, &user->regs.cs, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro             2020-02-15  130  	unsafe_put_user(regs->pt.flags, &user->regs.eflags, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro             2020-02-15  131  	unsafe_put_user(regs->pt.sp, &user->regs.esp, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro             2020-02-15  132  	unsafe_put_user(regs->pt.ss, &user->regs.ss, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro             2020-02-15  133  	unsafe_put_user(regs->es, &user->regs.es, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro             2020-02-15  134  	unsafe_put_user(regs->ds, &user->regs.ds, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro             2020-02-15  135  	unsafe_put_user(regs->fs, &user->regs.fs, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro             2020-02-15  136  	unsafe_put_user(regs->gs, &user->regs.gs, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro             2020-02-15  137  	unsafe_put_user(vm86->screen_bitmap, &user->screen_bitmap, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro             2020-02-15  138  
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro             2020-02-15  139  	user_access_end();
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c   Linus Torvalds      2005-04-16  140  
da51da189a24bb arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Andy Lutomirski     2017-11-02  141  	preempt_disable();
9fda6a0681e070 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst         2015-07-29  142  	tsk->thread.sp0 = vm86->saved_sp0;
ed0b2edb61ba4e arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst         2015-07-19  143  	tsk->thread.sysenter_cs = __KERNEL_CS;
252e1a0526304f arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Joerg Roedel        2018-07-18  144  	update_task_stack(tsk);
bd7dc5a6afac71 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Andy Lutomirski     2017-11-02  145  	refresh_sysenter_cs(&tsk->thread);
9fda6a0681e070 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst         2015-07-29  146  	vm86->saved_sp0 = 0;
da51da189a24bb arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Andy Lutomirski     2017-11-02  147  	preempt_enable();
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c   Linus Torvalds      2005-04-16  148  
5ed92a8ab71f88 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst         2015-07-29  149  	memcpy(&regs->pt, &vm86->regs32, sizeof(struct pt_regs));
49d26b6eaa8e97 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c   Jeremy Fitzhardinge 2006-12-07  150  
5ed92a8ab71f88 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst         2015-07-29  151  	lazy_load_gs(vm86->regs32.gs);
49d26b6eaa8e97 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c   Jeremy Fitzhardinge 2006-12-07  152  
5ed92a8ab71f88 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst         2015-07-29  153  	regs->pt.ax = retval;
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro             2020-02-15  154  	return;
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro             2020-02-15  155  
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro             2020-02-15  156  Efault_end:
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro             2020-02-15  157  	user_access_end();
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro             2020-02-15  158  Efault:
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro             2020-02-15  159  	pr_alert("could not access userspace vm86 info\n");
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro             2020-02-15  160  	do_exit(SIGSEGV);
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c   Linus Torvalds      2005-04-16  161  }
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c   Linus Torvalds      2005-04-16  162  

:::::: The code at line 116 was first introduced by commit
:::::: a37d01ead405e3aa14d72d284721fe46422b3b63 x86: switch save_v86_state() to unsafe_put_user()

:::::: TO: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
:::::: CC: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all@lists.01.org

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-04-04  7:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-04-03  7:20 [PATCH v2 1/5] uaccess: Add user_read_access_begin/end and user_write_access_begin/end Christophe Leroy
2020-04-03  7:20 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] uaccess: Selectively open read or write user access Christophe Leroy
2020-05-29  4:20   ` Michael Ellerman
2020-04-03  7:20 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] drm/i915/gem: Replace user_access_begin by user_write_access_begin Christophe Leroy
2020-05-29  4:20   ` Michael Ellerman
2020-04-03  7:20 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] powerpc/uaccess: Implement user_read_access_begin and user_write_access_begin Christophe Leroy
2020-05-29  4:24   ` Michael Ellerman
2020-04-03  7:20 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] uaccess: Rename user_access_begin/end() to user_full_access_begin/end() Christophe Leroy
2020-04-03 18:01   ` Linus Torvalds
2020-04-03 20:52     ` Al Viro
2020-04-21  2:49       ` Al Viro
2020-04-21  9:12         ` Russell King - ARM Linux admin
2020-04-21 18:34         ` Linus Torvalds
2020-04-05 18:47     ` Christophe Leroy
2020-04-04  6:20   ` kbuild test robot
2020-04-04  7:17   ` kbuild test robot [this message]
2020-05-29  4:20 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] uaccess: Add user_read_access_begin/end and user_write_access_begin/end Michael Ellerman

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