From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.8 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 94DBFC8300C for ; Wed, 29 Apr 2020 22:09:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: from kanga.kvack.org (kanga.kvack.org [205.233.56.17]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A645E214AF for ; Wed, 29 Apr 2020 22:09:07 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org A645E214AF Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=intel.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) id 7E2858E0012; Wed, 29 Apr 2020 18:08:48 -0400 (EDT) Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 40) id 71D958E000E; Wed, 29 Apr 2020 18:08:48 -0400 (EDT) X-Delivered-To: int-list-linux-mm@kvack.org Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 63042) id 4FDC38E0013; Wed, 29 Apr 2020 18:08:48 -0400 (EDT) X-Delivered-To: linux-mm@kvack.org Received: from forelay.hostedemail.com (smtprelay0110.hostedemail.com [216.40.44.110]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 37A8C8E0012 for ; Wed, 29 Apr 2020 18:08:48 -0400 (EDT) Received: from smtpin19.hostedemail.com (10.5.19.251.rfc1918.com [10.5.19.251]) by forelay02.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0727240DD for ; Wed, 29 Apr 2020 22:08:48 +0000 (UTC) X-FDA: 76762283136.19.fall93_128e65a0a4318 X-HE-Tag: fall93_128e65a0a4318 X-Filterd-Recvd-Size: 5803 Received: from mga06.intel.com (mga06.intel.com [134.134.136.31]) by imf19.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP for ; Wed, 29 Apr 2020 22:08:47 +0000 (UTC) IronPort-SDR: 6qTZErzN1RwDBcweChtaEEGoqHcCZOMd+DY4RtsaVVabhsiEicDC2HfA8FQRiGbjTZ/OKl1FdW PQxKmPwxSbYw== X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 29 Apr 2020 15:08:47 -0700 IronPort-SDR: p9cb/Q7S4xMy86CCEwnBcUwsVAc9j+7g/RmTBGqUUnl02LUmjD+QYT5MjQ5SwiptTEaO4qAsJC 62CDfEDdvf8g== X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.73,333,1583222400"; d="scan'208";a="276308893" Received: from yyu32-desk.sc.intel.com ([143.183.136.146]) by orsmga002.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 29 Apr 2020 15:08:46 -0700 From: Yu-cheng Yu To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann , Andy Lutomirski , Balbir Singh , Borislav Petkov , Cyrill Gorcunov , Dave Hansen , Eugene Syromiatnikov , Florian Weimer , "H.J. Lu" , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Mike Kravetz , Nadav Amit , Oleg Nesterov , Pavel Machek , Peter Zijlstra , Randy Dunlap , "Ravi V. Shankar" , Vedvyas Shanbhogue , Dave Martin , Weijiang Yang Cc: Yu-cheng Yu Subject: [PATCH v10 13/26] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2020 15:07:19 -0700 Message-Id: <20200429220732.31602-14-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0 In-Reply-To: <20200429220732.31602-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> References: <20200429220732.31602-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: Shadow stack accesses are those that are performed by the CPU where it expects to encounter a shadow stack mapping. These accesses are performe= d implicitly by CALL/RET at the site of the shadow stack pointer. These accesses are made explicitly by shadow stack management instructions like WRUSSQ. Shadow stacks accesses to shadow-stack mapping can see faults in normal, valid operation just like regular accesses to regular mappings. Shadow stacks need some of the same features like delayed allocation, swap and copy-on-write. Shadow stack accesses can also result in errors, such as when a shadow stack overflows, or if a shadow stack access occurs to a non-shadow-stack mapping. In handling a shadow stack page fault, verify it occurs within a shadow stack mapping. It is always an error otherwise. For valid shadow stack accesses, set FAULT_FLAG_WRITE to effect copy-on-write. Because clearing _PAGE_DIRTY_HW (vs. _PAGE_RW) is used to trigger the fault, shadow stack read fault and shadow stack write fault are not differentiated and both a= re handled as a write access. Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu Reviewed-by: Kees Cook --- v10: -Revise commit log. arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h index 9bf804709ee6..b4f4c725a350 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h @@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ enum { * bit 3 =3D=3D 1: use of reserved bit detected * bit 4 =3D=3D 1: fault was an instruction fetch * bit 5 =3D=3D 1: protection keys block access + * bit 6 =3D=3D 1: shadow stack access fault */ enum x86_pf_error_code { X86_PF_PROT =3D 1 << 0, @@ -176,5 +177,6 @@ enum x86_pf_error_code { X86_PF_RSVD =3D 1 << 3, X86_PF_INSTR =3D 1 << 4, X86_PF_PK =3D 1 << 5, + X86_PF_SHSTK =3D 1 << 6, }; #endif /* _ASM_X86_TRAPS_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c index a51df516b87b..a4a3c8f016f0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c @@ -1210,6 +1210,17 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_a= rea_struct *vma) (error_code & X86_PF_INSTR), foreign)) return 1; =20 + /* + * Verify a shadow stack access is within a shadow stack VMA. + * It is always an error otherwise. Normal data access to a + * shadow stack area is checked in the case followed. + */ + if (error_code & X86_PF_SHSTK) { + if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHSTK)) + return 1; + return 0; + } + if (error_code & X86_PF_WRITE) { /* write, present and write, not present: */ if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))) @@ -1367,6 +1378,14 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, =20 perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, regs, address); =20 + /* + * Clearing _PAGE_DIRTY_HW is used to detect shadow stack access. + * This method cannot distinguish shadow stack read vs. write. + * For valid shadow stack accesses, set FAULT_FLAG_WRITE to effect + * copy-on-write. + */ + if (hw_error_code & X86_PF_SHSTK) + flags |=3D FAULT_FLAG_WRITE; if (hw_error_code & X86_PF_WRITE) flags |=3D FAULT_FLAG_WRITE; if (hw_error_code & X86_PF_INSTR) --=20 2.21.0