From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 63BABC2BB84 for ; Thu, 3 Sep 2020 07:46:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: from kanga.kvack.org (kanga.kvack.org [205.233.56.17]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F3606208C7 for ; Thu, 3 Sep 2020 07:46:42 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="MF0yChXG" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org F3606208C7 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) id 509A46B006C; Thu, 3 Sep 2020 03:46:42 -0400 (EDT) Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 40) id 4B9826B006E; Thu, 3 Sep 2020 03:46:42 -0400 (EDT) X-Delivered-To: int-list-linux-mm@kvack.org Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 63042) id 3A8286B0070; Thu, 3 Sep 2020 03:46:42 -0400 (EDT) X-Delivered-To: linux-mm@kvack.org Received: from forelay.hostedemail.com (smtprelay0092.hostedemail.com [216.40.44.92]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1E7FD6B006C for ; Thu, 3 Sep 2020 03:46:42 -0400 (EDT) Received: from smtpin10.hostedemail.com (10.5.19.251.rfc1918.com [10.5.19.251]) by forelay04.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CC9F91E0A for ; Thu, 3 Sep 2020 07:46:41 +0000 (UTC) X-FDA: 77220968202.10.doll08_5507973270a7 Received: from filter.hostedemail.com (10.5.16.251.rfc1918.com [10.5.16.251]) by smtpin10.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9B3F816A06B for ; Thu, 3 Sep 2020 07:46:41 +0000 (UTC) X-HE-Tag: doll08_5507973270a7 X-Filterd-Recvd-Size: 8307 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by imf44.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP for ; Thu, 3 Sep 2020 07:46:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: from kernel.org (unknown [77.127.89.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 769A5206C0; Thu, 3 Sep 2020 07:46:31 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1599119199; bh=TM+Crt61G+Ba31blWDvtRLfW2Z9YrFGY3wqQAum69FQ=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=MF0yChXGd/fYnmNaBfXMyB3f9aoO7AYFy3Yxm15OKist2YnWvIrJDv6yYYWnoUPN7 3KGMOlzVwUUPwq8SItaWyQl5JTjaF1oF0P/NR62dyeRpeElV7VBo1Fs+nbHyCXZR3C GKujz+cNu0eyfNMXe39zrI6L+NlvvpdLt0ibHzLw= Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2020 10:46:27 +0300 From: Mike Rapoport To: Andrew Morton Cc: Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dan Williams , Dave Hansen , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Idan Yaniv , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Mark Rutland , Mike Rapoport , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , Thomas Gleixner , Tycho Andersen , Will Deacon , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Message-ID: <20200903074627.GA1213823@kernel.org> References: <20200818141554.13945-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20200818141554.13945-1-rppt@kernel.org> X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 9B3F816A06B X-Spamd-Result: default: False [0.00 / 100.00] X-Rspamd-Server: rspam05 X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: Any updates on this? On Tue, Aug 18, 2020 at 05:15:48PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote: > From: Mike Rapoport > > Hi, > > This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor. > > v4 changes: > * rebase on v5.9-rc1 > * Do not redefine PMD_PAGE_ORDER in fs/dax.c, thanks Kirill > * Make secret mappings exclusive by default and only require flags to > memfd_secret() system call for uncached mappings, thanks again Kirill :) > > v3 changes: > * Squash kernel-parameters.txt update into the commit that added the > command line option. > * Make uncached mode explicitly selectable by architectures. For now enable > it only on x86. > > v2 changes: > * Follow Michael's suggestion and name the new system call 'memfd_secret' > * Add kernel-parameters documentation about the boot option > * Fix i386-tinyconfig regression reported by the kbuild bot. > CONFIG_SECRETMEM now depends on !EMBEDDED to disable it on small systems > from one side and still make it available unconditionally on > architectures that support SET_DIRECT_MAP. > > > The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a > dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the > memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap() > of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret" > memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in > the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page > table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings. > > Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, > such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is > trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants > mappings. > > Additionally, the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect guest > memory in a virtual machine host. > > For demonstration of secret memory usage we've created a userspace library > [1] that does two things: the first is act as a preloader for openssl to > redirect all the OPENSSL_malloc calls to secret memory meaning any secret > keys get automatically protected this way and the other thing it does is > expose the API to the user who needs it. We anticipate that a lot of the > use cases would be like the openssl one: many toolkits that deal with > secret keys already have special handling for the memory to try to give > them greater protection, so this would simply be pluggable into the > toolkits without any need for user application modification. > > I've hesitated whether to continue to use new flags to memfd_create() or to > add a new system call and I've decided to use a new system call after I've > started to look into man pages update. There would have been two completely > independent descriptions and I think it would have been very confusing. > > Hiding secret memory mappings behind an anonymous file allows (ab)use of > the page cache for tracking pages allocated for the "secret" mappings as > well as using address_space_operations for e.g. page migration callbacks. > > The anonymous file may be also used implicitly, like hugetlb files, to > implement mmap(MAP_SECRET) and use the secret memory areas with "native" mm > ABIs in the future. > > As the fragmentation of the direct map was one of the major concerns raised > during the previous postings, I've added an amortizing cache of PMD-size > pages to each file descriptor and an ability to reserve large chunks of the > physical memory at boot time and then use this memory as an allocation pool > for the secret memory areas. > > v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200804095035.18778-1-rppt@kernel.org > v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200727162935.31714-1-rppt@kernel.org > v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200720092435.17469-1-rppt@kernel.org/ > rfc-v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200706172051.19465-1-rppt@kernel.org/ > rfc-v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200130162340.GA14232@rapoport-lnx/ > > Mike Rapoport (6): > mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER > mmap: make mlock_future_check() global > mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas > arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevant > mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation > mm: secretmem: add ability to reserve memory at boot > > arch/Kconfig | 7 + > arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 +- > arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 2 + > arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 1 + > arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h | 1 + > arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + > arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + > arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + > fs/dax.c | 11 +- > include/linux/pgtable.h | 3 + > include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 + > include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 7 +- > include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 + > include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h | 8 + > kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 + > mm/Kconfig | 4 + > mm/Makefile | 1 + > mm/internal.h | 3 + > mm/mmap.c | 5 +- > mm/secretmem.c | 451 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 20 files changed, 501 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h > create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c > > -- > 2.26.2 > -- Sincerely yours, Mike.